1. ' SAJJAD ALI SHAH, J.--In this appeal is called in question judgment dated 29th June, 1986 of learned Single Judge, whereby suit is decreed for Rs .99,855.79 against defendants jointly and severally with costs, who have filed this appeal.
2. ' Briefly stated relevant facts giving rise to this appeal are that Bazm-e-Salat, which is a Religious Social Organization operated current account No,152 in U.B.L. And was allowed over-draft from time to time. Ultimately there was a debit balance amounting to Rs,43,610.79 on 13-6-1971. Bazm-e-Salat applied for loan of Rs,50,000 in April, 1971, which was granted without interest on the ground that functions performed by loanee were of religious and social nature. Bazm-e-Salat executed promissory note on 14-4-1971 for Rs,50,000 at the rate of 4% over and above the State Bank of Pakistan published rate of interest with a minimum of 10% with quarterly rests. In spite of repeated advices for the liquidation of liability, Bazm-e-Salat did not respond but however, admitted their liability in writing on 11-6-1973 and promised to have the matter sorted out by the managing committee. On 14-7-1973 Bazm-e-Salat executed promissory note for a sum of Rs,99,855.79 with interest at the rate of 5% over and above the State Bank of Pakistan published rate of interest with a minimum of 10%. Per annum with quarterly rests. After repeated persistent demands from the Bank, Syed Azhar Sajjad, President of Bazm-e-Salat, agreed to provi,de further security and signed a fresh promissory note dated 30-6-1975 for a sum of Rs,99,855.79 with interest accrued thereon at the rate of 5% over and above the State Bank of Pakistan published rate of interest with a minimum of 10% per annum with quarterly rests. No deposits were made either in over-draft account or loan account. Interest charges were reversed on 5-10-1977 and in the over-draft account an amount of Rs,49,906.99 was shown as outstanding balance and in the loan account an amount of Rs,50,000 was shown as payable. Legal notices were also issued but without success and consequently suit was filed on 29-3-1978 under Order 37, C.P.C. On 17th August, 1978 amended memo. Of plaint was filed.
3. ' Suit was contested and written statement was filed in which a number of legal preliminary objections were taken including the one that suit is barred by limitation. Objection was taken that Syed Mazhar Sajjad signed guarantee in his official capacity as President Bazm-e-Salat and not in his private capacity. It was further stated in the written statement that over-draft and loan were sanctioned by previous management of the Bank before take-over by the Government and previously assurance was given that since Bazm-e-Salat was religious and social organisation, liability would be converted into donation and would be liquidated. Objection was taken that bank has no authority to "fill in the date-30-6-1975 and amount of Rs,99,855.79" in the letter of guarantee which is not a negotiable instrument. It was further stated in the written statement that since both promissory note and letter of guarantee dated 30-6-1975 had been executed in February/March, 1974, hence suit filed in respect of them was barred by time.
4. ' On 13-1-1979 with consent of the counsel appearing for parties the following issues were framed:--
(1) Whether the suit is barred by time?
(2) Whether the defendant No,2 (Syed Mazhar Sajjad) is a guarantor?
(3) Whether plaintiffs agreed with defendants that in due course they would convert the amount of loan into donation?
(4) Relief?
5. ' In order passed by the trial Court on the date mentioned above it was directed that issue No,1 would be tried as preliminary issue. On 30-4-1979 plaintiffs in the suit examined Syed Tariq Ali, Second Officer in U.B.L. North Nazimabad Branch (Ex.5), who produced account opening form of defendant No,1 (Bazm-e-Salat) as Ex. 5/1, statements of Accounts in respect of over-draft and loan Exhs.5/2 and 5/3, promissory note dated 14-4-1971 Ex.5/4, promissory note dated 14-7-1973 Ex.5/5, debit confirmation slip Ex.5/6, another confirmation slip executed by Treasurer of defendant No,1 Ex.5/7 and another promissory note dated 30-6-1975 signed by General Secretary and Treasurer of defendant No,1 Ex.5/8. This witness further deposed that the last document Ex.518 was signed in blank by General Secretary and Treasurer of defendant No,1 and these blanks were filled in by the Bank on 30-6-1975 before the filing of the suit. Defendant No,1 did not inform the Bank about death of their General Secretary. Witness further testified that name of the office-bearer of defendant No,1, who died was Mr. Sarfraz. Witness further produced copies of three notices Exhs. 5/10 to Ex.5/12 and reply from defendant No,1 Ex.5/13. He further stated that Bank did not charge interest for the reason that defendant No,1 is a religiouscum-charitable. Association.
