SAAD SAOOD JAN J.-- The petitioner was serving as an Executive Engineer, Class-I, in the Military Engineering Service, Ministry of Defence. Soon after the promulgation of the Martial Law in October, 1958, screening committees were constituted to examine the service records of the Government servants. On 31-12-1958, the relevant screening committee served a notice upon the petitioner why action should not be taken against him. On 18-3--1959, the petitioner was informed that his record was not satisfactory and he was called upon to show cause why he should riot be compulsorily retired from service on the ground of inefficiency. He submitted his reply in due course and even appeared in person before the committee. On 1-6-1959 the Committee made a recommendation that he should be compulsorily retired from service. He preferred an appeal against the said finding. On 27-6-1959 a Gazette Notification was issued retiring him from service from the date on which he was actually relieved. He was relieved from his post on 1-1-1960. On 23-12-1965, he filed a suit challenging his retirement from service. The suit was resisted by the respondent and one of the pleas taken by it related to limitation. The trial Court held that the suit was within time but that the order of retirement did not suffer from any legal infirmity; accordingly it dismissed the suit. The petitioner preferred an appeal before the Additional District Judge. The learned Additional District Judge held that the suit was barred by limitation; accordingly he dismissed the appeal. The petitioner then filed a second appeal in the High Court which too was dismissed on the ground that the suit was barred by time. He now seeks leave to appeal from this Court.
2. The Gazette notification directing his compulsory retirement from service was issued on 27-6- 1959. It was this notification which provided him with a cause of action. He instituted the suit on 23- 12-1965, this is, more than six years after the right to sue had accrued to him. Admittedly, the limitation in this case was governed by Article 120, Limitation Act. The suit was therefore barred by time.
3. The learned counsel for the petitioner contends that as he was actually relieved on 1-1-1960, it is this date and not the date when the Gazette notification was issued which should be regarded as the starting point for limitation. It is difficult to agree with the learned counsel. Apart from the Gazette notification there is no other order directing the retirement of the petitioner. The grievance of the petitioner is also against the order of retirement. Thus, so far as this order is concerned the limitation started running against him on 27-6-1959. In the circumstances, the fact that he actually relinquished charge of his post on 1-1-1960 will not furnish him with a fresh cause of action as the act of relinquishment was merely of a consequential nature. We are therefore unable to find any merit in this petition. It is hereby dismissed.