' CH. HASAN NAWAZ (MEMBER).--On 20-1-1980, when he was serving with the respondents as Accounts Assistant in the Office of Sr. B&AO (P&I), Lahore, the appellant, on having been rendered surplus, was transferred to Hyderabad in the Office of Chief Engineer, Electricity (Annex. R-3). He did not join at Hyderabad for his new assignment and, after the lapse of about two years and four months, on 31-5-1982 reported in the Office of General Manager (Coordination) WAPDA, Lahore with an application in writing praying that necessary orders may be issued for his "rehabilitation" in Wapda (Annex. A).
2. Disciplinary proceedings were initiated against him and he was served with show-cause notice dated 8-9-1982, where it was alleged that he failed to comply with the orders of his transfer to Hyderabad and absconded w,e,f, 24-11980 instead of reporting for orders of his posting to Chief Engineer (Electricity), Hyderabad. The charge was that on account of wilful absence without leave he was guilty of misconduct, as defined in Rule 2(5) of the Pakistan Wapda Employees' (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1978 (Annex. B).
3. He received the notice on 13-9-1982 and submitted his explanation in writing on 25-9-1982.
Thereafter, by letter dated 7-10-1982 (Annex. D) he was directed to appear on 14-10-1982 at 7-30 a.m. Before Manager, Finance (Water) in his office for personal hearing in response to his request made in the explanation in writing. After due consideration of his explanation in writing and what he said during personal hearing, Manager, Finance (Water) (respondent No, 2) was tentatively of the opinion that he should be removed from service. Therefore, he was served with notice dated 2- 11-1982 (Annex. E) calling upon him to show cause within fourteen days of the receipt of notice why penalty of removal from service shOuld not be imposed upon him.
4. He submitted his explanation (Annex F) in writing dated 14-11-1982 in response to this show- cause notice and was then given another personal hearing on 2-12-1982. (Annex. G).
5. After consideration of his explanation and other material available from the record, on 3-5-1983 he was awarded penalty of two steps down in the time scale of Accounts Assistant with immediate effect under Rule 4(b)(i) of the Rules (Annex. H). The period of his absence from 24-1-1980 to 23-1- 1982 was treated as leave extraordinary without pay and it was ordered that from 24-1-1982 he will be deemed to have remained on leave on full pay converted into leave on half pay till the date of resumption of duty. He was posted in the Office of Budget and Accounts Officer, (PPC), Rahimyar Khan against existing vacancy of Accounts Assistant. On 3-7-1983 he filed a departmental appeal against order dated 3-51983 (Annex. J) which was rejected by the competent authority on 12-9- 1983, with endorsement of a copy to him on 6-10-1983.
6. With these facts in the background, on 2-11-1983, he assailed the validity of order dated 3-5-1983 in the present appeal under. Section 4 of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973.
7. The main ground relied upon by him in support of his prayer for necessary relief was that he could not comply with the order of his transfer to Hyderabad because of illness and that he reported for duty on 31-5-1982 after having been declared as medically fit to resume duty. Other grounds have also been mentioned, but their detailed account is unnecessary.
8. The defence is that the allegation regarding illness is only a concoction and that the appellant absconded and remained wilfully absent for a long time to avoid his posting at Hyderabad.
9. A closer application to the appellant's pleadings in the appeal as also his explanation in writing in response to notices issued by the respondents during the course of disciplinary proceedings, would justify the conclusion that he has got no case and is not entitled to any relief. Under the circumstances appearing from record, I feel inclined to say that the competent authority seems to have taken a lenient view of the matter at the time of awarding punishment. There is every reason to believe that he absconded and remained absent without leave for a long time in disregard of office discipline only to avoid his assignment at Hyderabad; which constituted gross misconduct, as should have been visited by a severer penalty. As already pointed out before, the unsoundness of his pleadings hardly leaves any room for looking towards any other material for a finding adverse to the appellant's case. He seems to have avoided a clear statement of facts in his appeal, to escape from the possible elect which it could have produced. Anyway, it is now clear that the matter started with the orders of his transfer to the office of Chief Engineer (Electricity), Hyderabad on 20-1-1980. He has pleaded that "unfortunately he .Fell sick on 24=14980 and consequently completely disabled to do any work because of nervous breakdown" and this fact was communicated to the Wada on 24-4-1980". The receipt of any such communication is not admitted and there is absolutely nothing whatsoever on the record to establish, that the appellant informed the authority of his failure to join the station of his posting-either because of illness or any other reason. Be that. As it may, what is important is the fact that his pleadings in the -matter are evasive and clearly suggestive of the fact that he has told a lie. The nature of ailment has not been mentioned and mixing up any such ailment with "nervous breakdown" clearly leads us to the conclusion that he never fell ill and that the allegation regarding illness was a false excuse to avoid the result of the order of transfer.
