1. SALAHUDDIN AHMED, J.-The petitioner has been convicted under section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code and sentenced to death for the murder of two young girls, namely, Mst. Tahira and Mst.
2. Shagufta Jabin, who were sisters of the wife of the petitioner.
3. The prosecution case is that on the 1st of July 1968, the Nikah of the two sisters, namely, Mst.
4. Musarrat Shahin (P. W. 13) and Mst. Tahira deceased were performed with the petitioner and his step-brother Ehsanul Haq, respectively. Mst. Tahira was the elder sister. Their Rukhsati, however, was to take place only when a Barat had been brought from the side of the two bride--grooms within a period of two months from the date of the Nikah. As the bride-grooms failed to bring the Barats, the Rukhsati was deferred. The two bride-grooms insisted upon the parents of the girls that their Rukhsati should be made without the Barat. The father of the brides, P. W. 7, Hakim Ali, did not agree to this with the result that Mst. Tahira filed a suit for dissolution of marriage before the Family Court against Ehsanul Haq and the suit was ultimately decreed in her favour on the 11th of March 1969. Nevertheless the petitioner persisted in his efforts to pursuade the parents of his wife to perform her Rukhsati ceremony but ultimately gave up trying and divorced her on the 8th of May 1969. Three days later a report was lodged at the police station by P. W. Muhammad Tahir that although the petitioner had divorced his wife, he claimed that he had divorced her upon an impulse, and that he would either commit suicide or kill them. The petitioner also appeared at the police station and stated, inter alia, that be had divorced his wife in a fit of anger and that he wanted to withdraw the divorce as he was confident that his wife was agreeable to live with him.
5. He further stated that he would not persist in getting her if she refused to go with him. The police officer met Mst. Musarrat Shahin at her house and she gave a written statement in her own handwriting that she had been divorced according to Shariat and it was not possible for her to revive the relationship. Thereafter the petitioner sent a notice to the Chairman of the Union Committee revoking the divorce but it was filed. The petitioner nevertheless continued his efforts for obtaining Rukhsati of Mst. Musarrat Shahin. On the date of occurrence, namely, the 3rd of November 1969, the petitioner went to the house of Mst. Musarrat Shaheen armed with a pistol and a number of cartridges, and started firing at Mst. Tahira and Mst. Shagufta Jabin with the result that both the girls were injured and they succumbed to their injuries the same day.
6. Sh. Shaukat Ali, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioner has not disputed before us the conviction of the peti--tioner for the murder of the two girls. He has, however, contended that in the facts and circumstances of the case the petitioner should not have been awarded the extreme penalty of law, namely, death. He has contended in the first instance, that having regard to the fact that a long time had elapsed between the occurrence and the sentence of death passed upon the petitioner, the High Court should not have confirmed the death sentence. He has submitted that the occurrence took place on the 3rd of Novem--ber 1969, and the petitioner was convicted and sentenced to death on the 19th of May 1971, by the trial Court and his death sentence was confirmed by the High Court on the 30th of September 1972. In support of this contention he has drawn our attention to Chapter 24-B, Rule 6 of the Rules and Orders of the High Court of Judicature at Lahore, Vol. III, which says that the High Court requires explanations to be furnished in monthly Sessions State--ments of any cases pending over two months.
7. Furthermore, he has cited two decisions, namely, 21 I C 822 and PLD 1963 Dacca 74 in support of his contention.
8. We do not find any substance in this contention. The afore--said rules of the High Court do not authorise the High Court to commute the sentence of death to transportation for life or life imprisonment merely on account of delay in the disposal of the case the explanations required under the aforesaid rule 6 are for the purpose of securing the disposal of Sessions cases with the greatest possible expedition as indicated in Rule 1. Having regard to the large number of such cases pending before the High Court it would indeed be a dangerous proposition to lay down that mere delay in the disposal of a death sentence case would entitle the condemned person to automatically obtain commutation of his death sentence.
9. As regards the two decisions ; in the case of PLD 1963 Dacca 61, the High Court was of the view that all the five appellants fully contributed to the death of the victim in a joint venture and it was difficult to weigh and distinguish their respec--tive contribution in this respect. Alongwith this the Court tool into consideration that the condemned prisoner had been under a sentence of death for about three months. It was in these circumstances that the Court commuted the death sentence to bring it into line with the sentence of transportation for life passed on the other four convicts.
10. The other case reported in 21 I C 822, however, appears to support the petitioner. In the case under report there was a disagreement between the two Judges one upholding the conviction and sentence and the other setting aside the conviction and sentence. The matter was referred to a third Judge and he had no hesitation in saying that the Sessions Judge was right in passing the sentence of death. He however, proceeded to observe thus; "But, apart from the circumstances that one learned Judge of this Court has expressed himself as dissatisfied with the evidence, I am oppressed by the feeling that the appellants have, through no fault of theirs, had these capital sentences suspended over their heads for nearly six months. It is a fine point, perhaps whether I, sitting here as a Judge, should pay any attention to this fact and whether I ought not to confine myself to consider--ing the propriety of the sentences when originally passed, leaving the rest to the Executive Government. On the whole, I think that as the law stands in India where the alternative penalties of death and transportation are prescribed for murder, it is a matter for my consideration, and that I ought not to confirm the death sentences unless I personally think that they ought to be carried out now. And I believe I am right in saying that delay such as this has before now been regarded by Judges as a sufficient reason for refraining from imposing the extreme penalty. In this view, I will not confirm the sentences of death but direct that they be altered into sentences of transportation for life."
11. We are unable to agree with these observations of a learned Single Judge of the Calcutta High Court. No such principle of general application as contended for by Sh. Shaukat Ali, has ever been laid down by the Supreme Court of Pakistan or its predeces--sor the Federal Court of Pakistan. The confirmation or commuta--tion of a death sentence must rest on the facts and circumstances of a particular case, and it is neither desirable nor necessary to lay down any general principle governing such matters. The Calcutta High Court's decision is reminiscent of days when capital sentences cases took precedence over all other cases and they were disposed of with the utmost expedition. In the changed circumstances of today, this decision has no relevance.
12. The learned Advocate has also drawn our attention to certain matters to wit ; the petitioner had threatened to commit suicide if the Rukhsati of Mst. Musarrat Shahin did not take place ; the petitioner never intended to escape from the spot after the occurrence ; and the evidence did not exclude the possibility of a quarrel between some members of the household of Mst. Musarrat Shahin and the petitioner having preceded the occurrence. It has accordingly been contended that the petitioner had been suffering from intense mental stress and strain due to the refusal of the parents to send the wife to the petitioner and this should have been considered as an extenuating circumstance to reduce the sentence. The learned Advocate has submitted that these evidence were not adverted to by the High Court. We do not find any substance in this contention.
13. The evidence referred to did not amount to any extenuating circumstance which could legally weigh with a Court of law to determine whether a sentence of death or of imprisonment for life should be passed. In the present case the learned Sessions Judge sentenced the petitioner to death. He has deliberately and without any reasonable excuse killed the two sisters in their own house. There was no extenuating circum--stance whatsoever and he did not deserve any leniency.
14. The petition is accordingly dismissed.