6. ' After the evidence of the witness above was recorded on 30-4-1979, plaintiffs in suit made it known that they wished not to examine any other witness on the preliminary issue and reserved their right to lead further evidence on other issues. Mr. Hassan Akbar, Advocate appearing for defendant in the suit informed the Court that he would examine one witness on the preliminary issue on the next date of hearing. On 23-10-1979 Mr. Hassan Akbar made statement before the Court that defendants Nos.1 and 2 did not wish to lead any evidence on preliminary issue. In such circumstances the Court ordered that the case should be fixed for arguments. On 11-11-1981 none was present for plaintiffs and arguments of Mr. Hassan Akbar, Advocate for defendants were heard and judgment was reserved. Subsequently, order sheet of 29-2-1982 shows that the learned Single Judge realised that evidence was brought on record in respect of preliminary issue only while arguments of Mr. Hassan Akbar were heard on all issues. For that reason notices were issued to the learned counsel for the parties for 9th February, 1982. On that date Mr. Hassan Akbar, Advocate for the defendants filed statement in writing to the effect that since preliminary issue is such that a decision thereon would decide the whole suit, defendants craved that hearing on preliminary issue may be treated as regular hearing and judgment may be passed specially because no further evidence is to be led. On the said application there is recorded note by counsel for plaintiffs in which it is stated, that since document Exhs. E-1 and G-1 are admitted in the written statement, plaintiffs in the suit also do not propose to lead any further evidence as such hearing was adjourned for production of list of citations. It appears from the order sheet that thereafter this matter was adjourned from time to time and on some occasions arguments were heard also and finally judgment was delivered on 29-2-1986 decreeing the suit for Rs,99,855.79 against defendants jointly and severally with costs, which is impugned in this appeal.
7. ' During the hearing of the appeal before us, we have heard at length Mr. Hassan Akbar, Advocate for appellants and Mr. Inamul Haq, Advocate for respondent Bank. It was submitted on behalf of appellants that they were under the impression that liability would be converted into donation and would be liquidated and such assurance was given to them. In the written statement more light is shed on this assertion and in paragraph 4 details are given to the effect that both loan and overdraft were sanctioned by the previous management of the Bank prior to its take-over by the Government. Appellants have produced no proof in support of that assertion. It is not known as to who in the previous management gave such assurance. It is not known whether that assurance was oral or in writing. This objection has no force for the reason that appellants voluntarily refused to lead any evidence before the trial Court.
8. ' It was submitted on behalf of appellants that original letter of guarantee and notice of demand were not produced and were not exhibited on the record. It appears that probably this had happened on account of the reason that initially respondent Bank before the trial Court examined one witness in support of preliminary issue only which was to the effect whether suit was time- barred or not. Bank had reserved its right to produce further evidence on other issues. Appellants first declined to produce evidence on preliminary issue and then declined to produce evidence at all and requested that since preliminary issue was such that it would decide the whole suit, hence Court was requested to give decision in respect of the suit on the basis of arguments already made by their counsel on all issues without production of evidence. Furthermore, stand taken by appellants in the trial Court is reflected in the application dated 9-2-1982 which was filed by their counsel in the Court and on the said application counsel for the Bank wrote a note that photostat copies of the documents mentioned above were available in the record as Annexures E-1 and G-1 which were admitted in the written statement by defendants in the suit, hence the Advocate also agreed not to produce further evidence and in the disposal of suit as requested by appellants. In the circumstances it could be said that in the trial Court appellants did not insist upon production of original documents.
