1. MUHAMMAD GUL, J.-These twelve appeals by special leave raise common questions of law and- fact and arise out of order dated 24-8-67 of a Division Bench of the former High Court of West Pakistan at Karachi made in what purported to be 'a petition for the review of an earlier order dated 12-11-65 dismissing in limine L. P. A. No. 122 of 1965 against the judgment of a learned Single Judge of that High Court dated 15-9-65 dismissing twelve writ petitions filed by the appellants herein.
2. The appellants are displaced persons from the former Indian State of Jaipur which was a "non- agreed area". They filed their claim for agricultural land and urban immovable property for verification under the Registration of Claims (Displaced Persons) Act, 1956 (Act III of 1956). Their claims for land were verified under Schedule V by the Claims Officer and they were allotted lands provisionally against their verified claims. Subsequently, on the report of the Enforcement Police, the Additional Claims Commissioner, Hyderabad (Mr. Moghul), in exercise of his suo motu ravisional jurisdiction under subsection (3) of section 7 of the 1956 Act, vide his order dated 2-7-60, rejected the appellants' claims for land in toto as being bogus. Against that order the appellants filed revisions before the Claims Commissioner. However, before these revisions could be disposed of by the Claims Commissioner, Martial Law Regulation No. 84 came into force on 21-12-60, which prohibited the Claims Authorities from verifying the claims in respect of agricultural land abandoned in the non-agreed areas. During the pendency of their claims before the Claims Commissioner, they also filed their claims in Form MR-I as required by M. L. R.
84. However, before their claims could be verified under that Regulation, MLR 89 was promulgated on 23-8-61 under which all investigations of claims under M.L.R 84 were stopped. It also introduced what is described as "slab system." It also required the Central Record Office, Lahore, to issue entitlement certificates to displaced persons with land claims from the non-agreed areas on the basis of previous verification in accordance with the "slab system" prescribed under the new Regulation.
3. While the appellants' revisions were still pending with the Claims Commissioner, entitlements in Form M.R-V were issued to them and in the meantime they also succeeded in securing an order from the Chief Settlement Commissioner (who it appears at the relevant time also exercised the powers of the Claims Commissioner) staying the implementation of Mr. Moghul's order dated 2-7- 60, but this order was subsequently withdrawn by the Chief Settlement Commissioner on 2-8-62.
4. This led to the filing of twelve Writ Petitions (Nos. 680 to 691 and 823 of 1 962) by the appellants in the Karachi Bench of the former High Court of West Pakistan. These writ petitions were heard together and disposed of by a learned Single Judge on 15-9-65 whereby he held that Mr. Moghul's order dated 2-7-60 purporting to be in exercise of suo motu revisional jurisdiction of the Claims Commissioner under section 7(3) of the 1956 Act setting aside the appellants' verified claims was without jurisdic--tion. The learned Single Judge, however, also held that since the revisions filed by the appellants against the order of Mr. Moghul were pending before the Claims Commissioner when M. L. R. 84 came into force, these claims were pending verification within the meaning of M. L.
5. R. 89 at the commencement of that Regulation. On this point the learned Single Judge observed as follows :- "After the promulgation of Martial Law Regulation No. 89, the claimants of agricultural land are entitled to get evacuee lands only on two basis. In cases where a valid M. R. V. Has been issued to them they are entitled to claim certain index produce units on the basis of the slab system recognised under clause 5 of the said martial Law Regulation. In those cases, where the claims are still pending, the claims have- to be verified by a special officer appointed under clause 4 of the Regulation and the claims of such persons are to be settled on the basis of the scrutiny of their claim by such officer."
6. Accordingly the learned Judge directed that- "In view of the pending revisions of the petitioners before the Claims Commissioner (the appellants herein), the claims of the petitioners are still pending for verification under clause 4 of Martial Law Regulation 89, which should be disposed of by a competent officer appointed by the Chief Settlement Commissioner."
