' This constitutional petition has been filed to call in question the order dated 20-10-1986 passed by the learned District Judge, Lahore as an Appellate Authority under the West Pakistan (now Punjab) urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, VI of 1959 whereby he rejected the petitioner's appeal against the Controller's order dated 19-2-1986 directing the petitioner to vacate commercial property bearing No.SE-9R-57/4 and 57/5 Brandreth Road, Lahore within four months.
2. On 11-5-1982, the respondent Muhammad Yaseen filed an ejectment petition against the petitioner/Bank for eviction on the grounds of default in payment of rent since 1977 and requirement of the premises for business to be set-up therein by the landlord's sons Naeem Akbar Yaseen and Akhtar Yaseen. The Bank controverted both the pleas and denied the good faith of the landlord because of his intention to enhance rent. The matter was accordingly set down to be tried and on the basis of evidence led by the parties the learned Controller answered the issue with regard to default against the landlord with the observation as under:- "On the other hand, the respondent/bank has tendered in evidence Exhs.R-2 to R.10 being the challan forms deposited with the Excise & Taxation and Income-tax Department as discharge of the liability of the petitioner. Similarly, Exhs.R-11 to R-20 being the pay slips/pay orders have also been placed on record for the above-said payments to the Taxation Deparments concerned. I have calculated the amount for the period of alleged default with that of the one deposited vide Exhs.R-2 to R-20 by the respondent/bank and have come to the conclusion that the respondent is not found in arrears of the rent liable for payment to the petitioner. The issue is, therefore, decided in negative."
' The other issue, relating to personal need, was, however, decided in favour of the landlord for the reason that his two sons who had recently completed their education were required to be put in business and that a single shop admittedly occupied by the landlord could not accommodate four members of his family and order of eviction was accordingly passed on 19-2-1986 by granting four months time.
3. In an appeal thereagainst filed by the petitioner/Bank before the learned District Judge, Lahore, the order of eviction was sought to be defended on behalf of the landlord on the ground even of default in payment of rent which had been decided against him by the Controller and this led the petitioner/Bank to put in an application for grant of permission to produce 81 more documents in evidence for controverting the plea of default because they had been sent to the Central Store- Room of the Bank and were not available at the time of -evidence. Landlord's counsel contested the application but considering that the grant of permission would further delay the matter, he decided to gave up the ground of default. Learned District Judge, however, noticed that the Controller has not specified the period for which the amount was payable by the Bank and has not mentioned even the amount which the Bank had paid to the Government Departments on the basis of documents placed on the record. Thus, he considered that the Controller's finding on the issue was not helpful for determining the truth or otherwise of the ground of default but, in view of the abandonment of the plea of default, disposed of the matter with the observation that this ground would not anywise affect the decision of the other issue. The case was argued before the learned District Judge with reference only to the personal need alleged by the landlord but he affirmed the finding recorded by the Controller about the requirement of the landlord for the independent business of the two sons who were jobless since 1979-80. He held also that a basement available under the building in dispute could hardly be considered a suitable place for the business of Hardware desired to be set up for the sons of the landlord and upholding his plea, rejected the appeal on 20-10-1986 by giving a further period of three months to the Bank for vacating the premises.
4. Learned counsel for the petitioner has assailed the impugned orders of ejectment mainly on the ground that although the landlord had admitted in the course of evidence that he in occupation of a shop wherein he is running his own business in which he is being helped by another son Liaquat, yet, since he had not disclosed in the eviction-petition that he owned and occupied another shop in the same urban area in which the shop in dispute is situated, therefore, he stood precluded from showing that the shop in his admitted possession was inadequate for the need of his sons. In the same strain, he has further argued that such a non-disclosure has the effect also of seriously reflecting upon the bona fides cf the landlord with regard to his alleged personal need. In addition to relying on Abdul Majid v. Anwar Ali 1983 CLC 2511 in support of his arguments, he has referred also to an unreported judgment of this Court passed on 1-12-1975 in S.A.O. No.291 of 1975.
' In reply, learned counsel for the respondent-landlord has contended that the omission of the landlord to disclose in the ejectment petition that he owned and occupied another shop was inadvertent and not wilful inasmuch as he has readily disclosed this fact in his evidence and has sought to distinguish the judgments relied upon for the petitioner on the ground thet in those cases the landlords had deliberately tried to suppress the fact of their being in possession of other properties in the same urban areas. He has placed strong reliance on Muhammad Asif v. Noor Ahmad and 7 others 185 CLC 2498 wherein the case of Abdul Majid (supra) was considered and distinguished for the very same reason and it was held that the question of bona fide requirement of landlord has to be examined in the context of all the relevant facts and circumstances. He has also referred to Zahoor Din v. Mirza Ayub Baig 1981 SCMR 1081 and Muhammad Ibrahim v. Fakir Muhammad 1982 CLC 230 for the submission that the ingredients of section 13 of the Ordinance are not required to be specifically pleaded and has cited Mushtaq Ahmad v. Addl. District Judge, etc. 1986 MLD 428 in support of his argument that the landlord's possession of a shop for his own business cannot prejudice his claim about the premises in dispute being required for setting up independent business for his sons.
