1. ANWARUL HAQ, J.-This petition for special leave to appeal has arisen out of an application made by the respondent on the 25th of June 1962, under section 13 of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, for the ejectment of the pre--sent petitioner from a house named 'Gulkadah' situate on Rashid Road, Lahore, on the ground of the personal requirement of the land- lady. On the 25th of April 1964, the respondent is said to have made a second application for the ejectment of the peti--tioner on the ground of default in the payment of rent. It appears that no progress has been made in the second application. How--ever, in proceedings on the first application dated the 25th of June 1962, the petitioner appears to have deposited some rent for the premises in dispute. On 4-2-66, the respondent made an application to the Court of the Rent Controller for permission to withdraw the rent deposited by the petitioner-tenant, but this application was dismissed by the learned Rent Controller on 7-6-66 on the ground that no order had been made for the deposit of rent under section 13 (6) of the Ordinance.
2. Having dismissed the land-lady's application for the with--drawal of rent the learned Rent Controller then proceeded to pass an order on the 23rd of July 1966, directing the petitioner to deposit arrears of rent from 1-5-62 to 30th of June 1966, by the 30th of October 1956. He also directed that the petitioner shall deposit future rent as the rate of Rs.125 p.m. Before the 15th of each succeeding month, and the rent, if any already deposited by the petitioner, shall be adjusted.
3. The petitioner felt aggrieved by this order and filed an appeal, which was, however, dismissed by the learned Additional District Judge Lahore, on the 18th of March 1967. Thereafter, the peti--tioner filed a second appeal which also met the same fate in the High Court at Lahore.
4. Special leave to appeal is now sought on the grounds that the proceedings for ejectment having been initiated against the peti--tioner on account of the personal need of the land-lady, the provision regarding the deposit of arrears of rent and future rent was not attracted ; and that in any case the power vesting in the Rent Controller under section 13 (6) of the Ordinance could be exercised only before the framing of the issues, but in this case the issues had already been framed much before the order dated the 23rd of July 1966, was passed.
5. We see no merit in these submissions.
6. The opening words of subsection (6) of section 13 of the Ordinance are "in proceedings under this section on the first date of hearing or as soon as possible after that date and before issues are framed, the Controller shall direct the tenant to deposit all the rent due from him, and also to deposit regularly till the final decision of the case, before the fifteen day of each month the monthly rent due from him." It will be seen that the direction to deposit the arrears of rent as well as the future rent has to be made in all proceedings under this section, and not merely in proceedings initiated on the ground of default in the payment of rent.' Ejectment on the ground of personal occupation is dealt with in subsection (3) of section 13 of the Ordinance, and these proceedings are, therefore, covered by subsection (6). It cannot, therefore, be argued that a direction under subsection (6) of section 13 of the Ordinance cannot be made in proceedings initiated on the ground of personal use of the landlord.
7. As regards the second contention, it is true that the sub--section enjoins the Rent Controller to make an order for the deposit of arrears of rent and future rent on the very first date of hearing or as soon as possible after that date and before issues are framed, yet it does not mean that if the Rent Controller omits to make such an order before framing the issues, he is deprived of jurisdiction to do so at a subsequent stage. The mandatory provisions of this subsection are clearly intended for the benefit of the landlord, and also as a deterrent for a tenant from raising frivolous objections and prolonging the litigation without, in the meantime, paying the rent due for the premises. The effect of these provisions and their intent cannot be allowed to be defeated by the mere omission of the Rent Controller to pass the necessary order before framing the issues; on the contrary the Rent Cont--roller would appear to be under a statutory obligation to rectify his own omission or defect in procedure once the matter is brought to his notice even after issues have been framed. In interpreting these provisions one has to keep in mind the fact that the liability of the tenant to pay rent cannot disappear simply because issues have been framed by the Rent Controller in viola-- tion of the statutory provisions. We consider, therefore that the learned Rent Controller was right in making the necessary order under subsection (6) of section 13 of the Ordinance, once it was brought to his notice that his predecessor had not passed the pre--scribed order on the first date of hearing or, at any rate, before the framing of issues. No question of lack of jurisdiction arose in these circumstances.
8. The learned Judge in the High Court has in this behalf placed reliance on Hafiz Ali Muhammad v.
9. Jamal Din and others (PLD 1966 Lah. 934) and Muhammad Yamin v. Election Tribunal (PLD 1968 Kar. 397). We would endorse the view taken in these cases for the reasons mentioned in the preceding paragraph.
10. As a result4 this petition fails and is hereby dismissed.