This is an application for revision under section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code against the appellate order of the learned Additional District Judge, Sukkur in Miscellaneous Appeal No. 12 of 1969. The heading of the application, however, is in these words "Revision under section 115, C. P. C. Read with Article 102 of the Late Constitution anus Provisional Constitutional Order, 1969."
2. The facts, so far as they are material to the present --purpose, are that the parties were married to each other but the applicant divorced the respondent on or about the 31st of July 1963, and some time later she filed a suit against him In the Family Court, Sukkur. The suit was dismissed but on appeal the learned Additional District Judge decreed it for a sum of Rs. 2,100. Against this appellate judgment the present application was filed in this Court.
3. The case came up before me and a preliminary objection was taken on behalf of the respondent that on account of the decision of the Full Bench of this Court recorded in PLD 1972 Kar. 164 no application for revision lay and learned counsel for the petitioner asked for time, to consider his position. When the case came next for hearing learned counsel for the applicant conceded that in view of the Full Bench case no application for revision lay but now based his case upon the provisions of Article 102 of the Constitution of 1962 which gives authority to the High Court to supervise and control all other Courts that are subordinate to it. It was claimed that the suit itself was time-barred and that the original Court, therefore, had no jurisdiction in the matter; as a consequence the learned Additional District Judge, in decreeing the suit also went beyond his jurisdiction and that, therefore, as a Court of supervision I should set aside his judgment.
4. In support of this proposition learned counsel wanted to rely upon certain authorities but I drew his attention to the fact that the questions of the proper limits within which the supervisory jurisdiction of this Court may be exercised has itself been the subject-matter of a Full Bench decision of our Court reported as Abdur Rahman v. Chaman Ara (PLD 1972 Kar. 64) and counsel then took time again to consider the effect of that case.
5. Upon the case coming up before me for hearing again learned counsel relied upon four decisions to support his contention that I have power in this case to interfere. The first of these is Mst. Gaman v. Taj Din (PLD 1968 Lah. 987). So far as the question of the power under Article 102 is concerned it suffices, I think, to say that that was a case for the transfer of a matter before a Family Court. The learned Judge echo decided that case entertaining grave doubt about the applicability either of section 24 or of section 151 wound up his judgment by observing as follows: " The upshot of the above discussion 3s that since the applica',>ility of sections 24 and 151 of tile C. P.
C. Is highly doubtful, I would, by Invoking my jurisdiction under Article 102 of the Constitution, transfer the suit entitled as "Taj Din v. 41st. Gaman" pending in the Family Court a; Lahore to the Family Court at Vehari, where the suit entitled as "Mst. Gaman v. Taj Din" is already pending, to which transfer learned counsel for the respondent has no objection. The parties shall bear their own costs."
I am quite unable to see, therefore, how this case helps learned counsel for the applicant.
6. Reliance was then placed upon the case of Safia Begum v. Abdul Hamid (PLD 1968 Lah. 1358).
Again this was a case where the Court decided to transfer a case in exercise of the supervisory jurisdiction, as is evident from the following paragraph in the judgment.
"With the disappearance of the aforesaid sub-clause in Article 102 of the Constitution Act of 1962, the power vested in the High Court under section 107 of the Government of India Act, 1 415, appears to have been restored. No doubt the power is unlimited but it does not have the effect of converting the High Court into a Court of appeal or revision, regardless of the limitations imposed by law on those powers. I, however, agree with the view that the power is to be exercised only in very rare and exceptional cases and may be used ex debito jusritiae, where there is no other remedy available under the ordinary law."
It might be noted in passing that so far from supporting the case of the applicant the judgment in express terms holds that the High Court does not become a Court of Appeal or Revision on account of the power of supervision.
