1. The facts in this Revision Petition are few and beyond dispute. The decree-holder (respondent before me) filed an E. P. under Order XXI, rules 46 and 48, Civil Procedure Code, for attachment of the bonus of the petitioner (judgment-debtor) declared as due to him by the Andhra Cement Company Limited, Vijayawada (hereinafter referred to as "the company"), for the year 1965, by the issue of a propitiatory order. It was resisted by the judgment-debtor on the ground that bonus is not liable to attachment under section 60 (1) (h), Civil Procedure Code. The judgment-debtor is admittedly an unskilled workman, getting a monthly remuneration of Rs. 164 including all allowances. As per the Standing Orders of the company, he is not entrusted with any clerical or technical work, requiring exercise of powers of intellect or skill; and his services are utilised only for doing manual labour. It has been found by the learned District Munsiff, and it has not been disputed before me, that the remuneration paid to the judgment-debtor every month is "wages of labour" within the meaning of section 60 (1) (h) of the Civil Procedure Code. The argument on behalf of the decree-holder, which found favour with the District Munsiff, was that the " bonus for the year 1965 declared by the company is not a part of "wages" and, therefore, not exempt from attachment. Certain decisions were cited by him before the learned District Munsiff, but he chose to follow the definition of "salary" or "wage" given in section 2 (21) of the Payment of Bonus Act (LXI of 1965) (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") and held that the word "wage" in Civil Procedure Code does not include "bonus" arid therefore bonus is not exempt from attachment, and accordingly ordered execution to proceed in respect of the bonus.
2. Aggrieved by this decision, the judgment-debtor has preferred 4 this Revision Petition.
3. Sri M. Subramaniam, the learned counsel for the petitioner (judgment-debtor), contends that the view of the lower Court is, unsustainable.
4. Section 60 (1) (h) of the Civil Procedure Code enacts that the wages of labourers and domestic servants, whether payable in money or kind, are not liable to attachment or sale, but the Civil Procedure Code has not defined the word "wages". The words "wage" and "bonus" are, no doubt, defined in other Acts, but the definition in each Act has been given only for the purpose of that; Act, and cannot be imported into the Procedure Code, which has used the word "wages" in a general sense.
5. In A. Muniswa mi v. T. Viswa natha Nair (AIR 1957 Mad. 773) Ramaswami, J, has collected the definitions of the words "wages" and "bonus from all legal dictionaries and decided cases, and it is not necessary to reproduce all of them. Suffice it to say that it is well settle that "bonus" is not a regular part of "wages" deferred or otherwise, and, in essence, is an ex gratia payment, but by reason of an agreement between the employer and the employee, or by statute, payment of bonus can assume permanence, and become part of the wages.
6. The Supreme Court in Muir Mills Co., Ltd. v. Suti Mills Mazdoor Union ((1954) 7 F J R 483) referred to the definition of the word "bonus" in the New English Dictionary, and held that the primary meaning of that word is: "A boon or gift over and above what is nominally due as remuneration to the receiver and which is therefore something wholly to the good."
7. It was pointed out that the word "bonus" imports the conception of a boon, a gift or a gratuity otherwise described as an "ex gratia" payment.
8. We are not concerned in this case with the principles on which bonus is granted, as illustrated in the several cases referred to by the Supreme Court. It is enough to state that the Supreme Court in its decision pointed out that bonus is not a deferred wage, because if it were so, it would necessarily rank for precedence before dividends.
9. The next question arising for consideration is, whether in the instant case the bonus declared by the company remained only an "ex gratia" payment, or is one declared under a statute, and acquired permanence as a part of the wage.
10. As already pointed out, the lower Court proceeded on the assumption, and it has not been disputed before me, that the bonus in the instant case was declared only pursuant to the provisions of the Act. It is also clear from section 10 of the Act that every employer is bound to pay to every employee, in an accounting year, a minimum bonus of 4 per cent of the salary or wages earned by the employee during the accounting year, or Rs. 40 whichever is higher, whether there are profits in the accounting year or not. There can, therefore, be no doubt that the bonus declared in the present case, is in discharge of the statutory obligation under section 10 of the Act. That being so, it cannot be said to be an `ex gratia' payment.