9. ' It was submitted on behalf of appellants that Syed Azhar Sajjad defendant No,2 in the suit had signed letter of guarantee not in his private capacity but in his official capacity. This fact is admitted in paragraph 2 of the written statement to the extent that it was not signed in personal capacity. In paragraph 10 of the plaint the fact is mentioned that defendant No,2 signed letter of guarantee in a manner as to be liable as principal debter but the letter of guarantee was mistakenly affixed by the stamp of defendant No,2, which being meaningless was erased. To this action of erasure objection is taken in paragraph 7 of the written statement and assertion is made that defendant No,2 did not sign letter of guarantee to bind him personally but it was signed in his official capacity as President of defendant No,1. On this point whether letter of guarantee was signed in personal capacity or official capacity, defendant No,2 in the suit could have examined himself in the trial Court in support of the assertion. If this point was to be contested by defendants in the suit, then it is not understandable why initially request was made on behalf of defendants in the suit in the trial 'Court to have the whole suit decided on the basis of preliminary issue without recording of evidence, when there was no impediment in the way of parties to contest other issues which were framed by the Court. Now since assertion is made on behalf of appellants that defendant No,2 in the suit has signed letter of guarantee not in his private capacity but in his official capacity, onus is upon the appellants to prove the assertion and since the appellants voluntarily refused to produce evidence in the trial Court, this contention is rejected out of hand, as signing is not denied.
10. ' It was submitted on behalf of appellants that promissory note dated 30-6-1975 was a fake document for the reason that blanks were filled in it after the death of Mr.Sarfraz Hussain Rizvi, who was General Secretary of defendant No,1 and one of the executants of that note. In this context it 'appears from the record that initially suit was filed in the trial Court on 29-3-1978, after which on 2nd May, 1978 application was filed by Advocate for defendant under Order 37, rule 3, C.P.C. For grant of leave to appeal and defend the suit unconditionally. In support of the application, Syed Mazhar Sajjad defendant No,2 in the suit filed his personal affidavit in which this fact was stated that Sarfraz Hussain Rizvi had expired on 16-3-1974 and such death certificate issued by Abbasi Shaheed Hospital North Nazimabad Karachi was also produced alongwith photostat copy of Succession Certificate. Subsequently Advocate for the plaintiffs in the suit filed an application under Order 6, rule 17, C.P. C. On 3-8-1978 for permission to amend the memorandum of plaint in view of the fact that Sarfraz Hussain Rizvi had died on 16-3-1974. Amendment sought was to the effect that in an inchoate instrument, blanks in respect of date and amount were filled in by plaintiffs on 30-6-1975. Learned Single Judge allowed amendment to be made in the plaint and also granted leave to defendants in the suit to defend the suit unconditionally. In the trial Court plaintiffs in the suit examined Syed Tariq Ali who produced promissory note dated 30-6-1975 as Ex.5/8 and further stated that this was signed by General Secretary and Treasurer in blank. This note was further filled in by the Bank before filing of suit on 30-6-1975. Witness further testified that defendant No, 1 never informed the Bank about the death of their Secretary. He produced letter Ex.5/9 which is undated. This letter contains resolution passed by executive committee of defendant No,1 and by this resolution the Bank is informed that account cf defendant No,1 would be operated with the joint signatures of President, Vice-President and Treasurer. This letter does not mention that Secretary is excluded on account of the fact that he has expired. This witness Syed Tariq Ali was cross-examined on behalf of defendants in the suit but no question was put to him with regard to his assertion that Bank was not informed about death of Sarfraz Hussain Rizvi. This shows that controversy on this matter was not taken any further. Defendants in the suit did not produce any evidence on this point. We, therefore, hold that contention raised on behalf of appellants in this context is untenable.
11. ' Now we come to the preliminary issue which is to the effect whether suit is time-barred or not. It appears from the record that suit was filed on 29-3-1978 and paragraph 13 of the plaint shows different dates of cause of action mentioned therein including 30-6-1975 when the defendants signed fresh 'promissory note and letter of guarantee. Promissory note relied upon is Ex.5/8 on the record. It is submitted on behalf of appellants/defendants in the suit that since one of the executants of Ex.5/8, namely, Sarfraz Hussain Rizvi General Secretary had died before 13-6-1975, hence the Bank had no authority to fill in the blanks after the death of Sarfraz Hussain Rizvi. On this premise it was further submitted that even if it is to be assumed that it was a blank promissory note and was inchoate stamped instrument as contemplated under Section 20 of Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, then too legal requirement is that blanks are to be filled in within reasonable time. It was further submitted that in the instant case blanks were not filed in in reasonable time because blank promissory note was given in the month of February/March 1974 and the suit was filed on 28-2-1979. Learned Single Judge in his judgment which is impugned in this appeal, has held that reasonable time for filling in the blanks is three years. On the other hand, Mr. Hassan Akbar has argued that three years time is not reasonable because indirectly this would allow the Bank to file the suit of this nature after a lapse of six years when in fact under the law of limitation period allowed for filing such suit is three years. This would put the Bank to undue advantage as against other party. Section 20 of the Negotiable Instruments Act does not provide for any time limit to fill in the blanks hence it is to be assumed that the same is to be done within reasonable time. Question now arising is as to what is reasonable time. According to Mr. Hassan Akbar three years time is not reasonable time and in support of his contention, he has cited the case of Griffth v. Delter 1940 (2) K.B.
