In this Constitutional Petition it is prayed that the order of deposit of rent under Section 13(6) of the Rent Restriction Ordinance and as a result of its non-compliance the order of striking off defence and ejectment from the property in question passed by the Rent Controller and confirmed by the appellate authority may be declared as illegal and without lawful authority. This declaration has been sought in the circumstances that respondents-landlords filed an application on 25-5-1978 under Section 13 of the Rent Restriction Ordinance against the petitioners-tenants for their ejectment from the property in dispute on the ground of default by the petitioners and personal need of the respondents. In their written reply the petitioners denied relationship of landlord and tenant which necessitated framing of preliminary issue regarding existence of such relation. This issue was decided against the petitioners by the learned Rent Controller on 25-1-1983 and consequently his ejectment from the disputed property was ordered. The learned District Judge also confirmed this order in appeal on 18-9-1985. In Second Appeal before the High Court the petitioners admitted their status as that of a tenant and, therefore, this Court also confirmed the finding of the lower forum on preliminary issue by order dated 11--2-1987 but allowing the appeal the case was remanded to the Rent Controller "with direction to record his finding on the other issues with reference to the evidence on record and decide the case on merits and according to law."
2. After remand the learned Rent Controller on 11-1-1988 in terms of Section 13(6) of the Rent Restriction Ordinance ordered the petitioners to deposit the arrears of rent from 1-5-1975 to 1-1- 1988 at the rate of Rs.100 per month before the next date of hearing. Petitioners applied for review of this order on the ground that no order can be passed for deposit of rent beyond three years as the same would be barred by time. This review petition was dismissed by the Rent Controller through his order dated 9-5-1988 but the petitioners were afforded last opportunity for the deposit of rent till 9-6-1988. No rent was deposited in the given time and accordingly the Rent Controller on 9-6- 1988 struck off the defence of the petitioners and passed ejectment order against them. Appeal filed to impugn this order was also dismissed by the appellate Court on 15-2-1989.
3. The learned counsel arguing for the petitioners submitted that under Section 13(6) of the Rent Restriction Ordinance Rent Controller could not pass an order for deposit of rent for more than three years as such the impugned order would amount to asking for the deposit time-barred rent which cannot be termed as "rent due" from them as laid down in the said provision of law. It was, therefore, contended that the impugned order directing his clients to deposit rent from 1-5-1975 to 1-5-1988 covering a period of more than three years is illegal. In support of his arguments he relied on PLD 1968 SC 230. The substance of this arguments is that this three years period should be counted from the date of order and not from the institution of the application for ejectment.
4. This argument is fallacious and unsound. The analysis of Section 13(6) would show that the Court would order deposit of rent on the first date of hearing or as soon as possible, thereafter, but before issues in the case are framed. Therefore, the "rent due" would have relevance and be determinable from the date of filing of ejectment application. This interpretation is more in consonance with the spirit of this section because if the "rent due" is to be taken from the date of the order then it is obvious that genuine claims will be defeated by deliberately false and contumacious denial of the factum of the existence of the relationship of landlord and tenant in order to delay the deposit order and this self-created delay would then be used for the plea that the rent has by the time of the order of deposit become time-barred. Such a construction and exposition of the section would lead to anamolous results and would amount to allowing a party the benefit of his own wrong and defiance. This sort of insolent and headstrong conduct is highly deprecative in judicial proceeding and specially in discretionary and equitable jurisdiction as that conferred on this Court in issuance of writ wherein it is a salutary principle that those who seek relief in such proceeding must come for redress with clean hands. It is obvious that under Section 13(6), the Rent Controller would have ordered deposit of rent on the first day of hearing or in any case before framing of issues which was not done in the instant case because, of the denial of the relationship of landlord and tenant, therefore, the landlord could not be made to suffer either for the failure of the Court to pass an order at a proper time or on account of the unjustified denial of the petitioners. Even otherwise it is cardinal and leading principle of law that period of limitation stops running after the disputed claim is put in Court for adjudication, so on this analogy the rent which falls due during the proceeding of the application for ejectment cannot be held as barred by time so as to debar the Rent Controller for ordering its deposit or to exclude its deposit on the plea that it is not "rent due".
The precedent cited by the learned counsel for the petitioners PLD 1968 SC 230 is distinguishable and rather the contention of the learned counsel in that case was "the appellants pleaded that section 13(6) did not have the effect of depriving them of the legal defence under the Limitation Act, 1908, and declined to deposit the rent for the period beyond three years of the date on which application for eviction was instituted." The learned lower forums have properly decided the case and this writ petition is, therefore, deficient in substance and is accordingly dismissed in limine.