7. Aggrieved by the above direction by the learned Single Judge, the appellants went up In appeal under Letters Patent which was dismissed in limine on 12-11-1965 by the following short order :- "The learned Single Judge has merely issued directions that the claim of the appellant be placed before an officer for necessary action under law. Mr. Pirzada admits that the allotment in favour of the appellant had not been confirmed before Mr. Moghul passed the order which has been quashed. The allotment in favour of the petitioner had not therefore been dismissed. It is the finalization of those proceedings for which the learned Single Judge has issued directions. We accordingly see no substance in the appeal and dismiss it summarily."
8. There was no appeal against the above order. The Settlement Department however moved what is described as, a review application under Order XLVII, rule 1 read with section 151, Civil Procedure Code, with the object of securing what really was a clarification as to true implication of the order of the Letters Patent Bench. This application was dismissed on 7-11-66 for non-prosecution but was later restored on 9-12-66 to be dismissed once again. This was followed by a similar application by Ibrahim Khan (appellant in Appeal No. K-4/70) for the review e of the order of the Letters Patent Bench which was dismissed by the following order :- "The order against which the review application is sought to be filed merely mentioned that the learned Single Judge had only issued directions that the claim of the appellant be placed before an officer for necessary action under law. It was only this fact of the order which was operative the mention made in it about the allotment and its finalization was only reproduction of the argument of the counsel for the appellant. In these circumstances we see no merit in the review petitions and also do not consider it necessary to grant application under section 5 of the Limitation Act which are accordingly rejected."
9. It is against this order that the twelve appeals by special leave have been filed.
10. Learned counsel for the appellants argued that having reached the conclusion that the order dated 2-:-60 was without jurisdic--tion, the learned Single Judge was not justified in treating the appellants' claims "as pending" on the basis of the revision applications filed by them against an order which was a nullity in the eye of law. The argument was that the basis of the applica--tions for revision having been declared to be without jurisdiction, t-he revision applications thus became incompetent and therefore virtually non-existent. In that view of the matter, therefore, it was urged that the appellants' claims were no more pending for verification on the relevant date and therefore were not hit by the provisions of M. L. R. 84.
11. The argument however conveniently overlooks the all --important fact that the present appeals are against the order dated 24-8-67 dismissing what is described as the application for review by Ibrahim Khan, appellant in Appeal No. K-4/70. This order cannot on any discoverable rule of procedure be used as a lever to re-open what had been finally set at rest with the judgment of the Letters Patent Bench dated 12-11-65, affirming the judgment of the learned single Judge disposing of the twelve writ petitions by order dated 15-9-65. As pointed out already no appeal was taken against the judgment of the Letters Patent Bench which had since attained finality.
12. Learned counsel for the appellants however submitted that the appellants were really misled by the equivocal observations of the Letters Patent Bench which were equally open to the inter-- pretation that the claims of the appellants were to be "finalised" on the basis of the initial verifications by the claims officer under which they were provisionally allotted land. In other words, the real object underlying these twelve appeals though apparently directed against the order of the Division Bench dated 24-8-67 in the so-called revision applications is to question the decision of the Letters Patent Bench which the appellants could not do earlier because of being misled by the equivocal nature of the order. It is not controverted that the order dated 24-8-67, per se did not decide any issue between the parties. It only interpreted the order of the Letters Patent Bench dismissing summarily the appeals against the order of the learned Single Judge. This cannot be allowed to be used as a device to attack the order of the Letters Patent Bench itself and to set at naught all rules of limitation provided for appeals. A straightforward course open to the' appellants was to move belated appeals against the order of the Letters Patent Bench, with a prayer for condonation of delay. This they have not chosen to do and their subterfuge cannot be allowed to succeed.
13. Accordingly these appeals are misconceived and are dismissed.
14. Learned counsel for the appellants however prayed that pending a fresh verification of their claims by the designated officer under paragraph 4 of M. L. R. 89, the appellants' possession of the land already provisionally allotted to them may not be disturbed. Learned counsel for the respondents however stated that some of the land has since been allotted to other claimants who have already entered into its possession, but conceded that some of the appellants still retained the land. He undertook on behalf of the Department that the possession of such appellants will not be disturbed until the fresh verification of their claims is finalised in accordance with paragraph 5 of M. L. R. 89.
15. In the circumstances of the case, we make no order as to costs.