The dispute in this case relates to eviction of a portion of property No.106-Anarkali, Lahore, which was in occupation of the petitioner as a tenant of respondents Nos.1 to 11. The respondent-landlord filed an ejectment petition against the petitioner-tenant on ground of default. In view of the pleadings of the parties and after appreciating the evidence on record, the learned Rent Controller, by his order dated 6-10-1987, accepted the application and struck off the defence of the petitioner under Section 13 (6) of the Punjab Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, inasmuch as the petitioner failed to deposit the rent for the month of June, 1985, within the prescribed time, in pursuance of the order passed by the learned Rent Controller on 15-5-1983. On Appeal, the learned Additional District Judge, Lahore, after re-appraisal of the evidence on record dismissed the same. The Appellate Court observed that by order dated 15-5-1983 of the Rent Controller, the petitioner was required to deposit the future rent by 15th of every month. The petitioner, however, failed to deposit the rent for the month of June, 1985, on the due date, in that the rent was deposited on 18-6-1985 instead of 15- 6--1985. The explanation given by the petitioner for non-deposit of the rent was that he was an old illiterate person and could not calculate the time and, therefore, the default was not wilful.
2. Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that there was a bona fide mistake on the part of the petitioner in not depositing the rent within the prescribed time and, therefore, the learned Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority ought not to have dismissed the application on mere technicalities and that in the facts and circumstances of the case, it was a lit case for condonation of delay. Reliance is placed on Syed Haji Abdul Samad v. Mir Ghulam Rasool and others 1988 SCM R 1832, to contend that the bona fide mistake of tenant could be considered a ground for condonation of default and, therefore, the learned Rent Controller should have accepted the explanation of the tenant, I am afraid, this authority has no relevance to the facts of the present case, inasmuch as, in the precedent case the order of the Rent Controller was ambiguous and on perusal of same, the Supreme Court came to the conclusion that it might cause some misunderstanding when read out to a lay man. It was in this context that it was held that the bona fide mistake of the tenant could be considered a ground for condonation of default. In the instant case, the petitioner has been depositing the due rent within the prescribed time for a period of two years, prior to the default and, therefore, it cannot be argued that the impugned order created any misunderstanding to the petitioner. When faced with this situation; the learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the petitioner is an old man and the default might have been committed on ground of forgetfulness. I am afraid, this is not a sufficient ground for condonation of delay.
3. Learned counsel next relied on Habib Bank Ltd. v. Amanullah 1986 CLC 2917, to contend that the bona fide mistake of the petitioner should have been condoned by the learned Rent Controller. This judgment is again not applicable in the instant case, inasmuch as, in Habib Bank's matter, the order of the Rent Controller to deposit the rent was vague and capable of different interpretation.
Here, the order of the Rent` Controller for depositing the future rent did not suffer from any ambiguity, as stated above.
4. Learned counsel for the petitioner next contended that earlier also an application was moved that the petitioner failed to deposit the rent for certain months within the prescribed period. The said application was dismissed on 5-7--1986 and, therefore, the impugned order of the learned Rent Controller is hit by the principle of estoppel. He has relied upon Secretary to the Government of Punjab v. Additional District & Sessions Judge, Lahore and others 1988 SCM R 1u91. This case again has no relevance at all to the facts of the present case, in that, in the precedent case the order of the Appellate Court on the question of default was based on no evidence. In the instant case, no such question is involved. Further, no question of estoppel arose, in that, the. Previous application did not relate to the disputed period.
5. It is next contended that the petitioner specifically took a number of pleas in the memorandum of appeal before the Appellate Court but neither any finding has been recorded thereon by the Appellate Court nor adequate opportunity, was afforded to the petitioner to argue his case, in that, when the appeal was called for arguments, the counsel for the petitioner was not present.
The petitioner requested the learned Appellate court to adjourn the case to enable him to fetch his lawyer but his request was not acceded to and, therefore, placing reliance on Syed Amjad A.I Shah v. Muhammad Afzal and 3 others PLD 1987 Lah.280, it was argued that the Appellate Court was obliged to records a finding on the pleas specifically urged in the memorandum of appeal and failure to do so has vitiated the impugned proceedings. The contention has no force. If the counsel for the petitioner was not present at the time when the case was called out for hearing by the Appellate Court, the petitioner should blame his counsel and not the Court.
6. In any event, I have heard the learned counsel -for the petitioner ad length, but he has not been able to convince me that the impugned orders suffer from any jurisdictional defect warranting interference by this Court in the exercise of writ jurisdiction. Syed Amjad Alt Shah's case (supra) is distinguishable and is not applicable to the facts of the present case.
7. In view of the above, the writ petition fails and is hereby dismissed in limine.
H.B.T./A-646/L revisions by the competent authorities. Therefore, it is advisable to consult the official sources or legal professionals for the most up-to-date and accurate information.