' The petitioner, in this case, has questioned vires of the judgment passed by Advisory Board, Punjab, Lahore, dated 24-4-1986, upholding the findings recorded by respondent No.2 in order dated 21-3-1985.
2. I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner at length. In substance the controversy, in this case, revolves around interpretation of sections 24 (2), 26 (6) and 26-A of the Electricity Act, 1910, hereinafter referred to as the Act.
3. The relevant facts in the context of the present petition are that petitioner No.2, apprehending misrecording of electric meter installed at the premises of respondent No. 3, had it removed and sent it to petitioner's Laboratory for ascertaining its accuracy. Subsequently, an opinion was formed that respondent No.3 had been illegally consuming energy beyond the recording apparatus, thus he was served with a detection bill for a sum of Rs.1,06,200. He disputed the same and referred the matter to respondent No.2 for adjudication, as contemplated by section 24 (2) of the Act.--The respondent No.2 conducted a full fledged inquiry, where the parties adduced their evidence, witnesses were cross-examined, and finally a detailed reasoned judgment was delivered on 21-3- 1985. The petitioner, feeling aggrieved by this order challenged the same in appeal before respondent No.1 which was dismissed vide impugned order dated 24-4-1986. The respondent No.1, inter alia, held that since neither the cause nor the factum of theft has been established by the petitioner before respondent No.2, therefore, reference to section 26-A of the Electricity Act is not warranted.
4. It is contended by the learned counsel for petitioner that section 26-A of the Act was introduced by way of amendment in the year 1979, whereby exclusive jurisdiction has been conferred on WAPDA in cases of theft to make assessment and accordingly bill on the basis of various formulas prescribed therein; and that respondents Nos.1 and 2 do not figure anywhere in this scheme of things. Further, section 26(6) and section 24 (2) of the Act have no bearing whatsoever. It is also submitted that section 26(6) only deals with defective meter, which has not been the case of petitioner; whereas jurisdiction of respondent No.2 under section 24 (2) stands ousted in view of amendment introduced by virtue of section 26-A, of the Act.
5. In order of the appreciate arguments of the learned counsel for petitioners, it would be condusive to reproduce the text of these sections herein below:- "S. 24 (2), Where any difference or dispute as to any matter connected with any charge or other sum included in the bill of a licensee has been referred by a consumer under this Act to an Electric Inspector before the notice as aforesaid has been given by the licensee, the licensee, shall not exercise the powers conferred by subsection (1) until the Inspector has ivenisecision: Provided that the prohibition contained in this subsection shall not apply in any case in which the licensee has made a request in writing to the consumer for a deposit with the licensee of the undisputed charges and other sums and with the Electric Inspector of fifty per cent. Of the disputed charges and other sums and for the deposit with the licensee of further charges for supply of energy, as they accrue, and the consumer has failed to comply with such request within a period of fifteen days from the date of such request or, as the case may be, from the date of receipt of bills in respect of further charges for supply of energy. S.26 (6). Where any difference or dispute arises between a licensee and a consumer as to whether any meter, maximum demand indicator or other measuring apparatus in or is not correct, the matter shall be decided, upon the application of either party, by an Electric Inspector, within a period of ninety days from the date of receipt of such application, after affording the parties an opportunity of being heard and where the meter, maximum demand indicator or other measuring apparatus has, in the opinion of the Electric Inspector, ceased to be correct, the Electric Inspector shall estimate the amount of energy supplied to the consumer or the electrical quantity contained in the supply, during such time as the meter, maximum demand indicator or measuring, apparatus has not, in the opinion of the Electric Inspector, been correct; and, where, the Electric Inspector fails to decide the matter of difference or dispute within the said period or where either the licensee or the consumer decline to accept the decision of the Electric Inspector, the matter shall be referred to the Provincial Government whose decision shall be final: ' Provided that, before either a licensee of consumer applies to the Electric Inspector under this subsection, he shall give to the other party no less than seven days' notice of his intention so to do."
S. 26-A. Dishonest abstraction or consumption of energy-- Notwithstanding anything contained in section 23, the licensee may charge the consumer on the basis of one or more of the following considerations for the amount of energy deemed to have been dishonestly abstracted, consumed or used, for the period during which the meter maximum demand indicator or other measuring apparatus had, in the opinion of the licensee, remained connected, disconnected, injured, altered or prevented from registering the amount of energy supplied or the electrical quantity contained in the supply:-
(a) consumer's connected load or maximum demand in kilowatt hours during any period;
(b) consumer's maximum consumption of energy in kilowatt hours during any period;
(c) consumer's load factor;
(d) the power of consumer's load;
(e) the hours and the time for which the energy is deemed to have been abstracted, consumed or used by the consumer; and
(1) the purposes for which the energy is deemed to have been abstracted, consumed or used by the consumer."
6. As mentioned earlier section 26-A of the Act, was introduced by way of an amendment in the year 1979, and at that point of time, section 24 (2) and section 26 (6) of the Act were already inscribed on the statute book. It starts off with a non-obstente clause, by deploying the expression "notwithstanding any thing contained in section 23 ", which demonstrates beyond any degree of ambiguity, the obvious intendment of the Legislatures. The Legislature, at the time of the amendment, was not oblivious of the provisions of section 24 (2) and section 26 (6) of the Act and it preferred in its wisdom to exclude only section 23 from the rigour of the operational ambit of the newly added section, thus, leaving the afore referred two sections, immune from its impact. Had it entertained any notion to the contrary, then there was nothing in its way to add in the non obstente clause section 24 (2) as well as section 26 (6) of the Act or it could have still further easily adopted a blanket formula, for instance "notwithstanding the aforegoings....". To my mind, this devise has been adopted as a matter of design and not omission. This interpretation is fortified by having a recovery to Rule of interpretation enshrined in the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius.
7. Upon literal as well as logical construction of the section 26-A of the Act, I am convinced that although the Legislature by virtue of this newly added section has conferred jurisdiction on petitioner for making assessm ent and accordingly right to bill in cases of dishonest consumption of electricity, but at the same time, the Legislature has not manifested any intention to immune such an action of petitioner from the jurisdiction of respondent No.2, as contemplated by section 26 (6), which has limited scope as to defective metering apparatus, and section 24 (2) of the Act, which obliges respondent No.2 to adjudicate upon any dispute and difference resulting out of billing/charges etc between consumer and the licensee i.e. Petitioner No.1. The expression deployed by the Legislature in section 24 (2) of the Act i.e. "Any" is of the widest import, and it embraces within its connotation every conceivable controversy, free from all fetters, between a consumer and petitioner regarding billing and charges etc.
8. I am of the firm opinion, upon a conjunctive reading of section 24(2) and section 26-A of the Act, that the Legislature clearly intended that action taken by petitioner under section 26-A should remain subservient to powers/duties of respondent No. 2 as contemplated by section 24 (2) of the Act. Such an interpretation appeals to reason because there should be an independent forum, in the nature of respondents Nos. 1 and 2, for resolution of differences and disputes on account of billing by petitioner, otherwise, the society would be exposed to its arbitrariness, leaving consumer with the only choice of like it or lump it, which would inevitably further encourage corruption in the petitioner's department, the magnitude of which is not beyond reasonable comprehension to comprehend.
9. Having arrived at the conclusion that respondents Nos. 1 and 2 had the jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the matter duly referred to them.
' I have examined the impugned order as well as the order of respondent No.2. There is concurrent findings of facts and I see no reason to interfere with the same.
10. In this view of the matter, I find no merits in this writ petition, which is accordingly dismissed in limine.