264. This case was cited by him before the learned Single Judge as well and is commented upon in the impugned judgment but in an other context. In the reported case principle was laid down that in case in which cheque was given to the bearer with no date, which had to be filled in by the bearer then the bearer had authority under common law before passing of Bills of Exchange Act, 1882, at all events prima facie, to fill in the date within a reasonable time. What is reasonable time is a question of fact to be decided keeping in view particular facts of each case. In the reported case the date was filled in after eighteen months from the date of receipt of cheque and it was held that the date was not filled in in reasonable time but then in that case the cheque was presented as statement of account as it was sent to the solicitor and the covering letter also showed that it was not being relied upon as a cheque but only as statement of account showing how much money was due from debtor.
12. ' Reading of section 20 of the Negotiable Instruments Act clearly shows that in respect of inchoate stamped instrument clear cut authority is given to the person who receives such instrument to complete it into Negotiable Instrument. Under the law of limitation three years period is allowed for filing a suit on the basis of negotiable instrument. In the hands of bearer inchoate stamped instrument is certainly more beneficial than negotiable instrument for the reason that negotiable instrument is complete in all respects and suit can be filed in respect of it within three years. In case of inchoate stamped instrument bearer is empowered under the law and has authority to fill in the blanks within a reasonable time which is and should be in addition to limitation of three years allowed for negotiable instrument. If it is not so then in case of inchoate stamped instrument authority to the bearer to fill in the blanks is not of much utility and inchoate stamped A instrument will stand at lesser footing than negotiable instrument.
13. ' In the instant case one of the two executants of promissory note in question namely, Sarfraz Hussain Rizvi died on 16-3-1974 before the date was put by the Bank on the inchoate stamped instrument. This will not have any adverse effect on the validity of the document because authority is with the bearer to fill in the blanks within a reasonable time and this fact of death was deliberately suppressed from the Bank. Promissory note was delivered in the month of February or March 1974, death of Sarfraz Hussain Rizvi occurred on 16-3-1974 and the blanks were filled in by the Bank on 30-6-1975, hence it can be said that the blanks were filled in after about fifteen months, which is a reasonable time. Suit was filed on 29-3-1978, which was within three years from filling of blanks.
14. ' Now so far letter of guarantee is concerned, it is submitted on behalf of appellants that letter of guarantee is not negotiable instrument and further Bank is not agent of guarantor as such the Bank had no authority to fill in the blanks. There is no dispute that Section 20 of the Negotiable Instruments Act will not cover letter of guarantee but then doctrine of estoppel will definitely operate against the guarantor who has signed the letter of guarantee. In the instant case guarantor has not denied the signature on the letter of guarantee but has only stated that he signed it in official capacity and not in private capacity. Defendant No,1 did not appear in the trial Court as witness and did not produce any evidence to show whether letter of guarantee was signed by him in his private capacity and not in official capacity as claimed. Letter of guarantee is a printed document. It can be presumed that before appending the signature on the letter of guarantee, the guarantor must have read the terms and conditions in the printed form. If now any plea is taken on behalf of guarantor then burden is upon him, which is not discharged for the reason that defendants in the suit have not produced any evidence and have not examined any witness.
15. ' Before filing of the suit notice dated 13-10-1977 was sent Service of notice is admited in paragraph 9 of the written statement In any case plaint can also be treated as notice.
16. ' For the facts and reasons mentioned above we are satisfied that there is no reason whatsoever to interfere with the impugned judgment which is hereby upheld and in the result the appeal is dismissed with no order as to costs.