5. After giving my anxious consideration to the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the parties and going through the cases cited at the Bar as also the evidence led in this case, I am constrained to conclude that the plea raised in support of this writ petition does not have merit and is rather misconceived. Relevant provision made in section 13(3)(ii) of the Ordinance is as under:- "(3)(a) A landlord may apply to the Controller for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession. In the case of non-residential building or a scheduled building or rented land, if---
(a) he requires it in good faith for his own use or for the use of any of his male children;
(b) he or his said child is not occupying in the same urban area in which such building is situated for the purpose of his business any other such building suitable for his needs at the time; and
(c) he has not vacated such a building without sufficient cause after the commencement of this Ordinance, in the said urban area:
(b) The Controller shall, if he is satisfied that the claim of the landlord is bona fide, make an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building on such date as may be specified by the Controller and if the Controller is not so satisfied, he shall make an order rejecting the application."
' The use of expression 'or' in the above-quoted sub-clause (b) appears to convey that the question of occupation of another building in the same urban area has reference to the person whose need is urged as a ground and where a landlord maintains a petition for issuance of a direction to the tenant to put him in possession of a non-residential building to meet his requirement for its use by his male child, there the question of occupation of another similar building by the said child would be relevant and not the occupation by the landlord himself.
' In the present case there is no evidence even worth the name led to the effect that either of those two sons of the landlord may ever have been in possession of any shop. Such is not the case of the petitioner-Bank who did not contest the case before the Controller even with reference to the possession of a shop by the landlord himself which acutally is only irrelevant in the circumstances because it is well-settled that the choice for eviction from a particular premises lies exclusively with the landlord who cannot be told to maintain his plea not with regard to the property sued about but for another one. Sabu Mal v. Kika Ram alias Heman Das 1973 SCMR 185 refers, as also Dr. A.R.
Khan v. Muhammad Ishaque 1972 SCMR 437 wherein, at page 440 appear the following observations:- "The learned District Judge was wrongly influenced by the circumstances that the respondent had not thought of putting his son earlier in business although he was out of job for three years. It was for the landlord to decide as to the opportune time for putting his son in business depending on his resources and opprtunities. Again, the opinion of the learned District Judge that the respondent should have put his son in business in Rawalpindi, which was a more prosperous town from the business point of view than Murree, is merely fanciful. It was wrong on the part of the learned District Judge to assume the role of a gratuitous adviser as to which place was more suitable for the son of the respondent to set up his business."
' A fortiori, there can be no warrant for compelling the landlord to join his sons in his own business and his plea for setting up independent business for them cannot be taken to have been prejudiced by the fact even that he may have a shop in his possession big enough to accommodate his sons. Hence, the respondent landlord's omission to make a mention in the petition about the shop in his own possession is only immaterial.
6. Two authorities of competent jurisdiction have found that the landlord in good faith requires the shop in dispute for the use of his sons and the petitioner's advocate has not assailed these findings before me on their merit. Actually, this case stands concluded by the concurrent findings recorded about the bona fide requirement of the shop which is a question of pure fact and is not open to be questioned in writ proceedings which can be maintained to challenge orders which may either be of no legal effect or be considered to have been passed without lawful authority as propounded in Muhammad Hussain Munir and others v. Sikandar and others PLD 1974 SC 139 wherein it was held that these terms are expressions of art and refer to jurisdictional defects as distinguished from mere erroneous decisions whether on questions of fact or even of law and it was declared: - "It is wholly wrong to consider that the constitutional provision was designed to empower the High Court to interfere with the decision of a Court or tribunal of inferior jurisdiction, merely because in its opinion the decision is wrong. In that case, it would make the High Court's jurisdiction indistinguishable from that exerciseable in a full-fledged appeal, which plainly is not the intention of the Constitution-makers. When there is jurisdiction to decide a particular matter then there is jurisdiction to decide it rightly or wrongly and the fact that the decision is incorrect does not render the decision without jurisdiction."
' Again, in Abdul Rehman Bajwa v. Sultan and 9 others PLD 1981 SC 522 it was held:- "The question of jurisdiction of the High Courts under Article 199 has come under consideration in a number of cases before this Court and it has been repeatedly held that if a Court or Tribunal set up under the ordinary law has the jurisdiction to decide a particular matter then there is jurisdiction to decide it rightly or wrongly and the fact that the decision is incorrect, or is not one at which the High Court would have arrived does not render the decision without jurisdiction."
' Similarly, Abdul Ghani, v. Mst. Zahida Begum and others PLD 1982 Lahore 401 is also in point wherein the question of bona fide requirement for personal use of the premises by the landlord was contested in a writ petition and it was held on the authority of Muhammad Sharif and another v.
Muhammad Afzal Sohail etc. PLD 1981 SC 246 that the issue being one of fact is not open to be contested in writ proceedings.
6. Result of the foregoing is that there is no case made outherein at all for interference in exercise of constitutional jurisdiction. The writ petition is accordingly dismissed with costs.