' The appeal captioned above challenges the decision dated 25-8-1988 recorded by the learned Presiding Officer, Punjab Labour Court No.7, Gujranwala, whereby the grievance petition of the appellant has been dismissed as time-barred.
2. The appellant sent grievance notice on 2-41988 and the reply to it is dated 5-4-1988 which was received by the appellant on 7-4-1988. He brought the grievance petition on 8-6-1988. Since the reply to the grievance notice was given, the grievance petition could be brought within two months of the receipt of reply. The libation, therefore, started running from 7-4-1988 when the appellant had received the reply to the grievance notice. Period of two months expired on 6-6-1988, therefore, the grievance petition brought on 8-6-1988 was time barred. The appellant made an application for condensation of delay and the reason given is that he had fallen ill. No medical certificate was tendered in evidence, although a photo copy of medical certificate is on the record.
In the absence of the medical certificate the plea of the appellant that he had fallen ill is not supported. Since the photo copy too is not attested, it cannot be used ignoring the fact that it was not tendered in evidence. The other thing is that it does not bear the signatures or identification mark of the appellant. Merely production of a medical certificate is not sufficient unless it is shown that it relates to him. In his statement the appellant did not make reference to this certificate but rather said that he had consulted Dr.Humayun. The photo copy of the medical certificate which is on the record was not issued by any doctor by the name of Humayun. Apart from it, the nature of the disease given in the certificate is not such which may have prevented the appellant from getting the grievance petition prepared and presented in the Court. The disease is low 'backache'.
Since the pain was not severe but light, the appellant could have managed to get the grievance petition prepared and presented in person in the Court. A valuable right has accrued to the respondent by lapse of time, which has been rightly not denied to him by the learned lower Court.
3. Learned counsel for the appellant has cited 1986 SCMR 962, in which it has been observed that where an order has been passed without hearing and issuing notice to a party whose presence otherwise was necessary, the order passed will be a nullity in the eye of law and no question of limitation would arise. This is not the case of dismissal on charges but is a case of termination simplicity. The appellant may have succeeded if his petition had been within time and he had produced evidence but since he was not removed from service on any charges, therefore, charge sheeting and holding of inquiry were not necessary. The ruling therefore, is distinguishable. There is a Division Bench ruling of the Lahore High Court, in which it has been held that an order without jurisdiction may not be challenged and may be ignored but it will become necessary to challenge it if it has been used against a person and question of limitation would arise on the date on which such an order is used. In the present case since on account of the order of termination the appellant ceased to remain in service and was not allowed to work, the order of termination was implemented forthwith, therefore, it was necessary for him to challenge the same. The period of limitation, therefore, started running from the date on which he was terminated from service. The other thing is that the ruling cited by the learned counsel for the appellant emanated from a case under the Settlement laws and was not a labour case. According to section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, issuance of grievance notice and bringing of grievance petition within two months and 15 days of the service of notice or in cases where the reply to the notice has been received by the worker, within two months of the receipt of notice, is necessary. It is not said that where an order is a nullity, it will not be necessary to observe the law of limitation and that the worker concerned can at any time challenge the order of removal from service. For this reason also the ruling cited by the learned counsel is not helpful. Learned counsel for the appellant has also cited PLD 1973 Notes 66. According to paragraph 4 of the Rehabilitation Scheme, the land allotted to Jammu and Kashmir refugees on temporary basis for maintenance could not be allotted or transferred to any other person as it stands excluded from the operation of the scheme. The Rehabilitation Authorities had allotted the said land to others, therefore, it was held that the allotment was without jurisdiction since the land stood excluded from the operation of the scheme.
It is also held that since the allotment was void ab initio being without jurisdiction, no question of limitation was involved. Here this is not the case of the appellant that the authority who terminated his services had no jurisdiction. If the rule of first come last go was not observed, it would not mean that the employer had no jurisdiction to terminate the services and only this much can be said that the order was wrong. So PLD 1973 Notes 66 is also not helpful.
4. Since no ground for condensation of delay was made out, the learned lower Court was justified in dismissing the grievance petition of the appellant as time-barred.
5. As a result, the appeal fails and is dismissed.