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1987 PLC 470

Syed MANZAR ABBAS vs GLAXO LABORATORIES(PAKISTAN) Ltd.

Citation1987 PLC 470
CourtLabour Appellate Tribunal
Case No.Appeal No. LHR-639 of 1982
Date1984-06-13
Judge(s)Sardar Muhammad Abdul Ghafoor Khan Lodhi
ResultAppeal accepted

The decision, dated 6-11-1982 recorded by the learned Presiding Officer, Punjab Labour Court No.1, Lahore has been challenged in this While the appellant was going out of the Laboratories, the toolbox of his scooter was searched on 20-8-1981, resulting in the recovery of one kilogram of Glucose. The appellant was charge-sheeted and an enquiry was held which culminated in his dismissal from service. The plea of the appellant was that the charge-sheet Exh.P.6 delivered on 7-10-1981 was time-barred. He admitted the recovery of the Glucose but pleaded that he had purchased it from the shop of the Laboratories few days back. The plea that the Glucose had been purchased is not acceptable. The article was not purchased on the day of recovery but is alleged to have been purchased few days back.

Obviously, if it was purchased, it was to be taken to home. Question arises why it was not taken on the day it was purchased and why was being taken away on 20-8-1981. There is no plausible explanation. The other plea is that, since the appellant is admittedly a heart patient, so he keeps Glucose with him. For heart attack one kilogram is not taken but a very small quantity is taken, so there was no justification to keep one kilogram of Glucose. So it was established that it was stolen property. Admittedly Glucose is used in the Laboratories and since it was recovered within the Laboratories, so it was the property of the respondent.

3. The plea of the charge-sheet being time-barred, however, appears to be -correct. There are two charge-sheets. One is Exh.P.11, dated 26-8-1981 and the other is Exh.P.6, dated 16-9-1981. The case of the respondent is that the charge-sheet, dated 26-9-1981 was delivered to the appellant on the said date and as he fainted, so receipt could not be taken from him. The appellant admits having fainted on 26-8-1981 but does not admit the cause and the factum that the charge-sheet was delivered to him on the said date. If a charge-sheet had in reality been prepared on 26-8-1981, then there was no need of the preparation of another charge-sheet, dated 16-9-1981, rather the same charge-sheet EXh.P.11 that, according to the respondent, could not be delivered, should have been served upon the appellant. This is noteworthy that in Exh.P.12 wherein it is mentioned that a charge-sheet, dated 16-9-1981 had been sent by registered post and had been published in Nawa- i-Waqt of 17th, it was not mentioned that charge-sheet was shown to the appellant on 26-8-1981 but could not be delivered as he had after reading it fainted. It is thus clear that the charge-sheet Exh.P.11 neither existed nor had been shown to the appellant on 26-8-1981 and this story was prepared afterwards after coming to know that the period for serving the charge-sheet had expired and the charge-sheet, dated 16-9-1981 had come back undelivered with the report that the addressee was not present at his house. Usually letters are sent in closed envelops and at the time of delivering them signatures are received. This is not the case of the respondent that open charge-sheet was delivered on 26-8-1981. So if in reality a charge-sheet had been delivered on 26- 3-1981, before delivery a receipt would have been taken and there had been no necessity of serving the charge-sheet again and publishing it in the newspaper. It has been argued that sending of charge-sheet by registered post was enough compliance and it was immaterial that the letters came back with the report that the address was not available at his house. This argument is not acceptable. If a letter sent by registered post does not come back, the presumption is that it has reached the addressee but when the letter comes back unserved with the report that the addressee was not found, there is no presumption that it has reached the addressee. It has also been argued that since three times the report was that the addressee was not present at home, it be presumed that he was inside the, house and deliberately did not come out. I am afraid no such presumption arises. The appellant was admittedly on leave in those days, so may have gone out of station Service by publication is a substituted service and unless service by ordinary means has become impossible, service by publication does not raise any presumption of the service of a letter. In the present case publication was got made simultaneously alongwith sending of charge- sheet by registered post. If publication had been made after the letter had come back undelivered, it could be accepted as a legal service. It cannot, therefore, be presumed that on 17th which is the date of publication, the appellant learnt about the charge-sheet. The appellant said that he learnt on 22-9-1981. As by that time period of service of charge-sheet had expired, the appellant is entitled to its benefit. The respondent said in written statement that on 21-8-1981 he came to know of the misconduct. So time started from 21st and ended on 20-9-1981. Since the appellant learnt about the charge-sheet on 22-9-1981, the charge-sheet was time-barred. The learned lower Court has missed to consider this complicated aspect of the case and thus fell in error in holding that the charge-sheet was served within time.

4. As a result, the appeal is accepted and setting aside the impugned decision of the learned lower court, the appellant is directed to be reinstated in service. He is not entitled to back benefits as he has succeeded purely on a technical ground of the charge-sheet having not been served within time.

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