1. ' JAVID IQBAL, J.--This petition for leave to appeal is directed against the order of the Lahore High Court, Lahore dated 30th November, 1981 whereby R.SA. Of the petitipner was dismissed.
2. ' Briefly the facts are that Nabia who was the original owner of the disputed land died without male issue in 1947. Consequently mutation of inheritance of his landed property was sanctioned in favour of Mst. Rehmoon as his widow on 21st April 1948. This Mst. Rehmoon had a son from her previous husband and that is Abdullah the present petitioner. Mst. Rehmoon made a gift of the whole property of Nabia in favour of the petitioner vide registered gift deed attested on 26th June, 1957. Respondents Nos.1 and 2 are daughters of Nabia and respondents Nos.3 and 4 are nephews of Nabia. The respondents filed a suit for joint possession of 7/8th share in the aforesaid land. The petitioner resisted the suit among others on the ground that under special custom Mst. Rehmoon had succeeded as full owner, and therefore, she was capable of making the gift of her property in his favour. The Senior Civil Judge Sheikhupura decreed the suit as against the petitioner whose appeal was dismissed by the Additional District Judge and his R.S.A. Was also dismissed by the High Court. Hence the present petition.
3. ' The argument of the learned counsel before us is that West Pakistan Act V of 1962 (West Pakistan Muslim Personal Law (Shariat Application) Act 1962) whereunder the limited interest of females was abolished came in force on 31st December, 1962 whereas Mst. Rehmoon in the present case had already made the gift of the disputed property in her possession in favour of the petitioner and that therefore the respondents were not entitled to obtain joint possession of 7/8th share in the aforesaid land. But this argument of the learned counsel has no force. Mst. Rehmoon was a limited owner and even if Act V of 1962 had not come into force on 31st December, 1962 the gift in favour of the petitioner made by her of the estate was not sustainable for on her death when the inheritance of Nabia was to reopen she would have only been entitled to 1/8th share whereas respondents Nos.1 and 2 would have taken 2/3rd and respondents 3 and 4 the rest. Consequently the Courts below were correct in arriving at the conclusion that the respondents were entitled to the extent of 7/8th share in the estate in question.
4. ' In that view of the matter no ground is made out for interference. This petition is consequently dismissed.