This civil revision arises out of a suit for possession through pre-emption filed by the petitioner against the respondents in the Civil Court at Joharabad. During the course of hearing of the suit, parties agreed to be bound by special oath on Holy Quran of Haji Muhammad Hafeez who deposed that the sale had taken place for a sum of Rs. 89,250. On the basis of this statement the suit was decreed by the trial Court on 27th of June, 1981 subject to the deposit of the balance sale price by the petitioner within a period of fifty days.
2. On 13th of August, 1981 the petitioner filed an appeal against the judgment and decree of the trial Court in which it was asserted that the petitioner had never consented to the decision of the suit on the basis of special oath and his counsel had no authority to do so. This appeal was admitted to regular hearing on 13th of August, 1981 and the operation of the impugned decree and judgment was suspended. The appeal was ultimately dismissed by the District Judge, Sargodha on 28th of April, 1982. Since the time fixed in the decree, had in the meantime, expired, the District Judge allowed the petitioner to deposit the balance amount up to 26th of March, 1982. There is no dispute that this amount was actually deposited on 28th of April, 1982.
3. Subsequently, an application for review was filed by the respondents in which they stated that since the appeal filed by the petitioner was incompetent, the Court could not while dismissing it extend the period for deposit. This application was accepted by the learned District Judge on 28th of April, 1982 with the result that order for extension of time for payment granted to the petitioner stood recalled. This order of the District Judge has been assailed by the petitioner by filing this revision.
4. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that there was no justification for the District Judge to have reviewed his earlier judgment and decree whereby the time had been extended.
The learned counsel for the respondent on the other hand has asserted that since the appeal filed by the respondents before the District Judge was not competent, the period for deposit could not have been extended.
5. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties, I have come to the conclusion that the impugned order of the District Judge allowing review is not sustainable. The trial Court, while decreeing the suit had allowed the petitioner 50 days time from 27th of June, 1981 to deposit the balance sale-price. Before the said time could expire, the petitioner filed an appeal which was admitted to regular hearing and the operation of the judgment and decree of the trial Court was suspended on 13th of August, 1981. The District Judge, while deciding the appeal, after taking notice of the fact that the appeal before him was incompetent and also that the operation of the decree of the trial Court has been suspended by the Additional District Judge in his absence, had extended the time upto 6th o March, 1982. It has been authoritatively laid down by the Supreme Court that the appellate Court while dismissing the appeal of the pre-emptor can extend the time for deposit. Reference in this connection may be made to Nazir Ahmad v. Ghulama and another (1987 SCM R 1704). In another case Dost Muhammad and others v. Nazar Hussain. Khan and others (1984 SCM R 325) the extension of time was upheld by the Supreme Court even in a case of withdrawal of the appeal.
6. I also find force in the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that there was no justification for the learned District Judge to have reviewed his earlier judgment. Review is only permissible on the ground mentioned under Order 47, Rule I, C.P.C. None of these grounds were present in this case. From the perusal of the judgment dated 28th of April, 1982, it is apparent that while extending the time the District Judge was fully aware of the incompetency of appeal filed by the respondents. He also took notice of the suspension of decree of the trial Court by Additional District Judge at the time of the admission of appeal. If after noticing these facts, he had chosen to extend time, it could not be held that he had committed an error apparent on face of record or there were sufficient reasons of the like nature for reviewing of his earlier judgment.
Consequently this revision is accepted and the order of the District Judge dated 28th of April, 1982 is set aside. The parties are left to bear their own costs.