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1973 SCMR 545

MUHAMMAD Alias MAMMI vs PUNJAB PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT THROUGH

Citation1973 SCMR 545
CourtSupreme Court of Pakistan
Case No.Civil Petition for Special Leave to Appeal No. 396 of 1972 Writ Petition No.
Date1973-05-23
Judge(s)Waheeduddin Ahmad, Sheikh Anwarul Haq
ResultPetition dismissed

ORDER

1. ANWARUL HAQ, J.-This petition for special leave to appeal seeks to call in question an order made by a learned single Judge of the Lahore High Court, on the 23rd of June 1972. Whereby a constitution petition filed by the petitioner Muhammad alias Mammi, against his conviction and sentence under sec--tion 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code, in proceedings held under the West Pakistan Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1963 (herein--after referred to as the Act), was dismissed.

2. The relevant facts, briefly stated, are that a First Informa--tion Report was lodged at Police Station Noor Shah in the Sahiwal District on 26-7-1966, by one Lal, alleging that his daughter Mst. Fatima had been done to death by her husband Waryam and his associates Pir Ali, Ahmad and Shera. He asserted that these persons had admitted their guilt before him and his companions Lal Muhammad, Pehlwan, Moazzam, Hussain, Ramzan and Wahab, when all of them had gone to the house of his son-in-law Waryam in search of Mst. Fatima. The motive for the crime was stated to be the fact that in the previous month of Ramzan, Mst. Fatima bad eloped with one Muhammad Anwar and had been restored to her husband Waryam only 20 or 25 days before the date of the report.

3. Although the petitioner was not named as an accused person in the First Information Report, yet he was sent up for trial by the police, and the man named Ahmad, mentioned in the F. I. R. Was declared to be innocent. The case was referred for trial by the Divisional Commissioner to a Tribunal constituted under section 3 of the Act. The President of the Tribunal held all the accused persons guilty of murder, whereas the members of the Tribunal opined that only the present petitioner was guilty. The District Magistrate of Sahiwal, by his order dated the 27th November .1968, agreeing with the members of the Tribunal, convicted the petitioner and acquitted the remaining four accused. The petitioner was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 14 years subject to confirmation by the Divisional Commis--sioner.

4. The necessary confirmation was accorded by the Commis--sioner by his order dated the 15th of January 1969, holding that the circumstantial evidence on the record proved the guilt of the petitioner. Aggrieved by this order, the petitioner filed an appeal before the Home Secretary to the Provincial Government, but the same was dismissed on the ground of limitation. The petitioner, thereupon invoked the writ jurisdiction of the High Court, by means of Writ Petition No. 1593/69, whereupon the case was remanded to the Home Secretary for decision on merits. While hearing the appeal, the learned. Home Secretary suo motu issued notices to the acquitted accused to show cause why their acquittal should not be set aside and they be convicted of the offence of murder. The affected persons again approached the High Court by means of Writ Petition No. 14228/70, and the notices issued to them were quashed. As a result, the petitioner's appeal came to be heard by the Additional Home Secretary, on the 20th. Of March 1972 and was rejected.

5. The petitioner then filed a fresh writ petition in the High . Court, contending that there was no evidence whatsoever to connect him with the crime. This plea did not however prevail, and consequently the writ petition was dismissed by the High Court, on the 23rd of June 1972.

6. In support of the present petition, it is submitted by Sh. Nasim Hassan that the case is fully covered by the dictum of this Court .In The State v. Nawab Gul (PLD1963SC270), namely, that it could never be expedient to refer to a Tribunal a case where the facts alleged against the accused person did not make out a prima facie case. The learned counsel contends that the name of the petitioner not having been mentioned in the F. I. R. By the father of the deceased woman, and the pieces of circumstantial evidence relied upon by the statutory authorities, namely, the extra. Judicial confession and the alleged incriminating recoveries etc., being inconclusive against the petitioner, the conviction and sentence recorded against him could not be sustained in law.

7. After hearing the learned counsel at some length, and perusing the available record, we are of the view that this is not a case of no evidence, and accordingly, the High Coui t was right in refusing to interfere in the matter. While it is correct that the name of the petitioner was not mentioned in the F.

8. I. R. By the father of the deceased, yet at the trial evidence was led that he was also one of the persons who had made an extra] confession regarding the killing of the woman. There was also evidence to show that the petitioner and one other accused had pointed out the place where the woman was strangled to death. The petitioner and one other accused, had also pointed out the place where the dead body was cut into pieces and thrown into the canal. A pair of shoes belonging to the deceased was also recovered at the instance of the petitioner. There was thus evidence available before the Tribunal and the higher authorities to connect the petitioner with the crime. The Tribunal not being bound by any formal rules of evidence, it could act on the joint confessional statement as well as the other incriminating circumstances brought out in evidence.

9. The High Court was not sitting as a Court of appeal to determine whether the evidence was or was not sufficient to warrant the conviction of the petitioner, It was enough that there was some evidence to connect the petitioner with the crime.

10. For the foregoing reasons, we see no merit in this petition, which is accordingly, dismissed. revisions by the competent authorities. Therefore, it is advisable to consult the official sources or legal professionals for the most up-to-date and accurate information.

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