10. In paragraph 2 of the appeal it has been pleaded that the appellant remained seriously sick and this fact was in the knowledge of each and every one that therefore; the Wapda or "any 'competent Authority did not issue any explanation letter or any letter requiring the appellant to resume duty and no action was taken till 30-5-1982". The fact of the matter, as would appear from these pleadings is that he never informed the respondents about his illness and he did not even send an application for leave. He remained silent and had been doing nobody knows what, during all this period till 31-5-1980 when he applied for "rehabilitation". Had he in fact been suffering from any ailment, he would have applied for leave and gone to some doctor of the department for treatment. He never procured any medical certificate and could not possibly have done so only because he was never ill. II Even the averments made .In application' dated 31-5-1982 praying for rehabilitation, also indicate that he had not been suffering from any ailment. While mentioning the order of his transfer to Hyderabad he said that "at that time my family circumstances and my health did not permit me to report at Hyderabad as I was seriously suffering from nervous breakdown". Nothing can be more clear to show the evasive nature of his pleadings. No evidence was required in this Case to establish the fact of his willful absence: It may be noticed that in this application he did not make any mention of his illness and that all he said was that his family circumstances and health did not permit him to report at Hyderabad, because of nervous breakdown. He mentioned his health with reference, to nervous breakdown, which makes it difficult to spell out the existence of any illness as could have physically restrained him from joining his duty.
12. His explanations in writing dated 25-9-1982 and -14-11-1982 tell us the same story. As in the case of his appeal, whatever he said in these explanations was evasive in nature and pointed towards the fact that he was telling a deliberate falsehood: I do not feel any hesitation in saying that whatever he said either in his explanations in writing or subsequently in the appeal told volumes in support of the conclusion that he never fell ill and that he deliberately absented himself from duty to avoid compliance with the order of his transfer, in wanton disregard of office discipline exposing himself to a severe disciplinary action.
13. This was with regard to the merits of the case. As for the grounds of appeal, we feel inclined to say that, with one exception, they are not worth any analysis, which is only a mild expression. It will be sufficient to say that they are absolutely worthless and hardly adequate to promote the appellant's case. They constitute only a vain attempt to make out some justification for relief, which in actual fact does not exist. Things have been said in these grounds which are evidently without any substance, which is to say the least.
14. Only one point requires our address before we take leave of the matter. It arises from the contention that the impugned order is in violation of the provisions of fundamental rule 29 of the Fundamental Rules and Supplementary Rules, which makes the following reading:- "If a Government servant is, on account of misconduct or inefficiency, reduced to a lower grade or post, or to a lower stage in his time-scale, the authority ordering such reduction shall state the period for which it shall be effective and whether, on restoration, it shall operate to postpone future increments and if so, to what extent."
15. We feel inclined to hold that there is substance in this contention, inasmuch as the impugned order, which imposed penalty of two steps down in the time scale, contains no mention of the period for which it was to remain effective. Nor is there anything to show whether on restoration, it had to operate to postpone future increments and if so, to what extent. However, the authority's failure to comply with the provisions of this rule was seemingly the result of a genuine mistake, due probably to the fact that it was not brought to its notice. Whatever be the reason for non- compliance of these provisions, we are of the view that this circumstance is by no means fatal to the impugned order. Ash already found, the material on the record is quite sufficient, to establish that the appellant's absence from office was deliberate to avoid his transfer to Hyderabad, which constituted misconduct of the highest order. This being so, there was every justification for passage of the impugned order. As already pointed out, it only amounted to a lenient view of the matter. It will, therefore, be in the interests of justice to modify the impugned order in exercise of power under section 5(1) of the Act which lays out that a Tribunal may on appeal, confirm, set aside, vary or modify the order appealed against.
16. For these reasons, in partial acceptance of the appeal, the impugned order is modified to the extent that it shall be effective for a period of five years from the date of its passage and it shall not operate to postpone future increments. There will be no order as to costs.