1. The present application under section 34 of 1. R. O., 1969 was filed by applicant Maqsood Ahmad Chohan against Messrs Firdous Rubber Industries on 9th August 1972 in this Court.
2. During the pendency of this application Industrial Relations (Amendment) Ordinance of 1972 was promulgated which amended the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. Under the Amendment Ordinance of 1972, individual workman could not file application under section 34 of I. R. O. but could only do so under section 25-A of the same Ordinance.
3. Considering the above amendment; Mr. Obaidur Rehman, the learned Representative for the respondents made an applica--tion on 21st November 1972 in which he submitted that in view of the Amendment Ordinance of 1972, application under section 34 of I R. O., 1969 by individual workman was not maintainable. Hence he prayed that the present application be dismissed on that ground.
4. Looking to the importance of the question involved and looking to the vast number of cases under section 34, I. R. O. 1969, tiled by the individual workman pending in this Court, I requested all that senior Representatives to enlighten the Court on the legal aspect of this matter.
5. On 7th December 1972 the above-named learned Legal Representatives appeared and addressed the Court on this important point.
6. Mr. Ubaidur Rehman who had raised the objection read section 28 of the Amendment Ordinance of 1972 which gives pro---section to the proceedings under subsection (4) of section 25-A of I. R. O., 1969 pending in this Court prior to the resent amendment. Section 28 of Amendment Ordinance of 1972 reads as under:-- "Saving.-Nothing in this Ordinance shall b deemed to-
(a) require the transfer to the Junior Labour Court of any matter under subsection (4) of section 25-A which may be pending before a Labour Court immediately before the com--mencement of this Ordinance ; or
(b) affect any appeal from an order of a Labour Court which may be pending before the Labour Appellate Tribunal immediately before such commencement."
7. He has further read clause 2(b) of section 67 of I. R. O., 1969, which according to him did not attract the provi4ons of the present Amendment Ordinance. His case i9 that if the intention of the Legislature was to protect the proceedings udder section 34 of I. R. O., 1969 filed by the individual workman, there should have been a saving clause as given under section 28 of the Amending Ordinance in respect of proceedings under subsection (a) of section 25-A, I. R. O. Thus he contends that all the cases of the individual workman become infructuous in view, of the latest amendment.
8. Mr. Masood Mirza was also of the view that all the proceedings under section 34,
1. R. O., 1969, pending in this Court prior to the amendment filed by the individual workers stand abated on the day the amendment came into force. His arguments were almost similar to those of Mr. Obaidur Rehman.
9. I have then heard Messrs Wasi Ahmed, Ghulam Hasan, S. M. Yaqoob, Abdul Majeed, Mahmood Akhtar, Mahmood Abdul Ghani and Saeed Pasha Lodhi. All of them were of -the opposite view. Their stand is that the pending cases under section 34 of I. R. O. filed by the individual workman prior to the Amend--ment Ordinance are to be tried and disposed of in the same way as prior to the said amendment. According to them it is a vested right of the individual workman, which could not be extinguished without specific enactment. They have argued that the proceed--ings under subsection (4) of section 25-A of I. R. O., 1969 have been protected under section 28 of the Amendment Ordinance of 1972, because the complete forum of the proceedings under section 25- A have been changed by the Amendment Ordinance. Under section 36-A, Junior Labour Courts have been set up and all proceedings under section 25-A shall be tried by the said Courts. The Labour Courts become Courts of appeal under section 36-D of I. R. O. in respect of cases under section 25-A decided by the Junior Labour Courts. They are, therefore, of the view that since the very forum of trial has been changed, it was necessary for the Legislature: to have incorporated the saving clause in respect of pending proceedings under subsection (4) of sec--tion 25-A before the Labour Courts. They have relied upon section 6 of the General Clauses Act. They have also taken me through Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes. Therein on p. 206, retrospective operation as regards vested rights has been explained. Finally they have relied upon the decision of the Appellate Tribunal West Pakistan as -reported in 1970 PLC 373 in support of their contention.
10. I have considered all aspects of the case. I have considered the arguments advanced by the learned Representatives on this point. I have gone through the case-law quoted.
11. The Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 came into operation on 3rd November 1969. Section 34 of this Ordinance reads as under:- "Application to Labour Court.-Any party to an Industrial dispute relating to a matter arising out of any right guaranteed or secured to an employer or workman by or under any law for the time being in force or an award or settlement may" apply to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute."
