' AJMAL MIAN, C.J.--This High Court Appeal is directed against an order dated 28-9-1987 passed by a learned Single Judge in Execution Application No,88/1979 (Suit No,95 of 1973), allowing the respondents' prayer for execution of the decree for specific performance in respect of an immovable property obtained by late Ahmadul Haq Siddiqui, hereinafter referred to as the deceased decree-holder, the predecessor-in-interest of the respondents.
2. The brief facts leading to the filing of the above appeal are that the deceased decree-holder filed aforesaid Suit No,95 of 1973 for specific performance of a Sale Agreement dated 23-12-1972 for the sale of plot of land bearing No,SD-36, measuring 1,000 square yards situated in Block A, North Nazimabad, Karachi, for Rs,60,000. The above suit was decreed on 10-1-1979 in favour of the deceased decree-holder. After that on 18-3-1979 the deceased decree-holder filed the aforesaid Execution Application for the execution of the Sale-Deed and for the recovery of the cost of the suit.
It seems that the judgment-debtor, preferred High Court Appeal No,31 of 1979 against the above judgment and decree for specific performance dated 10-1-1979, which was dismissed by a Division Bench of this Court, against which the judgment-debtor filed Civil Petition for Leave to Appeal bearing No,CPLA K-269 of 1979, which was eventually dismissed. During the pendency of the above High Court Appeal and the petition for leave, the aforesaid Execution Application was stayed.
' It also appears that on 14-11-1984 the deceased decree-holder expired, leaving behind the respondents. The respondents were impleaded as the decree-holder in place of the deceased decree-holder. They filed CMA No,1323/85 praying therein that the sale-deed be executed in their names in place of the deceased decree-holder. The above application was opposed by the judgment-debtor, i.e, the present appellant, on the ground that, the respondents should first obtain a Succession Certificate in terms of section 214 of the Succession Act, 1925, hereinafter referred to as the Act. The learned Single Judge by the order under appeal overruled the objection and ordered that the decree relating to the specific performance of the aforesaid Sale Agreement is to be executed in favour of the respondents without obtaining a Succession Certificate but the portion of the decree relating to the cost will be executed, upon obtaining a Succession Certificate, in terms of the above, section of the Act by the respondents. The appellant being aggrieved by the above order has filed the present appeal.
3. In support of the above appeal, Mr. Nizam Ahmad learned counsel for the appellant has urged as under:
(i) That (he, word "debtors" used in section 214 of the Act has wide connotation and would include even a decree for specific performance, particularly, in view of the fact that subsection (2) of section 214 of the Act does not provide an exhaustive definition of the word 'debt'.
(ii) That if it is to be held that section 214 of the Act applies to money decrees only the provision of sub-clause (i) of clause (b) of Secfion 214 would be rendered redundant.
(iii) That since according to the learned Single Judge the object of providing the requirement for obtaining a Succession Certificate by the legal representatives of a deceased decree-holder before executing a money decree is to provide protection to the judgment-debtor from any future claim from any left out legal representative, the same is equally applicable to a decree for specific performance.
' On the other hand, Mr. Abrar Hasan learned counsel for the respondents has submitted as under:
(i) That the word 'debt' has been defined in subsection (2) of section 214 of the Act, which does not include any other liability than the payment of money and that even if it is to be considered that the above subsection (2) does not provide exhaustive definition of the word 'debt', the Court will have to give ordinary meaning to the above word.
(ii) That sub-clause (i) of clause (b) of subsection (1) of section 214 of the Act does not become redundant if we were to hold that the above section is applicable to money decree only.
(iii) That there is a marked distinction between a money decree and a decree for specific performance and, therefore, the reason for providing the requirement to obtain a Succession Certificate by the legal representatives of a decree-holder before executing is not present in the case of other decrees than the money decree.
4. Adverting to the first submission of the learned counsel for the parties, in our view, it will be advantageous to reproduce above section 214 of the Act, around which the controversy in issue is resolved, which reads as follows:- "214. Proof of representative title a condition precedent to recovery through the Courts of debts from debtors of deceased persons. (1) No Court shall:-
(a) pass a decree against a debtor of a deceased person for payment of his debt to a person claiming on succession to be entitled to the effects of the deceased person or to any part thereof; or
(b) proceed, upon an application of a person claiming to be so entitled, to execute against such a debtor a decree or order for the payment of his debt, except on the production, by the person so claiming, of:-
(i) a probate or letters of administration evidencing the grant to him of administration to the estate of the deceased; or
(ii) a certificate granted under section 31 or section 32 of the Administrator General's Act, 1913, and _having the debt mentioned therein; or
(iii) a succession certificate granted under Part X and having the debt specified therein; or
(iv) a certificate granted under the. Succession Certificate Act, 1889; or
(v) a certificate granted under Bombay Regulation No, VIII of 1827, and, if granted after the first day of May, 1889, having the debt specified therein.
