1. ' Applicant Basar seeks bail in a case registered under section 392, P.P.C. Read with section 17(3) of the Offences Against Property (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, (VI of 1979). It is alleged by the prosecution that on 11-4-1989 a convoy of four NLC tankers was going to fill in oil from Leghari village. On the way, about 4 Kms. Away from Sujawal Badin Road, a private bus was found parked on the road, resulting in the stoppage of the convoy, whereafter four persons, out of whom two were armed with .12 bore pistols and two with hatchets, their faces un-covered and visible in the light of the oil tankers, approached from the front of the private bus. This was followed by firing in the air and, subsequent denuding the tanker drivers of their cash and watches. During the investigation footprints of the culprits were also shown to a tracker. The applicant was arrested on 12-4-1989 and was picked out, by all the four victims, in an identification test, held on 25-4-1989, under the supervision of a Magistrate. The tracker also identified applicant's footprints in a test, duly held. Bail is sought on the ground of delay in holding the identification test. No other ground was urged at the bar except a faint reference to delay in lodging the F.I.R., which seems to be explainable by the complainant, in the face of official commitments and, on assumption of official duty, proceeding to obtain clearance from the relevant officer in the N.L.C. It is to be noted that common-place short delays in lodging F.I.R. Are, generally, not fatal and the concept of delay becomes relevant, normally, where it generates suspicion of a trumped up charge, founded on ill- motives. This, at this stage, cannot be assumed in the present case.
2. ' Application for bail having been dismissed by the Incharge Sessions Judge, Thatta, the applicant has approached this Court.
3. ' Learned counsel for the applicant, in the context of the delayed identification test relies on the decision of this Court in Bago v. The State 1984 P Cr. L J 3229 and Akhtar Muhammad v. The State 1987 P Cr. L J 243. In the first of these cases Zafar Hussain Mirza, J., while in this Court, allowed bails, inter alia, on the grounds, that, at the time, there was no evidence connecting the applicants with the incident except the identification test, that the accused were arrested on 21-3-1981 while the identification test was held on 5-4-1981 and that there was no allegation in the F.I.R. Of any property having been robbed by the applicants. The Honourable Judge, in holding the case to be one for further inquiry and allowing bails, referred to the cases reported as Zulfiqar Ali and another v. The State 1968 P Cr. L J 1976 and Inayat and another v. The State 1975 P Cr. L J 1271. It may bear mention here that in the case of Inayat Ibid identification test was not relied upon as the accused were taken to the police station to afford an opportunity to the prosecution witnesses to see them in order to facilitate identification. In the second case referred to by the learned counsel namely, that of Akhtar Muhammad, bail was granted, discarding the identification test, on the grounds amongst others, that the Mashirnama of identification was signed by the A.S.I., who was the Investigating Officer in the case, thus contravening the ratio in the case of Ali Ahmed v. State 1987 MLD 2592.
4. Other grounds in that case were recovery of currency notes, which were in common circulation, still remaining to be connected with the offence, and delay in holding the identification test, during the intervening period, the accused having been taken out of custody on two occasions for obtaining remands.
5. The above cases, I am afraid, are clearly distinguishable. The rule in the matter of identification tests seems to be one of commonsense and prudence. It is calculated to ensure identification of accused free from all reasonable doubt. All precautions are to be observed to fore-stall any possible manipulations from the side of an over-zealous police force. It is thus that any undue delay in holding B such a test is warily looked at. Supervision by a judicial functionary in the conduct of these tests has similar motivations. All these are, however, safeguards evolved through judicial precedents since the law of procedure as recognised in a recent Division Bench case of this Court reported as Muhammad Yusaf Zai v. The State PLD 1988 Kar. 539, is altogether silent in this behlaf.
6. ' The case-law on the subject postulates that if an identification test is all that there is, conflating the accused with the crime, and such test is held, without explaining the delay, if any, in circumstances which lead to an inference that time was consumed to, in advance, reveal the identity of the accused to the prosecution witnesses, the case becomes one of further enquiry and accused, in the absence of other material, becomes entitled to bail. Similar results are to follow where identification parade is bereft of independent judicial supervision. Provision as to due number of dummies is also likewise evolved and has similar objectives in contemplation.
7. ' In the instant case, the accused was taken in custody on 12-4-1989, remand was obtained on 13- 4-1989 and identification test was held on 25-4-1989, when all the four N.L.C. Drivers successfully picked out the accused. It is not only conceivable but likely that such time was consumed in securing the presence of the relevant witnesses who, on account of their roving duties, are almost always expected to be on the highways and all of them had to come together in order to hold the identification. There is no previous enmity between the parties and the accused, for remand, was taken only once out of police custody. Recoveries, made from the accused in the case, consist of Golden Seiko watch, two pistols, two hatchets and currency notes, out of which one hatchet has been recovered from the present applicant. In addition, the tracker, whose services were utilised, has also been able to identify and co-relates the footprints of the applicant with those found at the place of incident. It is thus clear that the identification test alone has neither been solely relied upon to connect the applicant with the crime nor has the delay in holding it remained unexplained nor is there any circumstance of manipulation of the identification test, with a view to, mala fide, implicate the present applicant.
8. ' In this view of the matter, I do not consider this case to be one of further enquiry or fit for grant of bail at this stage of the proceedings. This bail application, therefore, is dismissed.
9. ' Before parting with the case, it has to be observed that the Additional Advocate-General, who appeared in this case, conceded to the grant of bail but, even so, it is always an obligation of the Court to examine the cases on merits, particularly those involving serious offences, a Highway robbery being one such offence, and if a different conclusion is drawn bail can still be disallowed, as has been done in this case.