1. KHUDA BAKHSH A. KAZI (CHAIRMAN).-On 2nd September 1972 the above-named applicant filed an application under section 34 of the I. R. O., 1969 against the above-named respondents in this Court.
2. In the application the applicant prayed that the matter be adjudicated and he may be, held to be entitled to allowances in addition to salary for extra duty of work. He further prayed that through injunction the respondents be restrained from ousting the applicant from service without permission of this Court, Alongwith the said application an application under Order XXXIX, rules 1 and 2 read with section 151, C. P. C. andsection 36(2) of I. R. O., 1969 was filed on behalf of the applicant wherein it was prayed that temporary injunction be issued against the respondents from altering to the disadvantage the service condi--tions/status and position of the applicant without prior permission of this Court or during the pendency of this proceeding in any manner including termination or dismissal from service. This application is supported by the affidavit of applicant Muhammad Ibrahim.
3. Mr. S. S. Dhunjeebhoy, Administration Manager of the respondents filed his counter-affidavit in which he denied all allegationsmade by the applicant in his application and the supporting affidavit. He further explains that on 21st August 1972, the respondents agreed to pay a monthly conveyance allowanceof Rs. 25.00 to the applicant with effect from 1 August 1972solely for the purpose of the performance of his dutiesfor the transport of certain members of the staff of the respondents from their residences to the office and vice versa. He has attached true copy of the letter dated 22nd August 1972. The applicant was informed that the said allowance could not be paid to him during the period of his leave or in the event of his being discharged from performingst his said duties. However, at the time of disbursement of wages on 31st August 1972, the applicant insisted that the said conveyance allowance should not be paid-to him separately and that the same should be consolidat--ed with his salary. This demand was not accepted by the respondents, whereupon the applicant refused to carry out his duties. On his refusal he was suspended. At first the applicantrefused to accept the suspension notice but on the second thought accepted the same and left the respondent's office. The applicant, however, returned to the office shortly thereafter, and entered the office of the Sales Manager without permission, grabbed forcefully the signed office copy of the suspension notice and tore the same into pieces. A true copy of the report of Sales Manager has also been filed with the counter-affidavit. Since the act of the appli--cant came under the mischief of misconduct a show-cause notice was despatched to him as required under Standing Order 15. A true copyof the show-cause notice has been filed with the counter-affidavit.A fresh suspension notice was also despatched to himby registered post, true copy of which has also been filed. After receiving the fresh notice of suspension the applicant filed application under section 34 of I. R. O., 1969 and the present application.He has categorically denied that any threat was given to the applicant. The action if any could be taken against him after following the procedure laid down in law. He has challenged the maintainability of the applicationunder section 34 of I. R. O., 1969 on the ground that the respondents have not interfered with or violated any right guaranteed or secured to the applicant under any law, award or settlement. Finally he assorts that the present application can only be considered by this Court under the provisions of section 36 (2) of I. R. O., 1960: Since section 43 of the I. R. O., 1969 provided that no Industrial dispute shall be deemed to exist unless it has on raised in the prescribed manner by the collective bargaining agent (or an employer) and since the dispute raised by the appli--cant has not been raised under the terms of section. 43 of the ordinance, the alleged dispute would not constitute an industrial dispute.
4. I have then heard the learned Representatives of the parties on this application.
5. The case of the applicant is disclosed in his application and his supporting affidavit. The respondents on the other hand have denied all the accusations and allegations in the counter- affidavit. Besides, various legal objections have been raised. The most important of the objec-- tions is that section 36(2) of I. R. O., 1969 empowers this Court to adjudicate and determine an industrial dispute and for that pur--pose it would have powers of a civil Court. Section 43 of I. R. O., 1969 lays downs how an industrial dispute is raised. It says that no industrial dispute shall be deemed to exist unless It has been raised in the prescribed manner by the collective bargaining agent (or an employer). In the instant case the matter is under enquiry by the Management for the alleged misconduct of the applicant. It has yet to be determined by the enquiry officer if the applicant was guilty of misconduct.
6. I have considered all aspects of the case. I have gone through the application, the affidavit and the counter-affidavit. I have considered the arguments advanced by the learned Represen--tatives of the parties. It is true that this Court sits as a civil Court under section 36 (2) of the Ordinance for adjudicating and determining an Industrial dispute and industrial dispute under section 43 of the Ordinance could be raised in the prescribed manner by the collective bargaining agent (or an employer). The present case is not covered by A these provision. Even otherwise since final action has not been taken by the authorities concerned against the applicant for his alleged misconduct, I consider this application to be pre--mature. Consequently I find no force. In this application. Thus I vacate the order of status quo passed on 5th September 1972 and dismiss application under Order XXXIX, rules 1 and 2 read with section 151, C. P. C, and section 36 (2) of the I. R. O., 1969 without cost.