Dispute in this case relates to 16 kanals of land comprised in Khasra No.158/11-12, Khata No.176, situate in Mauza Chak Dodara, Tehsil and District D.G. Khan which admittedly belonged to Jalal respondent. Case of Qasim Khan petitioner is that he was a complainant in a case under section 326/34, P.P.C. In which Shah Ali and Doda (brother and nephew of Nawab respondent No.2) were the accused. This case was compromised on the condition that Nawab respondent shall give 5 Bighas of land to the petitioner. According to the settlement arrived at between the parties, the aforementioned land belonging to Jalal being adjacent to the petitioner's house was given to the petitioner and Nawab respondent agreed to give some land in exchange to Jalal respondent.
Possession of the land in dispute was allegedly given to the petitioner in pursuance to the said agreement. One more Bigha had yet to be given to him. This agreement was admittedly oral.
Respondents allegedly backed out of this agreement. Petitioner, therefore, brought a suit on 30-7- 1978 for a declaration that he was owner in possession of the land in dispute and the respondents had no concern therewith. Respondents contested the petitioner's suit denying the alleged compromise.
2. Prior to the institution of the petitioner's suit, Jalal respondent had also filed a suit for permanent injunction against the petitioner and some others on 14-5-1978, in respect of the land in dispute alleging that the defendants therein were threatening to take over forcible possession thereof. It was alleged in this suit that the petitioner had divorced his wife Mst. Bano, who then contracted Nikah with Shah Ali. Subsequently, however, petitioner filed a suit against Mst. Bano for restitution of conjugal rights which was decreed in his favour. Mst. Bano filed appeal in the Court of District Judge.
During the pendency of the appeal, petitioner approached Jalal respondent and offered to acknowledge the divorce provided the latter could get him 1 acre of land from Shah All.
Negotiations were held but the compromise could not be effected. Mst. Bano's appeal succeeded whereafter petitioner again approached Jalal respondent and asked him to procure 1 Bigha of land from Shah Ali failing which he would forcibly take possession of the land in dispute.
3. Both the suits were consolidated and the proceedings were taken in the suit titled "Qasim v. Jalal etc." On the pleadings of the parties, following issues were framed:- (1)Whether the plaintiff is owner in possession of the suit property? O.P.P.
(2)Whether the suit has incorrectly been valued for the purposes of court-fee and jurisdiction?
O.P.D.
(2-A) Whether Jalal defendant is entitled to a decree for permanent injunction? O.P.D.1.
(2-B) Whether Qasim, the plaintiff has committed any contempt of Court by allegedly violating order of status quo? O.P.D.
(3)Relief.
Issue No.2-B appears to have been framed in the suit filed by Jalal respondent on the allegation that Qasim petitioner (defendant in their suit) had taken the possession of the suit land forcibly in defiance of the interim injunction issued by the trial Court on 14-5-1978.
4.Both the parties led evidence in support of their respective contentions. Petitioner in order to prove the factum of compromise/ agreement produced Sardar Muhammad Bakhsh P.W.1, Ladu Khan P.W.2, Ata Muhammad P.W.3 and himself appeared as P.W.4. He also produced copy of the index of the criminal case "State v. Dogha" EXh.P.l, copy of the compromise reached between the parties in that case as Exh.P.2 and copy of-the application under section 345, Cr.P.C. Exh.P.3.
Respondents, on the other hand, examined Shah Ali D.W.1 and Nawab respondent appeared as D.W.2 and Jalal as D.W.3. They also adduced in evidence copy of the order of the learned District Judge dismissing the petitioner's appeal in the suit for restitution of conjugal rights as Exh.D.l.
5. Learned trial Court after considering the evidence separately recorded on issue No.2-B found that the petitioner had taken possession of the suit land forcibly "to effectuate so-called compromise". This issue was, therefore, decided in favour of Jalal respondent and it was directed that "status quo ante is restored, and possession be handed over to Jalal defendant No.l- applicant".