(2) The word 'debt' in subsection (1) includes any debt except rent, revenue or profit payable in respect of land used for agricultural purposes."
' It may be noticed that subsection (1) of above-quoted section has two parts, namely, the first part prohibits a Court from passing a decree in.Favour of legal representatives of a deceased creditor against a debtor or proceeding upon an application of the legal representatives of a deceased decree-holder, whereas the second part provides the requirement which is to be complied with before decree in favour of legal representatives of a deceased creditor can be passed or executed namely, the production of any one of the following certificates/ documents:
(i) a probate or letters of administration evidencing the grant to him of administration to the estate of the deceased; or
(ii) a certificate granted under section 31 or section 32 of the Administrator General's Act, 1913, and having the debt mentioned therein; or
(iii) a succession certificate granted under Part X and having the debt specified therein; or
(iv) a certificate granted under the Succession Certificate Act, 1889; or
(v) a certificate granted under Bombay Regulation No,VIII of 1827 and, if granted after the first day of May, 1889, having the debt specified therein. It may further be noticed that the word 'debt' has been defined in subsection (2) by providing that debt referred to in subsection (1) includes any debt except rent, revenue or profit payable in respect of land used for agricultural purposes.
5. Mr. Nizam Ahmad in furtherance of his above first submission has referred to clause (10) of section 2 of the Civil Procedure Code which defines the term "judgment-debtor" as means any person against whom a decree has been passed or an order capable of execution has been made: It has, therefore, been contended by him that the definition of the above term given in the C.P.C.
Does not restrict its meaning to a money decree but embraces all types of decrees.
' In our view, the above submission is devoid of any force for more than one reason, firstly, that the term "judgment-debtor" has not been employed in section 214 of the Act and secondly, that while A construing the provisions of the Act, we cannot import the definition given in the C .P. C. Unless the same is made applicable by any provision of the Act.
6. It seems to be a well-settled principle of interpretation of statutes that a word used in a provision of a- statute is to be given the meaning if defined by the statute itself or its ordinary or literary meaning. In the present case subsection (2) of section 214 of the Act defines the word by providing that it includes any debt except rent, revenue or profit payable in respect of land used for agricultural purposes. The above definition will cover all types of debts except rent, revenue or profit payable in respect of land used for agricultural purposes. However, the word 'debt' has not been given any special meaning in the above subsection (2) of section 214 of the Act and, therefore, we will have to refer to its ordinary meaning given in English dictionaries.
' The. Chambers Twentieth Century Dictionary revised edition defines the word 'debt' as what one owes to another: a state of obligation or indebtedness; what one becomes liable to do or suffer: a duty.
' Whereas Black's Law Dictionary fourth edition gives the definition of the above word 'debt' as a sum of money due to certain and express agreement; as by bond- for a determinate sum, a bill or note, a special bargain, or a rent reserved on a lease, where the amount is fixed and specific, and does not depend upon any subsequent valuation to settle it. It also gives the definition of the above word with reference to various decided cases which pertain to monetary obligation.
' Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, Third Edition, defines the word 'debt' by providing that it is a sum payable in respect of a liquidated money demand, recoverable by action. It also gives the definition with reference to the decided cases which indicate that the same related to monetary obligation.
' Both the learned counsel appearing for the parties have referred to the following two cases:
(i) Mst. Khatija Begum and others v. Haji Gulzar Ahmad, PLD 1969 Karachi 141, in which a learned Single Judge of the erstwhile High Court of West Pakistan held that there is consensus of judicial opinion that the legal representatives should obtain succession certificate before proceeding with the execution of the decree. In support of the above conclusion, the learned Single Judge has referred to several decisions of the various High Courts in pre-partition India, namely, Bhagwan Manaji Marwadi and others v. Hiraji Premaji Marwadi, AIR 1932 Bom.516; Abdul Majeed and others v.
Shamsherali Fakruddin AIR 1940 Born. 285; Secretary of State v. Grindra Nath Saha and others AIR 1938 Cal. 445; Sri Sri Kalyani Prasad Singh Deo Bahadur v. Mahadev Roy and others 197 IC 461; Hari Chand Radha Kishan and another v. Tara Chand AIR 1943 Pesh. 42; Jadaobai v. Puranmal and others AIR 1944 Nag.243; Teraj Rajmal Marwadi and others v. Rampyari AIR 1938 Nag. 528; Thoma Chacko v. Koshi Varghese and another AIR 1956 TC 183; Narayana Pillai Narayana Pillai v..
