For the purpose of this criminal miscellaneous application filed under section 561-A, Cr.P.C. The following statement of facts would suffice:-
1. On 16-6-1988 Syed Qasim, respondent No.2 filed a complaint against Absar Ahmad Siddiqui and Khalil Khan for the offence under section 324/34/109, P.P.C. In the Court of Assistant Commissioner and S.D.M. Saddar (South), Karachi, which was brought on regular file on 21-6-1988. The applicants appeared before the trial Court and made an application under section 249-A, Cr.P.C. For their acquittal which was, however, dismissed on 4-9-1988. The applicants have now approached this Court for quashment of proceedings to prevent abuse of process by the Court.
2. The facts as disclosed in the complaint by respondent No. 2 in brief are that on 22-5-1988, while he had gone to the office, applicant No.2 Khalil Khan at the instance of applicant No.1 Absar Ahmad Siddiqui, caused him injuries by throwing glass upon him and also gave beating with fists and kicks. Respondent No.2 lodged such report at Artillery Maidan Police Station and he was referred to Police Surgeon, Karachi, for examination. Since no action was taken by the police, respondent No.2 filed complaint, which was brought on record by the learned A.C./S.D.M., Saddar (South), Karachi.
3. I have heard Mr. Muhammad Akmal Wasim, learned counsel for the applicants and Mr. A.I. Qarni, learned counsel for the State. I have also heard respondent No.2 in person.
4. It is contended on behalf of the applicants that the facts as disclosed in the complaint do not constitute an offence and there is no likelihood of the trial resulting into the conviction of applicants.
5. The scope of section 561-A, Cr.P.C. Was examined by the Supreme Court in M.S. Khawaja v. The State reported in PLD 1965 SC 287, and it was observed:- "Every prosecution for a criminal offence is to be deemed to have been commenced and continued in the public interest, as a duty of the State. It can only be in a very rare case that a superior Court acting under its inherent power to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, would deem it appropriate to act so as to place an alleged offence outside the operation of the criminal law, on incidental grounds, such as that of delay, or for any reasons other than reasons going to the question whether the allegation is sufficient to constitute an accusation of an offence in law."
At page 291, the Supreme Court remarked:- "To quash a judicial proceeding in order to secure the ends of justice would involve a finding that' if permitted to continue, that proceeding would defeat the ends of justice, or in other words, would either operate or perpetuate an injustice. To end an `abuse' it would be necessary to see in the proceeding a perversion of the purpose of the law such as to cause harassment to an innocent party, to bring about delay, or where the machinery of justice is engaged in an operation from which no result in furtherance of justice can accrue and similar perverse results."
6. The case of Ghulam Muhammad v. Muzammil Khan and 4 others reported in PLD 1967 SC 317, is again relevant in a situation like this. Following the dictum as laid down in M.S. Khawaja v. The State the Supreme Court held as under:- "the inherent jurisdiction preserved by section 561-A, Cr.P.C. Is not an alternative jurisdiction or an additional jurisdiction but it is a jurisdiction perversed in the interest of justice to redress grievances for which no other procedure is available or has been provided by the Code itself. The power given by this section can certainly not be so utilised as to interrupt or divert the ordinary course of criminal procedure as laid down in the procedural statute. The High Court, as has repeatedly been pointed out its a number of decisions, should be extremely reluctant to interfere in a case where a competent Court has, after examining the evidence adduced before it, come to the view that a prima facie case is disclosed and has framed charges or summoned the accused to appear, unless it can be said that the charge on its face or the evidence, even if believed, does not disclose an; offence."
7. The cases reported as Mohsin A.I and another v. The State 1972 SCMR 229, Abdul Rehman v.
Muhammad Hayat Khan etc. 1980 SCMR 311, Marghoob Alam and another v. Shams Din and another 1986 SCMR 303 and Manzoor Hussain Shah v. The State 1988 SCMR 265 are also relevant in this behalf. While examining the extent of the jurisdiction of High Court under section 561-A, Cr.P.C. In Akhtar Hussain Zaidi v. The State, reported in PLD 1985 Lah. 662, it was observed that quashment of proceedings at an early stage gives an unfortunate impression of stifling of criminal prosecutions by exercise of extraordinary power under section 561-A, Cr.P.C. It was also held in the same authority that mere filing of a civil suit is not a bar to the continuation of criminal case.
8. A bare reading of the complaint would show that there is prima facie' evidence on record connecting the applicants with this crime. The extent to which the witnesses can be believed can only be determined by the trial Court after the case proceeds before it. It was, therefore, premature for the applicants to have approached this Court at the initial stage when no evidence was recorded. Respectfully following the above authorities, I am of the view that the application filed under section 561-A, Cr.P.C. Being premature must fail. The same is accordingly dismissed.