The only law point requiring determination in this appeal is whether Noora one of the vendees who was tenant over the part of the land having joined the other vendees with him who are not tenants in any part of the land could claim superiority in the right of pre-emption qua the portion of the land with him as tenants as against the respondent/plaintiff who have claimed superior right of pre-emption being collateral of the vendor.
2. Learned counsel for the appellants argued that since in the sale-deed all the four vendees have purchased the land in equal shares, therefore, each one of them shall be deemed to have purchased 1/4th share of the land, therefore, the sale was divisible, as such, Noora could non/suit the respondent's claim qua that portion of the land in his possession as tenant, therefore, the suit of the respondent to that extent was liable to be dismissed as Noora being tcn.To had superior right of pre-emption as against the collateral of the vendor.
3. I am afraid the contention is wholly misconceived. It has been held in judgment reported as Abdullah etc. v. Abdul Karim etc. PLD 1968 SC 140 that the recitals m the sale-deed that the vendees have purchased the land in equal shares would not make the purchase by them separable if the payment of consideration therein has been shown in lump sum without specifying the amounts separately which each of the vendees paid. In this case learned counsel for the appellants frankly conceded that the payment and consideration of the entire amount has been shown in lump sum. The said judgment has been rightly relied upon by the Courts below in rejecting the claim of Noora having superior right of pre-emption qua one part of the land which was with him as tenant. It has also been rightly held which is the law declared by the Supreme Court in the said judgment, that Noora having joined with him other three persons as vendees has also been relegated to the position of a stranger and lost his own superior right if there was any, on the basis of principle of sinker. The judgments and decrees of both the Courts below suffer from no legal infirmity which are perfectly valid and B in accordance with law. This appeal has no merits which is hereby dismissed with costs.