Eravi Narayana Panicker and others AIR 1957 TC 147. It has also been pointed out by the learned single Judge in the above case that in the case of Muhammad Yusuf v. Rahim Bepari and others (1899) ILR 26 Ca1.839, Kshetra Mohan Paddar and others v. Azizullah Mea and others AIR 1920 Ca1.580; Ghulam Hussain v. Emperor AIR 1936 Pesh.16; Raghubir Narain Singh v. Raj Rajeshwari Prasad Singh and others AIR 1957 Pat. 435 and the case of Jogendra Kishore Sarkar v. Gajendra Kumar Nandi and others PLD 1960 Dacca 617, it has been held that succession certificate is not necessary by the legal representatives of a decree-holder if the decree-holder dies during the pendency of the execution proceedings. However it has further been pointed out that in the case of Teraj Rajmal Marwadi and others v . Rampyari AIR 1938 Nag. 528, and in the case of Thoma Chacko v.. Koshi Varghese and another AIR. 1956 TC 183 the Nagpur and Travancore-Cochin High Courts respectively have dissented from the latter view and held that even in the pending execution application in a money decree the legal representatives cannot proceed without obtaining a certificate specified under section 214 of the Act.
(ii) Muhammad Bashir v. M.A. Footwear, 1985 CLC 2698. In the above case a learned Single Judge of this Court held that a pending execution application is not excluded from purview of section 214 of the Act and in case of death of the decree-holder the provisions of Section 214 are immediately attracted to and the Court cannot pass any order without production of a succession certificate by the legal representatives. It may be observed that from the above-reported judgment it is not clear as to whether the execution pertained to the money decree or of any other type of decree.
However, Mr. Abrar ' Hassan has produced a copy of the plaint of the suit giving rise to the filing of the aforesaid Execution Application, which is the subject-matter of the above-reported case which indicates that it was a money decree as the suit was for the recovery of Rs,3,17,104.94. In the above- cited case the learned Single Judge opted to follow the view which found favour with the majority of the High Courts during pre-partition and post-partition India and in Indo-Pak.
' Mr. Abrar Hasan has also referred to the following cases:-
(i) Sabju Sahib v. Noordin Sahib and others, The Indian Law Reports Madras Volume 22 page 139 in which the majority view seems to be that if a suit does not involve recovery of any debt the requirement of obtaining a certificate under section 4 of the Succession Certificate Act, 1889 is not attracted to. Shephard, Officiating C.J. With whom Subramania, J. Agreed, observed as follows:- "The question, then, is whether the claim which the plaintiff is prosecuting is a debt within the meaning of that Act. There is no reason for supporting that the term 'debt' was used in any but the ordinary sense, except perhaps that it may be said that persons chargeable in respect of claims other than debts in the proper sense have no less need of protection than persons who are strictly debtors of the deceased. The present claim is to have an account taken of the partnership business that was carried on between the deceased and others and to have the share of the deceased partner paid over to the plaintiff as his representative. It is quite clear that this is not a debt, for there was at the time of the death no present obligation to pay a liquidated sum of money. The claim is one about which there is no certainty; it may turn out that there is nothing due to the plaintiff. I think that, in construing the section, regard must be had to the state of things at the time of the intestate's death and not at the time when the decree is passed. On the decree being passed, there is in every case where the claim is for money a judgment debt created.
Different language would have been used, if it had been intended to bring all such cases within the operation of section 4. In so far then as the direction to take out letters was founded on the nature of the plaintiff's claim, I do not think it can be supported. But in his plaint, the plaintiff himself expressed his willingness to take out letters, and it is not improbable that advances may have been made by the intestate to the other members of the firm which would constitute a debt.
' Under these circumstances, I think it would be sufficient to modify the decree by providing that if the plaintiff, when the account has been completely taken, satisfies the Court that there is no debt owing by the defendants to the deceased, he shall be relieved from the obligation to take out letters of administration."
(ii) Geneshmal v. Smt. Anand Kanwar and others, AIR 1968 Rajasthan 273 (V 55 C 53), in which a Division Bench of the Rajasthan High Court held that even in a pending execution application the legal representatives of the deceased decree-holder for a money decree are required to obtain a certificate in terms of section 214 of the Act. It was also observed that the main purpose of section 214 is to protect the debtor from vexatious proceedings and from being harassed at different times by different persons, claiming to be the successors of the plaintiff or decree-holder.
7. There seems to be consensus of judicial opinion that in case of death of a plaintiff in a suit for recovery of money, if the plaintiff dies during the pendency of the suit the legal representatives cannot prosecute the suit without first obtaining any one of the certificates specified in section 214 of the Act but there seems to be divergence of view, on the question whether a certificate in terms of section 214 of the Act is required if a decree-holder during the pendency of an execution application dies as pointed out by Noorul Arfin, J. In the above case of Mst. Khatija Begum and others v. Haji Gulzar Ahmad (PLD 1969 Kar.141). However, it is evident that most of the High Courts have taken the view that if a decree-holder dies during the pendency of an execution application for a money decree the legal representatives are obliged to obtain one of the certificates specified in the above-quoted section 214 of the Act. Same view found favour with Saeeduzzaman Siddiqui, J.
