This is an appeal under section 30 of the Workmen's Com--pensation Act, 1923 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). The appellant Mohiuddin was employed in the Mills of the respondent. These Mills admittedly are grinding mills, commonly known as Chaki'. The appellant met with an accident on 23-11-1968 and was examined by Dr. A. Aziz on 25-1-1969 Dr. Abdul Aziz issued a certificate in favour of the appellant to the effect that he had suffered 60 percent disability. The appellant gave are notice to the respondent on 20-2-1969 and subsequently made an application under section 10 of the Act on 2 9-4-1969. On the written statement being filed the learned Commissioner framed the following issues:-- "(1) Whether the claim of the applicant is liable to be suspended for net submitting himself for medical examination?
(2)Whether the applicant is workman within the meanings of the Workmen's Compensation Act?
(3) Whether accident arose during the course of and out of employment with the opponent?
(4) What is the extent of disability and loss of earning capacity ?
(5) What were the wages of the applicant at the time of accident?
(6) To what relief the applicant is entitled?"
2. As would appear from the nature of the issues the first two issues were of a preliminary nature and if the decision on these first two issues went against the applicant (appellant the remaining Issues required no determination. The learned Commissioner therefore recorded evidence to relation to the fret two issues and came to the conclusion that the appellants was not a workman within the meaning of section 2 (n) of the Workmen's Compensation Act. In the result an application for compensation filed by the appellant failed and teas dis--missed. Being aggrieved with that decision of the learned Commissioner, the present appeal has been filed.
3. Mr. M. M. Baig, the learned counsel for the appellant has sought to build up the case before me that the eaq3loymenr of the appellant was of a nature that attracted item (VII-a) of Schedule 2 of the Workmen's Compensation Act. This item reads as follows:-- "employed in loading and unloading of goods in the mechanically propelled vehicles in the Karachi Division."
The case that iii sought to be built up by the appellant in this Court, is that the appellant was working as a labourer and was engaged in the loading and unloading of goods from the truck which used to bring or carry away the goods from the Mills of the respondent. In the alternative it has been contended by the learned Advocate for the appellant, that the case of fhb appellant would be covered by item XXVI of Schedule 2.
4. In the application under section 10 of the Workmen's Com--pensation Act filed by the appellant all that was stated was that the appellant was stacking grain bags in the respondent's Mills Godown. No mention whatsoever has been made in this applica--tion that the appellant was actually, generally or even occasionally, engaged in loading or unloading of goods in a mechanically propelled vehicle. Similarly in the original notice of demand, which is a statutory notice under section 10 of the Workmen's Compensation Act all that is stated is that the appellant was "'--working as a labourer within the premises of the respondent Mills and that while he was stacking grain bags, he met with Abdul Be an accident by falling from the ladder. It is significant that the appellant has not stated that he was loading grain on a mechanically propelled vehicle.
Again in his evidence before the Com--missioner, the appellant had not stated that he was loading the goods on any mechanically propelled vehicle or his employment involved such work or duties. All that he said was that he was a labourer for loading and unloading of goods. The learned Advocate for the appellant has relied on one sentence appearing in examination-in-chief of the appellant which sentence reads as follows:- "There were treks from 5 to 10. "
I have failed to see the significance of this assertion but I must say that this statement falls far short of establishing that the injury was suffered by the appellant while he was loading the goods on a truck or that the work of appellant involved loading or unloading of goods in a Truck.
Similarly Baig Muhammad, the witness of the appellant had not stated before the Commissioner that the appellant received the Injury or not with an accident while he was loading the goods in a mechanically propelled vehicle nor has he stated that the appellant was engaged for loading goods in vehicles.
5. The evidence of the respondent and his witnesses also expressed a denial of the appellant having met with an accident while loading the goods on a mechanically propelled vehicle.
6. Coming to the scheme of schedule of Workmen's Compensation Act, it will be seen that it is not every person engaged in loading and unloading of goods that is covered by the Schedule. There are various items in this Schedule dealing with the case of compensation to such persons as are involved in the work of loading and unloading. Item VII concerns payment of compen--sation to such persons as are employed for loading and unloading A of goods in ships. Similarly item VIII deals with employment in the construction, repair or demolition of buildings or structure which of necessity will also involve a fair amount of work of loading or unloading. Similarly item XVII of the Schedule relates to such workmen as are employed in the operation of any ferry boat capable of carrying more than 10 persons. Even such operation will involve loading and unloading of goods.