Issue No.l which incorporates the real controversy between the parties was decided by the trial Court against the petitioner. While discussing this issue, learned trial Court does not seem to have accepted that the alleged compromise was effected. It, however, proceeded on the premises that the proposition was entirely legal and held that the agreement involving the compromise of a non- compoundable offence was against public policy and was, therefore, unenforceable being hit by section 23 of the Contract Act. Learned trial Court also took the view that the petitioner should have filed a suit for specific performance and the suit as brought was not maintainable.
Issue No.2 was decided against the respondent and it was held that the suit as framed was properly valued. Issue No.2-A was decided in favour of Jalal, who, it was held, was not affected by the alleged compromise as no exchange had taken place between him and Nawab respondent.
In view of the aforementioned findings, learned trial Court dismissed the petitioner's suit and decreed that of Jalal respondent vide judgment, dated 28-11-1984.
6. Petitioner preferred an appeal to challenge the aforementioned judgment and decree of the trial Court. He also moved an application for permission to produce a photo copy of the alleged agreement by way of additional evidence. Learned District Judge rejected this application holding that it was petitioner's own case in his evidence that the compromise was not put into writing.
Learned District Judge also dismissed the main appeal vide judgment, dated 8-1-1986 upholding the finding of the learned trial Court. Learned District Judge further held that the principle of section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act was not applicable in the instant case for the reason that the alleged agreement was not reduced into writing.
7.Petitioner has now invoked the revisional jurisdiction of this Court to assail the impugned judgments of the learned Courts below.
8. I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner at considerable length. This revision petition is liable to be dismissed on the short ground that the agreement which was made the basis of the suit was void on the petitioner's own showing as the consideration A for that agreement was compromise of a criminal case involving non-compoundable offence. Thus, the agreement being against the public policy, was clearly hit by the provisions of section 23 of the Contract Act. It was held in Ghulam Mohyud Din v. Deoki Nand and others 39 Punjab Record 1914 (Page 133) that a promissory note, the object or consideration of which was wholly or in part the withdrawal of a prosecution for an offence which was in law non-compoundable, falls within the meaning of section 23 of the Contract Act and is void. Similar view was taken in Majibar Rahman v. Muktashed Hossein (1912) I L R 40 Cal. 113 wherein it was held that it is contrary to public policy to compound a non-compoundable criminal case, and any agreement to that end is wholly void in law. In that case, a mortgage bond executed by a 'Gomashta' in favour of his master for withdrawal of a prosecution for criminal breach of trust was held to be void and a suit brought by the master to enforce such a mortgage bond was held to be not maintainable. In the present case, the agreement on which the petitioner founded his claim fell within the meaning of B section 23 of the Contract Act and was, therefore, unenforceable. That being so, the Courts below proceeded on correct premises in dismissing the petitioner's suit.
9. It has also been rightly held by the learned Courts below that Jalal respondent was not bound by the agreement in so far as there was no evidence that he was given any land in exchange by Nawab respondent. Learned counsel has not controverted this finding. Petitioner could not, therefore, enforce his alleged claim qua the land in dispute which was admittedly owned by Jalal respondent. In any case, petitioner's suit as framed was not maintainable.
10. In the aforesaid view of the matter, the impugned judgments of the learned Courts below are not open to any exception.
11. Apart from what has been held above, it may be noted that the petitioner had taken possession of the suit land forcibly before) filing the suit and he did so in defiance of the injunction order issued by the trial Court in the suit of Jalal respondent. It has been C so found by the trial Court which finding does not appear to have been assailed by the petitioner before the learned District Judge. That being so, the petitioner is disentitled to any relief in revisional jurisdiction which is purely discretionary.
12. In view of what has been said above, no interference with the impugned judgments is called for in revisional jurisdiction of this Court. Revision petition is accordingly dismissed in limine.