12. In 1970, another Amendment Ordinance was passed. Therein section 34 was amended as under:- "Application to Labour Court.-Any collective bargaining agent or any employer or workman may apply to the Labour Court for the enforcement of any right guaranteed or secured to it or him by or under any law or any :ward or settlement."
13. Finally under the present amendment which came into being under Amendment Ordinance of 1972, section 34 reads as under:- "Application to Labour Court.-Any collective bargaining agent or any employer may apply to the Labour Courts for the enforcement of any right guaranteed or secured to it or him by or under any law or any award or settlement."
14. I have, given the definitions of section 34 of I. R. O., 1969, under the original Ordnance as well as under the amending Ordinances in order to distinguish the terms laid down therein.
15. Tow section 25-A was inserted by Labour Laws Amendment Ordinance, 1972, which came into force on 13th April 1912. Section 25-A lays down as under:- "Redress of individual grievances.-(1) A worker may bring his grievance in respect of any right guaranteed or secured to him by or under any law or any award ox settlement for the time being in force to the notice of his employer in writing, either himself or through his Shop Steward or Trade Union, within three months of the day on which the cause of such grievance arises.
(2) Where a worker himself brings his grievance to the notice of the employer, the employer shall, within fifteen days of the grievance being brought to his notice, communicate his decision in writing to the worker.
(3) Where a worker brings his grievance to the notice of his employer through his Shots Steward or Trade Union, the employer shall, within seven days of the grievance being brought to his notice, communicate his decision in writing to the Shop Steward or, as the case may be, the Trade Union.
(4) if the employer fails to communicate a decision within the period specified in subsection (2) or, as the case may be, subsection (3), or if the, worker ;s dissatisfied with such decision, the worker or the Shop Steward may take the matter to his Trade Union or the Labour Court or, as the case may be, the Trace Union way take the matter to the Labour Court, and, where the matter is taken to the Labour Court it shall give an awarded within twenty days from the date of the matter being brought before it as such matter were an industrial dispute:- Provided that a worker who desires to so take the matter to the Labour Court from the date of the communication of the employer the case may be, from the expiry of the period mentioned in subsection (2) or subsection (3), as the case may be.
(5) In adjudicating and determining a grievance under subsection (4), the Labour Court shall go into all the facts of the case and pass such orders as may be just and proper in the circumstances of the cases."
16. In the latest amendment of section 25-A, clause (6) has been added and the amended section 25-A as it stands at the moment reads as under:- "Redress of individual grievances.-(1) A worker may bring his grievance in respect of any right guaranteed or secured to him by or under any law or any award or settlement for the time being in force to the notice of his employer in writing, either himself or through his Shop ,Steward or Trade Union, within three months of the day on which cause of such grievance arises.
(2) Where a worker himself brings his grievance to the notice of the employer, the employer shall, within fifteen days of the grievance being brought to his notice, communicate his decision in writing to the worker.
(3) Where a worker brings his grievance to the notice of his employer through his Shop Steward or Trade Union, the employer shall, within, seven days of the grievance being -brought to his notice, communicate his decision in writing to the Shop Steward or, as the case may be, the Trade Union.
(4) If the employer fails to communicate a decision within the period specified in subsection,(23 or, as the case may be, subsection (3), or if the worker is dis-satisfied with such decision, the worker or Shop Steward may take the matter to his Trade Union or the Junior Labour Court, or, as the case may be, the Trade Union may take the matter to the Junior Labour Court, and where the matter is taken to the Junior Labour Court, it shall give a decision within seven days from the date of the matter being brought before it as if such matter were an industrial dispute Provided that a worker who desires to so take the matter to the junior Labour Court shall do so within a period of two months from the date of the communication of the employer or, as the case may be, from the expiry of the period mentioned in subsection (2) or subsection (3), as the case may be,
(5) In adjudicating and determining a grievance under sub--section (4), the Junior Labour Court shall go into all the facts of the case and pass such orders as may be just and proper in the circumstances of the case.
(6) Notwithstanding anything contained in subsections (1) to (5), any workman aggrieved by the termination of his employment as a result of retrenchment, dismissal, discharge, lay-off, lock-out or otherwise after the commencement of this Ordinance may make an application to a Junior Labour Court having jurisdiction in the area in which the establishment Is situated."
