This appeal has been heard under subsection (4) of section 22-B of I.R.O., 1969 in the absence of the third Member Mr. Ashraf Ali, Joint Secretary Labour, who is pre-occupied.
2. The appeal is directed against the dismissal, by a Single Bench of the Commission, of a complaint filed by the appellant under section 16 read with section 53 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. The dismissal followed upon the view that "no offence is committed".
3. Although the appeal was initially admitted to full hearing on 11-12-1985, the question of its maintainability arose during the hearing on 24-3-1986. The matter dragged on from one date to another, as adjournment was sought from time to time and as the appellant's Counsel sought time to seek instructions regarding the advisibility of withdrawing the appeal. He subsequently, expressed his difficulty in withdrawing the appeal because of certain observations, to which we will advert later, made by the Single Bench in the impugned judgment.
4. The right of appeal is governed by the provision of subsection (1) of section 22-D of the IRO, which reads: 22-D Appeals.--(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Ordinance, or in any other law for the time being in force, any person aggrieved by an award or decision given or a sentence or order determining and certifying a collective bargaining unit passed by any Bench of the Commission, other than a Full Bench, may, within thirty days of such award, decision or sentence or order, prefer an appeal to the Commission.
The subject-matter of appeal can, therefore, be (1) an Award, (2) decision, (3) a sentence or, (4) an order determining and certifying a Collective Bargaining Unit (CBU). Apparently, the four subject matters of appeal are independent of each other and arise in separate and distinct proceedings.
Award is given in an industrial dispute, a sentence is passed in a criminal trial, an order determining and certifying a CBU is made in a proceeding under section 22-EE, while "decision" pertains to proceedings other than the three aforesaid mentioned matters. On the principle of 'Expressio unius eclusi alterius', whereby the mention of one of a class may be regarded a silently excluding all other members of the class, matters other than those specified have to be excluded. It will thus follow that in proceedings which may culminate in an award, a decision, a sentence or an order determining a C B U, no appeal will lie from any matte except the award, the decision, the sentence or the order determinin--g CBU. The law therefore, intends that in a criminal proceeding, no appeal shall lie from any matter except a sentence if passed. That being so the dismissal of a complaint will not qualify for appeal under section 22D(1) of the IRO.
5. The question of appealability of disposal of a complaint otherwise than resulting in a sentence had been examined by a Full Bench of this Commission in Manager, Administration, Wyeth Laboratories Gulberg, Lahore v. Gulzar Ahmad Ch. And another (Appeal No.12(41)/86) and on the analogy of rulings of this Commission in Capt. (Retd) Abdul Wajid and two others v. Sher Muhammad and others (1980 PLC 800u) and Ch. Ghulam Hussain v. Alexandor Fernandez, M.D.
Bata Shoe Co. (Pak.) Ltd. 1980 PLC 1191, it had been held that dismissal of a complaint was not appealable under section 22-D(1) of the IRO. In view of this decision, the present appeal must fail.
6. The main grievance of the appellant, however, is against the following observation made in para. 12 of the impugned order:- "In my opinion, this complaint is a part of the pressure which the management wants to built to get the workers to drop their demands which they raised through their notice under section 26(1) of the IRO, 1969".
Learned counsel for the appellant submits that this observation, which amounts to a finding against the Management is not based on any record or evidence and has caused serious prejudice to the appellant. He drew our attention to the order of the Full Bench dated 11-12-1985, in which his objection to the above observation had been duly noted and it had been remarked, "We find farce in the contention of the learned counsel for appellant".
He, therefore, prays that the said remarks be expunged as being unwarranted. Expunction of the offending observation or for that matter any interference with the impugned order, is however not possible, as there is no valid appeal before us nor is there any other provision in the IRO, enabling us in this behalf.
7. The appeal is dismissed as not being maintainable.
A.A./95/Lb.I.R.C