In the above-reported case of Muhammad Bashir v. M.A . Footwear, 1985 CLC 2698.
' There seems to be no other reported case other than the reported case of Sabju Sahib v. Noordin Sahib and others, The Indian Law Reports Madras, Volume 22 page 139 on the point in controversy in the present case. The majority view in the above Madras case, as pointed out hereinabove seems to be that if the subject-matter of a suit is not claim for money the requirement to obtain a certificate under the Succession Act is not attracted to. The dictionary meanings of the word 'debt' referred to hereinabove given in Stroud's Judicial Dictionary and Black's Law Dictionary with reference to decided cases indicate that the above word is used for money claim and not in relation to any other obligation. However, the definition given in the Chambers Twentieth Century Dictionary does support the submission of Mr. Nizam Ahmad to some extent.
8. We are inclined to hold that tenor of the above-quoted section 214 clearly indicates that the requirement to produce any one of the certificates specified in sub-clauses (i) to (v) of clause (b) of subsection (1) of section 214 is attracted for the recovery of debts from debtors of deceased persons either in a pending suit or in execution of an application for a money decree and it is not applicable to any other type of suit or execution application. The above conclusion is fortified by the factum that the word 'debt' has been defined in subsection (2) of section 214 as having meaning in relation to money claims.
9. As regards the above second submission of the learned counsel for the parties, we are unable to subscribe to the submission made by Mr. Nizam Ahmed that the provision contained in sub-clause
(i) of clause (b) of subsection (1) of section 214 has been rendered redundant on account of the view found favour with the learned Single Judge. We may point out that the requirement under section 214 is not that the legal representatives of a deceased plaintiff in a money suit or in an execution application for money decree should produce a succession certificate, but it contemplates the production of any of the certificates/documents mentioned in the above- quoted sub-clauses (i) to (v) of clause (b) of subsection (1) of section 214 which include probate or letters of administration. We may point out that a probate or letters of administration covers the entire estate of a deceased which will include the right to recover any money claim in a pending suit or in an execution application for a money decree and, therefore, it has been provided that if a legal representative inter alia produces a probate or letters of administration in a suit pending for the recovery of a debt from debtor of deceased person or in an execution application, the same will be sufficient. But it does not lead to an inference that mentioning of inter alia probate and letters of administration in the above section 214 will make the latter applicable to an execution application in respect of an immovable property like a suit for specific performance or an execution application in respect thereof.
' In our view the above sub-clause (i) of clause (b) does not control the first part of subsection (1) of section 214, which provides that no Court would pass a decree against a debtor of a deceased person in payment of his debt to a person claiming on succession to be entitled to or proceed upon an application of a person claiming to be so entitled to execute against such a debtor a decree or order for the payment of his debt.
10. Reverting to the third submission of Mr. Nizam Ahmad, we may observe that there is a marked difference between a money decree and a decree for specific performance, inasmuch as, in the former case if some of the legal representatives are omitted either deliberately or inadvertently from being impleaded in a suit or an execution application and some of the legal representatives obtain the decretal amount, it may be difficult to rectify the above legal infirmity, but in the latter case comparatively it will be easier to rectify the above omission as in a decree for specific performance the sale-deed is to be executed in favour of the legal representatives and if some of the legal representatives are left out deliberately or inadvertently the above mistake can be rectified by including their names at a subsequent stage by filing appropriate proceedings. Even otherwise, in our view, it is not necessary for us to go into the object of providing the requirement of obtaining any one of the certificates mentioned in section 214 in a proceeding for recovery of debts from debtors of a deceased person by the legal representatives of the deceased if the language of the section is clear. We do not find any ambiguity in above section 214 and, therefore, the question as to the object is merely academic and the matter of surmises and conjectures.
11. Then it was contended by Mr. Nizam Ahmad that there cannot be bifurcation of a decree as has been done by the learned Single Judge by holding that the portion of the ecree relating to the specific performance can be executed without obtaining a certificate under section 214 of the Act but the portion of the decree relating to recovery of cost cannot be executed without obtaining a certificate specified in the above section. The above submission has not impressed us as it is possible that the decree-holders may not consider it economical to obtain one of the certificates specified in section 214 for executing the portion of the decree relating to cost which may be hardly few thousands and they may be contented with the execution of the portion of the decree relating to specific performance. Even otherwise, there is nothing illegal in bifurcating of the above two portions of the decree.
12. The upshot of the above' discussion is that the above appeal has no merits and, it is dismissed but there will be no order as to costs.