DECISION ' This is an appeal filed by the appellant union against an impugned order, dated 10-11-1987, passed by the Sind Labour Court No, II at Karachi, who had dismissed the application of the Appellants union filed under section 32(1-A) of Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969.
2. Brief facts of the case were that the appellant union claimed to be a registered trade union in the respondent establishment enjoying the status of C.BA., so, on 26-5-1986, it had claimed to have sent Demand Notice under section 26(1), I.R.O. 1969, to the respondent establishment and as the management did not pay any attention to it, therefore, on 15-6-1986, it had served a Notice of Demand under section 26(3), I.R.O. 1969 and also endorsing a copy of it to the Directorate of Labour which vide letter, dated 17-6-1986 had asked the management to attend the joint meeting before him. It was also claimed by the appellant union that as the respondent management did not care to attend the said meeting, therefore, a Failure Certificate was issued in favour of the appellant union by the Assistant Director, Labour (Con. II), Karachi, followed by the present application under section 32(1-A), I.R.O. 1969, before the learned Labour Court. The respondent management had resisted the application on the ground that as all the office bearers of the union were outsiders and none of them was employed in the establishment, therefore, the union having No, 1/3rd of the total workmen employed in the establishment as its members/office-bearers, therefore, Failure Certificate issued by the Labour Directorate was invalid, incompetent and illegal, hence in view of this legal proposition, the application under section 32(1-A), I.R.O. 1969, before the Labour Court was liable to be dismissed as not maintainable.
3. Only evidence was led on behalf of the appellant union while the respondent management had preferred not to lead any evidence, therefore, after considering all the facts, the learned Labour Court had passed the impugned order, hence, the present appeal.
4. Nemo was present on behalf of the appellant union. I have heard Mr. Khursheed Ahmed Siddiqi, the learned Advocate on behalf of the respondent establishment and have also carefully perused the record and proceedings of the case. It has been argued by Mr. Khursheed Ahmed Siddiqi, the learned Advocate for the respondent management that the present appeal, filed by one Fida Muhammad was not legally maintainable as before the learned Labour Court this Fida Muhammad was a witness and not the applicant, while, in fact Dawood Said was an applicant before the learned Labour Court. It was contended by the appellant union that as the learned Labour Court did not allow an application for adjournment submitted by the Counsel and had proceeded with the case so some important documentary evidence could not be produced in support of their contentions, therefore, it was prayed that this Tribunal may allow the appellant union to produce additional evidence at the appellate stage. On the other hand, it was contended by Mr. Khursheed Ahmed, the learned Advocate for the respondent management that at the appellate stage production of additional evidence cannot be allowed to patch up the weaker parts of the case or to fill up the omission and it can only be allowed if it was required by the appellate Court itself on the basis of its own appreciation of evidence already on record and in support of his pleadings, Mr. Khursheed Ahmed has placed his reliance on the principle laid down in a case of Privy Council, reported in AIR 1931 (Privy Council) at page 143, wherein it was an observation that 'inadvertence of the party or mistaken legal advice or negligence of a party is not a ground for allowing additional evidence and it could only be allowed where a party is unable to produce evidence through no fault of its own." Taking into consideration this legal proposition as well as other facts and circumstances brought on record, I am of the view that the impugned order is well- reasoned and I would maintain the same while, deciding the present appeal also.
5. For the reasons discussed by me above, I see no reason to interfere with the impugned order and would maintain the same. The present appeal is accordingly dismissed.