17. Thus the cases filed by individual workmen under section 25-A are to be tried and disposed of by Junior Labour Courts as required by Amendment Ordinance of 1972. Appeal against their orders lies with the Labour Courts. In the latest amend--ment word "workman" has been removed from section 34 of I. R. O. in order to facilitate the individual workman to, seek remedy before the Junior Labour Courts who have to decide their cases within seven days under sub-clause (2) of section.36-B of the 1. R. O. Thus they would get expedicious disposal of their cases. Since the forum of the proceedings under section 25.A of 1. R. O. has been totally changed, the Legislature thought it necessary to protect the proceedings already pending in the Labour Courts under section 25-A by providing a saving clause under section 23 of the Amendment Ordinance, 1972. Likewise, they have protected under section 28(b) of the Amending Ordinance the appeal from an order of the Labour Court passed in proceedings under section 25-A of the Ordinance.
18. As far as the pending proceedings under section 3 4 of I. R. O. fused by the individual workman in the Labour Courts are concerned, it is altogether a different matter. Cases under section 34 of I. R.
19. O. could be filed in the Labour Court even now either by the collective bargaining agent or any employer. It is a settled law that when vested interests are involved those could not be extinguished without specific enactment. The powers of the Courts could not be ousted unless it is provided in the law itself. Above all this, section 6 of the General Clauses Act gives protection to the pending cases under section 34 of 1. R. O., filed by the individual workmen pending in the Labour Courts before present Ordinance came into force. Section 6 of the General Clauses Act reads as under:-- "Where this Act, or any Central Act or Regulation made after the commencement of this Act, repeals any enactment hitherto made or hereafter to be made, then, unless a different intention appears, the repeal shall not
(a) revive anything not in force or existing at the time at which the repeal takes effect; or
(b) affect' the previous operation of any enactment so repealed or anything duly done or suffered thereunder; or
(c) effect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under any enactment so repealed;
(d) affect any penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred in respect of any offence committed against any enactment so repealed; or
(e) affect any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy in respect of any such right, privilege, obligation, liability, penalty, forfeiture or punishment as aforesaid; and any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced, and any such penalty, forfeiture or punishment maybe imposed as if the repealing Act or Regulation had not been passed."
20. This section has made it very clear that the omission of word "workman" wall not a heat any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired accrued or incurred under any enactment so repealed as provided under section file of the General Clauses Act. On page 206 of Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes, the explanation on the retrospective op-ration as regards the vested rights has been given. It is laid down as under:- "Where vested rights are affected, prima facie it is not a question of procedure. There is nothing in the Act of 1938 which is intended to alter past rights which became vested before the new Act came into operation by reason of the parties acting upon, and. being entitled to act upon, the law as it stood before the new Act came into operation."
21. Finally to case as reported In 1970 PLC 373, Appellate Tribunal West Pakistan has also held the same view.
22. As already pointed out earlier the vested rights could not be extinguished unless it is so specified in the enactment. The vested rights of the individual workmen involved in proceedings under section 34 of i. R. O., 1969, filed in the Labour Co iris prior to amendment could not be extinguished unless it was specifically provided in the amending Ordinance. The Amendment Ordinance of 1971 has not taken away this vested right of the workmen. This a matter of fact, the Amendment Ordinance appears to have been promulgated for the welfare of the parties and more so for the benefit of the workmen. Junior Labour Courts have been set up in order to heir the grievances of~ individual workmen and o dispose of the same expeditiously within seven days. Hence it could not be the intention of the Legislature to do away with hundreds of applications under section 34 of I. R. O.
23. 1969, filed by the individual workmen pending in the Labour Courts, before the amendment.
24. Thus for the foregoing reasons and relying upon the law quoted, I find no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that all the applications under section 34 of 1. R. O., 1969, filed by the individual workmen pending in Labour Courts, before the Amendment Ordinance of 1972, came into operation remain alive and are to be disposed of by these Courts (Labour Courts) as before. The Amendment Ordinance of 1972, wool i not affect the pending cases under section 34 of I. R. O., 1969, filed by the individual workmen prior to the amendment.
25. I, therefore, reject the objections raised by Mr. Obaidur Rehman, the learned Representative for the respondents in this case.
26. This Order will apply to all the applications under section 34 of I. R. O., 1969, filed by the individual workman pending in this Court before the Amendment Ordinance of 1971, came into force.
27. In the end I cannot help thanking all the learned Representa--tives above-named who had taken special pains to enlighten the Court on this important law-point.