11. If it is not an `ex gratia' payment, would it not become a part of the wages?
12. That question was considered by Ramaswami, J, in A. Muniswami v. T. Viswanatha Nair, already cited, and it was held that by statute or by agreement bonus can assume permanency and become part of the wages, and that section 60, Civil Procedure Code, covers only a limited class of wage-earners, viz., labourers who earn their daily bread by personal manual labour or in occupations which require little or no art, skill or, previous education, and if these conditions are fulfilled, bonus will stand protected under section 60. On the facts of that case it was held that the bonus sought to be attached was not declared either by statute or by agreement, and had not assumed per--manency so as to become part of the wages, and hence it was held that bonus in that case was liable to attachment.
13. A Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Badlu Prasad v. Tirjuji Sitaram (AIR 1965 M P42), Tare and Krishnan, JJ., held that the inclusion or exclusion of such payment as bonus and gratuity in the definitions of "wages" in different enactments is not quite uniform, for the reason that each of those enactments was made with a special purpose of giving the employee certain amount of protection in regard to periodical payments and welfare contributions, and it is not the aim of any one of these enactments to guarantee to the employee everything that will be payable to him under agreement or statute, or regular practice in the business, but only to guarantee certain specific payments, most often of a periodic' nature. It was also held that the very fact that bonus and gratuity are excluded from the definition of "wages" in those Acts, would indicate that without them wages might include the categories of payment thus excluded, and that the Civil Procedure Code speaks of swa ges" of labourers and leaves it to the Courts to understand by "wages" what in the context of the particular cases before them it would connote. The position was finally summed up thus:- 'Thus we have what can be called swages' in general or the genus of wages which included all payments made to an employee arising out of the relationship, and swages' in-the narrower or special sense, which is a periodical payment. Different enactments deal with wages of the latter kind, that is, wages as species; but the Civil Procedure Code which has no qualification and no explanation in this regard speaks of wages as genus. No doubt the use of the same in these two different senses may at first sight cause some confusion; but if the context and the purport of the enactment is remembered, the confusion will mostly clear by itself."
14. From the foregoing discussion, the following principles can be deduced:-
(1) The Civil Procedure Code has defined "wages'. The word "swages" is used in a general sense or as genus of wages, without any qualification, including all payments made to an employee arising out of the relationship, but wages, has also a narrower or special meaning connoting periodical payment. The phrase swa ges of labour" has to be understood in the context of the particular case before the Court.
(2) Bonus" paid to a labourer is an 'ex gratia' payment, and is not a wage deferred or otherwise, and as such cannot be a part of wages which has a permanence and a periodicity.
(3) The definition of "wages" in enactments of a special nature made with a special purpose for giving the employee certain amount of protection cannot be imported by reference into section 60
(1) (h) of the Civil Procedure Code.
(4) Payment of bonus may also assume permanence and periodicity if it is the result of an agreement between the employer and an employee of is the result of a statute.
(5) Bonus declare under the Payment of Bonus Act, No. 61 J of .1965, being the result of a statute, acquires permanence and periodicity, and a part of wages within the meaning of the Civil Procedure and is a pre Code.
15. Reliance cannot, therefore, be placed on the definition under section 2 (21) of the Act for deciding the meaning of the word "wages" in section 60, Civil Procedure Code. Definition in section 2 (21) was provided for the purposes of the Payment of Bonus Act. Under that Act, wages must necessarily exclude bonus, as bonus payable to a particular employee has to be determined in relation to his wages. For all these reasons, I hold that "bonus"' payable to an employee under the Payment of Bonus Act is "swa ges" under section 60 (1) (h) of Civil Procedure Code, and not liable to attachment. The order of the Court below- is, therefore, unsustainable. In the result, the Revision Petition is allowed with costs, and the E. P. is dismissed. revisions by the competent authorities. Therefore, it is advisable to consult the official sources or legal professionals for the most up-to-date and accurate information.