The instance in the Schedule can be multiplied to many more by a close examination of various items in the Schedule. I have analysed these items for the purpose of examining whether each and every person who may be employed in loading and unloading operations will be entitled to compensation and I am clearly of the view that it is not correct to assume that every person so employed is entitled to compensation. It seems that the Legislature wanted to provide compensation to all such persons employed in loading and unloading work only if the very nature of employment involved a dangerous or hazardous occupation. It would be seen that just a: construction or demolition of buildings is a dangerous occupation by itself so is the plying of a ferry boat On the other hand a person who is employed for handling or transporting the goods is entitled to compensation under item XXVII only if 10 or more persons are employed for the purpose.
The employment of 10 or more persons would by itself imply a fair amount of hazard because the employment of such a big number of labourers would indicate that the magnitute of the work is very large.
Reverting then to item VII-a in the Schedule, I am of the view that this item has been provided for the benefit of such persons who are employed in loading and unloading of goods in mechanically propelled vehicles and that also within the District of Karachi. The idea underlying is obvious. In the City of Karachi where there is vast traffic, such persons who are carried on trucks for the purpose of loading and unloading of goods from the truck are exposed to peril and hazard. This item in my view covers only such persons who are employed for this purpose viz. to load or unload goods from trucks etc. It is common knowledge that carries engage labourers for the purpose of loading and unloading of goods and such labourers keep moving with the transport. This item in my view is designed to cover the cases of such persons and not of that class of labourers who are employed within the precincts of a Warehouse or Go--down. The word precincts is significant. It implies cot merely the Warehouse itself out also the space around it, which is kept for the purpose of the benefit of the Warehouse. For example a Warehouse may be having a compound Micro trucks come for loading or unloading. If a labourer loads or unloads goods from the Warehouse to the truck 'or vice versa, his case may be covered under item XXVII, depending on the number of persons employed; but Item VII-a is not attracted to such work.
I have arrived at this Conclusion by, having regard to the well, established maxim of interpretation, of laws, pro--viding for consideration of the various parts of the statutes as a whole and prohibiting interpretation in isolation.
7. I am, therefore, of the view that item (VII-a) of Schedule 2 of Workmen's Compensation Act is not attracted to this case. I feel that this is a b1lated attempt on the part of the appellant to bring iris case within item (VII-a). I am fortified in this view because of the reason that the pleadings arid the initial notice did not mention the appellant having received these injuries while loading the goods on a truck.
8. The learned Advocate for the appellant has alternatively invoked item XXVI of Schedule, of the workmen's Compensa--tion Act and has attempted to show that 10 or more persons were employed by the respondent. On this point the learned Commissioner has considered all the evidence that had been produced before him; and came to the conclusion that the res--pondent's Mill did not employ 10 or more persons, and there--fore item XXVI of Schedule 2 of the Act was not attracted.
Although this is a finding of fact and under section 30 of the Workmen's Compensation Act such a finding is not to be lightly disturbed, but I have all the same considered the evidence on that point.
The appellant in his evidence has stated that 20 to 25 persons are employed by the respondent.
Baig Muhammad witness of the appellant has however state] that number of workers of the Mills of the Opponent is 6 to 8. In fact in cross-examination this witness stated that only four persons were in the Godown on the day in question. Oil the other hand respondent in his evidence had state.' that 10 or more persons were never employed by him. Faqir Muhammad son of Dada another defence witnes9 has categorically stated that four persons are employed in the; Mills of the respondent.
9. On a consideration of all this evidence, I find that the conclusion on point of fact arrived at by the learned Commis--sioner is fair and correct. It was open to him to come to that conclusion and he has arrived at that finding of fact on consideration of all the material evidence on the record in that context.
I, therefore, do not find any substance in the alternate con--tention of the learned Advocate when raising the point that the case of the appellant fell under item XXV1, Schedule, 2 of the Workmen's Compensation Act.
10. Besides the above two points no other point has been raised before me. I find no merit in this appeal and it is dismissed.
11. In the circumstances of this case there shall be no order as to costs.