This is a revision reporting that the order dated 8-7-1986 recorded by the learned Presiding Officer, Punjab Labour Court No.1 Lahore is wrong and improper.
2. The respondent had brought an application under section 15 of the Payment of Wages Act for gratuity on the basis of a settlement, copy of which is Ex.P-5.
3. It has been argued by the learned counsel for the petitioner that according to section 15 of the Payment of Waged Act as it stands amended, gratuity allowed by any law can be claimed as the word 'law' has been used and not any settlement or award and that a settlement not being a law, on the basis of it, no petition under section 15(2) was maintainable. The argument is without force.
The word 'law' used in section 15(2), Payment of Wages Act is not in the sense as it is used in section 25-A of Industrial Relations Ordinance. According to section 25-A, a grievance petition on the basis of a right guaranteed by any law, settlement or award can be brought. The 'law' referred to in the said section, therefore, does not cover settlement and an award. The word 'law' used in section 15(2) does not mean a codified law or any enactment. It means gratuity allowed lawfully can be claimed. Since the petitioner and the CBA entered into a settlement both of them are bound by its terms and the settlement has legal force. The things allowed by the settlement, therefore, can be said to have been legally allowed and on the basis of settlement, a benefit can be claimed in a petition under section 15(2) in cases where the employer has refused or delayed the payment.
4. The other argument of the learned counsel is that section 7 of the Road Transport Ordinance makes applicable not the whole of Standing Order 12(6) of the Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968, therefore, the Authority can to the extent the said section allows the application of Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968, grant gratuity. First thing to be seen is whether Road Transport Ordinance excludes the application of Standing Orders Ordinance? The learned counsel admits that there is no exclusion clause. In the absence of any exclusion clause whatever is said in section 7 is not restrictive. In cases where otherwise Standing Orders Ordinance is not applicable, it applies by virtue of section 7 of the Road Transport Ordinance but this is not the case of the parties that otherwise the Standing Orders Ordinance is not applicable. For example, if in an establishment number of employees is not more than 49, Standing Orders Ordinance would not apply so far as Standing Order 12(6) is concerned and would apply by virtue of section 7 of the Road Transport Ordinance. Since this is not the case of the petitioner that number of workers is not more than 49 therefore, Standing Orders Ordinance without the help of section 7 of the Road Transport Ordinance is applicable and thus gratuity could be claimed under the Ordinance.
5. The other argument of the learned counsel is that the word 'benefit' is used in Standing Order 12(6) and gratuity not being a benefit, it could not be claimed under the said Standing Order, besides claiming under the settlement. On the face of it the argument is without any force. Gratuity is a benefit, therefore, besides the gratuity allowed by any settlement or award, usage or custom, it can be claimed under Standing Order 12(6) of the said Ordinance.
6. The other point raised by the learned counsel is that as drivers are not mentioned in rule 3 of the gratuity Rules, the respondent could not claim the same. He also says that since the settlement is in respect of the rules which are not helpful to the respondent, therefore, the settlement does not give him any right. He also argues that since no reference to rules is made in the settlement, therefore, the rules apply. These two arguments are self-contradictory, therefore, they have no force. On one hand the learned counsel says that the settlement is in respect of the gratuity rules and in the other breath he argues that since no reference to the rules in the settlement is made so the rules apply and not the settlement. Where a right is guaranteed by any rule, there is no need to make any settlement. Since the workers claimed something more than the rules allowed, therefore, industrial dispute was raised which culminated in the settlement, the respondent therefore, is entitled to the benefits of the said settlement.
7. The last point argued by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the respondent gave the date of his entry into service as 1967 but gratuity has been calculated from 4-3-1964. No doubt, the respondent gave the year of his appointment as 1967, but this is wrong. RW-1 has said that the respondent was recruited as driver in 1964. So the date of appointment is 4-3-1964 and not 1967.
Thus the gratuity was rightly allowed from 1964.
8. As a result, the revision fails and is dismissed.
A.E./361/Lb.P