7. Reference was then made to the case of Karim Bux v. Mubarak Jan (PLD 1970 Pesh. 169) but it was emphasised in this case that the purpose of the power is to empower the High Court to supervise and control all Courts subordinate to it and to enable the High Court to discharge its duty as a superior Court towards the fair and proper administration of justice. The learned Judges held clearly that it was not a power intended to give relief to a particular party. On the contrary the Court refused in that case to interfere with a decision which under the Family Courts Act had become final. It will be useful, I think to reproduce the following passage from the judgment:- "A comparison of the above provisions will show that Article 102 is not meant to be invoked by a party, nor is the Court required by it to provide relief to anybody. As against this, Article 98 of the Constitution is meant to provide relief to aggrieved parties, section 151, C. P. C. Is intended to prevent abuse of the process of Court as well as to empower the Court to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice. Article 102 of the Constitution on the contrary merely empowers the High Courts to supervise and control all Courts subordinate to it. The power is meant to enable the High Courts to discharge its duties as a superior Court towards fair and proper administration of justice. The High Court has the authority to check and prevent dereliction of duty and to stop as well as correct violations of law. As observed in Emperor v. Tarapore 'superintendence' includes the power to guide, advise and encourage Judges of the subordinate Courts. According to the Allahabad High Court 'superinten--dence' includes the power to direct subordinate Courts and tribunals to carry out its orders vide Sant Lal Mahadeo Prasad v. Kedar Nath. According to their Lordships of the Privy Council this includes the authority to direct inquiry with a view to take disciplinary action for cases of flagrant maladministration of justice. See Rajkumar v. Ramsundar. The observations made in certain judicial pronouncements, while discussing the scope of section 107 of the Government of India Act, 1915, and Article 227 of the Indian Constitution which provisions are in many ways to the same effect as the pro--visions of Article 102 of our Constitution of 1962, indicate that the purpose of these provisions is not to convert the High Courts into Courts of appeal or revision-See Jalaluddin v. Jalaluddin and Rajkamal v.
Indian Motion Picture Union cited in Basu's Commentary on the Constitution of India, 4th Edn., Vol. IV, p.
6. We respectfully agrees with this view and our reason for holding this view is that this supervision and control is for making and keeping the administration of justice pure and not to help any particular party. This duty can be performed irrespective of whether any body will be benefited, by it or not. Its exercise may be distasteful to some and gratifying to others but that is immaterial because this power is not exercised ex debito justitiac but in the interest of good administration of justice. There is a clear difference between these two objects-See The King v.
Richmond Confirming Authority. The object of this provision is to enable the High Court to establish orderly, honourable, upright, impartial and legally correct administration of justice.
(7) No doubt, in the process of supervising the conduct of the subordinate Courts it is possible that some order passed or direction given by a subordinate Court be set aside or suitably modified with the incidental result that one of the parties to a cause be benefited. The relief that may come to the party, however, would come to it only collaterally. Moreover, it is not contemplated in the terms of Article 102, that the High Court should issue an order against a party to a cause as such. This also shows that the High Court is under this provision concerned only with the Courts subordinate to it rather than with the parties to a cause.
(8) We have to see in the light of the above discussion whether this is a fit case in which the order of the Family Court requires to be interfered with In terms of Article 102 of the Constitution. We observe that the Family Court has passed decree for dissolution of marriage and that this it could do under the Statute. We also note that under the relevant statute no appeal is provided against such a decree except in one circumstance vide section 14 of the Act which is not arising herein. This section intends to confer finality on the decrees and to stop all controversies regarding the subsistence of the marital tie between the parties. The attempt of the petitioner to revive by this petition a controversy which stands concluded with the passing of the decree of dissolution of marriage by the Conciliation Court as well as by the decree of the Family Court, tantamount to subverting the purpose of the law. The grounds on which the judgment and decree of the Family Court is Impugned, namely, that the evidence of dissolution of marriage recorded by the Conciliation Court should not have been permitted by the Family Court and that the Family Court should not have triad its conclusions on the findings recorded by the Conciliation Court are not at all adequate to justify Interference with the judgment and orders passed by the Family Court in the present case. No justification exist, therefore. To Invoke the powers of control vested In the High Court under Article 102 of the Constitution in this case:'
8. Reliance was next placed upon a Single Judge decision of this Court, namely, Farida Parveen v.
Qradeeruddin (PLD 1971 Kar. 118). It is true in this case a decision of the appellate. Court was set aside upon the ground that the latter Court had failed to exercise jurisdiction. Nevertheless the learned Judge observed:- "It is, therefore, clear that the judicial control thus is limited to the correction of exercise of jurisdiction or non-4 compliance of any statutory provision or the concerned law. It does not extend to the interference on merits if otherwise the subordinate Court has acted within its bounds."
