1. HAMOODUR RAHMAN, J.-The petitioner used to carry on hotel business at Gulmerg, Srinagar and Rawalpindi. She ac--quired for this purpose three bungalows on Gwyn Thomas Road, Rawalpindi, on lease from one Mohan Singh in 1929. It appears that at Gulmerg and Srinagar also her business was carried on in premises acquired on lease.
2. On the 15th March 1950, the premises in Rawalpindi were allotted to a refugee from India and the petitioner was asked to vacate the same, as they had become evacuee property upon the migration of Mohan Singh. The petitioner, however, got the above order vacated by the Rehabilitation Commissioner, Rawal--pindi, on the 14th of May 1951.
3. In the meantime, the premises in Gulmerg and Srinagar wherein her hotel business was carried on were requisitioned by the Indian Military authorities, as a result of which she was forced to discontinue her business in Kashmir. In these circumstances, she describing herself as a non- claimant displaced person from Jammu & Kashmir applied on the 8th of August 1959 for the transfer of the hotel premises situated at Rawalpindi on a KNCS form. Unfortunately this form could not be traced later. So on the 26th of April 1960, she filed another such form. The Deputy Settlement Commissioner rejected her application and transferred the premises to the respondents Nos. 2, 3 and 4 respectively, but referred the case to the Chief Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner for further orders. The petitioner moved the Settlement authorities in appeal and revision but without any success. Hence she filed a writ petition in the High Court of West Pakistan but the same was also dismissed on the 3rd of October 1961, and this order was confirmed by a Division Bench of the same High Court in a Letters Patent Appeal on the 3rd of January 1963. It is against this order that she now seeks special leave to appeal.
4. In the Latters Patent Appeal the High Court took the view that she was not a displaced person within the meaning of sub--section (3) of section 2 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, because; (a) she was not a perma--nent or quasi-permanent resident of any area not forming part of, or occupied by, India, (b) she was not a person who can be des-- cribed to have on account of civil disturbances or the fear of such disturbances left or been displaced from her place of residence in such area, and (c) she did not come within the category of persons resident in any territory outside India who was unable to manage, supervise or control any property belonging to her in India or in any part occupied by India.
5. So far as the first ground is concerned, it has been found as a fact by the Settlement authorities, and was admitted on behalf of the petitioner in the High Court, that she left Srinagar in October 1947, not on account of any civil disturbances or the fear of such disturbances, for, in October 1947, there were no disturbances of any kind in Jammu & Kashmir. It appears that her husband was a Barrister practising at Rawalpindi and it was the petitioner's practice to return to Rawalpindi in the month of October every year after spending the summer season at Sri--nagar and Gulmerg. In this view of the matter it was held that she was a permanent resident of Rawalpindi, although she usually went to Kashmir to look after her hotel business there during the season.
6. She asserted that after 1947 she could not return to Srinagar via Murree as was her usual practice nor could she send her Muslim Kashmiri staff to Srinagar as a result of Partition. But it was pointed out that she could have taken a route via India, if she so desired, for, she could not claim any vested right to travel by any particular route.
7. Lastly it was held that since the premises in which her hotel business was carried on at Srinagar and Gulmerg had been re--quisitioned by the Military authorities in India, there was no necessity for her to return to Srinagar, as there was no business left there. In these circumstances, it could not also be said that she was a person resident in Pakistan who was as a result of civil disturbances or the fear of such disturbances rendered unable to manage her hotel business at Srinagar and Gulmerg.
8. In this connection the High Court also pointed out that although the question of her nationality was not very relevant, it could be referred to in order to ascertain if she was a person who could not return to Kashmir. She held, it appears, a British Passport in which she was described as a British subject by birth and her domicile was shown as United Kingdom, although her place of birth was said to be Calcutta. She actually travelled on this Passport to United Kingdom in 1950. Since there were no travel restrictions in India against persons holding such Pass--ports, the view was taken that the petitioner could have gone to Srinagar too on that Passport, if she so desired.
9. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has attempted to point out to us that the High Court had overlooked the fact that she was not registered as a British subject with the British High Commission in Pakistan and hence it could not be said that she was domiciled in United Kingdom.
10. High Court was fully conscious of this fact and it cannot be said that its view that a person holding such a British Passport could C, travel freely to India is incorrect, even though she was not registered as a British subject with the British High Commission. So far as the other questions are concerned, they appear to us to be concluded by findings of fact which could not have been assailed in a writ petition in the High Court. We are therefore, unable to agree that the decision of the High Court as to the status of the petitioner was wrong. We are satisfied that the petitioner has failed to establish that she came within the category of a displaced person as defined in subsection (3) of section 2 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, even if it be assumed that the petitioner had become a citizen of Pakistan under clauses (b) and
(d) of section 3 of the Pakistan Citizenship Act, 1951. There is no ground, therefore, for interference in this matter. This petition is accordingly, dismissed.