This is the case which goes further In favour of the applicant and it will be noted that even so the learned Judge was confining himself to a correction in the exercise of jurisdiction.
9. I come finally to the Full Bench case to which I have earlier referred, namely, Abdur Rahman v.
Chaman Ara which of course is binding on me. After a very elaborate consideration of the various provisions the then learned Chief Justice having notice both the Peshawar case and the Karachi case to which I have referred observed: " A glance at it would show that the Article mentions no relief which may be given to a party under it. It does not even refer to any proceedings, order, judgment, relief or remedy. They are all outside the ambit of the provision except of course to the extent that the conduct of the Courts them-- selves may be involved in them. It merely confers on the High Court the power of supervision and control over its sub-- ordinate Courts. This power has nothing to do with grievances of parties or with doing justice to them. The High Court is under this Article concerned with its lower Courts only and has to keep an eye on them so that they may clot fall to do their own duties apart from the problems and interests of the parties. Such duties are to attend the Courts regularly and punctually to hear and decide those cases only which fall within their jurisdiction and not to hear and decide those which may be ousting their jurisdiction I to obey legitimate directions of their superior authorities; to know the law and to conduct themselves like judicial officers. Their judicial orders and judgments are subject to scrutiny, on appeal or revision, in accordance with the provisions that confer those jurisdiction on Courts of various grades. Every appeal and every revision does not lie to the High Court, nor is the power to hear appeals and revisions inherent in Courts. This power is a creation of law; therefore, they do not exist unless conferred by law. Thus where these powers have not been conferred by law they cannot be exercised and should not be exercised in order to give relief to an aggrieved party by way of supervision and control of subordinate Courts. Mr. Justice Muhammad Haleem did not set aside the appellate judgment on the consideration that one of the parties was aggrieved but because the appellate Court had to be checked and controlled since it had acted without jurisdiction. The two cases which were transferred by the two judgments given at Lahore were so dealt with because the Courts were found to be unfit for hearing them"
10. I am, therefore, quite unable to see how the learned counsel for the applicant can properly say that in the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction I can set aside the judgment complained of. Even upon merits I do not think be has made out any kind of case. The argument before me is that the suit itself was time-barred and was quite correctly, though not upon that ground, dismissed by the trial Court. It is, therefore, argued that in decreeing the suit although it was time-barred the learned Additional District Judge exceeded his jurisdiction. Now the amazing thing is that the entire petition before me does not so much as refer to the contention that the suit was time---barred. I have gone through the issues that were struck in the suit and which are referred to in the appellate judgment as well none of them refer to any question of limitation. Even the very facts upon which the plea of limitation is now pressed before me are vaguely and uncertainly stated at the bar. It is not certain whether the suit was presented on the 2nd of` September 1965 or on the 15th of July 1967 though It is numbered as being 1 of 1967. From the fact of numbering the date 15-7-1967 is argued to be the more probable date it being admitted that if the suit was filed in 1967 it would be time---barred. I have already held that Article 102 is not intended to be a remedy for an aggrieved party. Even if that had not been so, however, and if it was open to counsel to say that I should exercise this jurisdiction in order to correct a jurisdictional error it is clear that the case set up before me now is attempted to be made out only after it has been realised that a revision application does not lie. None of the material necessary for setting up the case c was even attempted to be pleaded not only in the application before me but even in the pleadings in the Court below. In the circumstances I can see no reason whatever for granting this application.