' National Bank of Pakistan, Bannu sued Syed Mir for recovery of Rs.1,81,852.43 but the suit was dismissed and the appeal also met the same fate. The Bank has now come on second appeal to this Court.
2. The allegations of the appellant were that the respondent was advanced a loan of Rs.8,000 on 11- 6-1968 and he hypothecated the stock of his shop to it. He has been making payments occasionally but on 30-6-1976 the amount in suit was found due from and he declined to make payment thereof. The respondent denied the allegations altogether. Both the learned Courts below recorded a concurrent finding of fact against the appellant and held that it had failed to establish that the documents relied on by it had been executed by the respondent and the latter had borrowed the amount from it.
3. Agreement for cash 'credit (hypothecation of goods) dated 11-6-1968 is Exh. P.W. 1/2 on the record and is said to have been executed by the respondent. It bears the signature of the guarantor Sher Daraz Khan and is signed by Abdur Rab Tareen (P.W. 2), the then Manager of the Bank. Form A (Special) of the same date, Exh. P.W. 1/3, bears the signature of Sher Daraz Khan who is shown to have signed it in the presence of the Manager and another officer of the bank. The principal document Demand Promissory Note dated 11-6-1968 is Exh. G.W.1/1 on the record and thereby Rs.8,000 were advanced to the respondent as a loan. It is shown to bear his signature and on its reverse appears the signature of Sher Daraz Khan. D.P. Notice Delivery Letter dated 11-6-1968, Exh.P.W. 2/7, bears the signature of the principal debtor as well as the guarantor. Exh. P.W. 1/4 is the statement of account of the respondent and in it Rs.8,000 are shown to have been debited on 11-6- 1968. Exh. P.W. 1/5 to 10 are the documents showing that the respondent had been confirming the balance in his account on the close of each year and this lend corroboration to the entries made in the statement of account Exh.P.W. 1/4. It is pertinent to note that the respondent categorically denied to have signed any of these documents and both the learned Courts below recorded a finding in his favour.
' It is contemplated by section 67 Evidence Act that if a document is alleged to be signed or to have been written wholly or in part by any person, the signature or the handwriting of so much of the document as is alleged to be in that person's handwriting must be proved to be in his handwriting.
M. Monir in his commentary on the Law of Evidence (1974 Edition.) has enumerated various modes of proving a signature or writing recognised by the Act and amongst them are the following:-
(i) By calling the person who signed or wrote the document.
(ii) By calling a person in whose presence the document was signed or written.
(iii) By calling a handwriting expert.
(iv) By calling a person acquainted with the handwriting of the person by whom the document is supposed to be signed or written.
(v) By comparing in Court the disputed signature or writing with some admitted signature or writing.
5. The appellant followed modes (ii) and (iv) to prove the execution of the disputed documents by the respondent. Farooq Hamid Chughtai, Manager of the Bank, deposed that the respondent had taken a loan of Rs.8,000 per Demand Promissory Note, Exh. P.W. 1/1, and had signed it in his presence. Agreement for cash credit, Exh. P.W. 1/2, was also signed by the respondent in his presence whereas the guarantor Sher Daraz Khan had signed Form A (Special), Exh. P.W 1/3. The acknowledgements Exhs. P.W. 1/5 to 10 bore the signature of the respondent. Abdur Rab Tareen (P.W. 2) who was working as Manager of the Bank then deposed that Rs.8,000 were borrowed by respondent per Exh. P.W. 1/1. And Exh. P.W. 1/2 and P.W. 1/3 were signed in his presence. Exh. P.W. 2/1 also was signed by the respondent in his presence. He could not recollect as to which member of the staff had filled in Exh.P.W. 1/1 to 3.
6. All the aforesaid documents, except Exh.P.W. 1/1, were admitted into evidence without any objection by the respondent. It is Exh. P.W.1/1 which was admitted subject to objection for want of proof. Now it is well settled that where no objection is made by the opposite party when a document is admitted into evidence and duly exhibited A the parties shall not be permitted to raise such an objection at a later stage. Reference in this context can be made with advantage to Muhammad Yousaf Khattak v. S.M. Ayub and 2 Others (PLD 1972 Pesh. 175), Abdullah and 3 Others v.
Abdul Karim and Others (PLD 1968 S.C. 140) and Malik Din and another v. Muhammad Aslam (PLD 1969 SC 136). In the instant case all these documents, except Exh. P.W. 1/1 were admitted without an objection by the respondents, Secondly, the testimony of Farooq Hamid Chughtai (P.W. 1) and Abdur Rab Tareen (P.W. 2) when put together go a long way to show that the aforesaid documents were signed by the respondent. It is true that they are officers of the bank but it is equally true that on account of this ground their testimony could not be discarded altogether nor it could be shattered by the respondent in cross-examination. Both asserted that the respondent had signed these documents in their presence and I am of the view that the appellant succeeded by adopting the modes of proof referred to above in proving execution of these documents by the respondent.
7. The learned counsel for the respondent contended that mere pro-duction of a certified copy of the account was not by itself sufficient to charge the respondent with liability and placed reliance on Messrs Muhammad Siddiq Muhammad Umar and another v. The Australasia Bank Ltd. PLD 1966 SC 684 wherein it is remarked that section 4 of Bankers' Books Evidence Act does not purport to give the certified copy any greater efficacy than the original itself and mere production of the copy would not per se be sufficient to charge a person with as liability. In the instant case the statement of account finds corroboration from Exh. P.W.1/1, P.W.1/5 to 9 and Exh. P.W. 2/2. The contention of the learned counsel for the respondents would not, in circumstances, prevail.
8. The learned counsel for the respondents urged that the concurrent finding of fact recorded by both the learned Courts below could not be interfered with in second appeal and placed reliance on Akbar All Shah and 3 Others V. Muhammad Shah and 4 others 1982 SCMR 286. The consensus of opinion, however, is that where in the process of arriving at a finding of fact the lower Courts have committed an error of law or adopted an erroneous or defective procedure which has affected the decision of the case, the finding will be open to attack in second appeal. In Hayat Khan and 6 others v. Jahandad and 2 others PLD 1971 SC 330 the Courts below had failed to raise presumption of correctness attached to entries in the Jamabandi and the High Court was held justified in interfering with a finding of fact in second appeal. The view expressed in Mst. Bibi Jan v. Habib Khan and another PLD 1975 SC 295 was that the High Court had no jurisdiction to entertain a second appeal on the ground of an erroneous finding of fact howsoever gross or inexcusable the error may be, yet there is no sanctity attached even to a concurrent finding of fact based on misreading or misrepresentation of evidene as this would clearly bring the case within the scope of clause (c) of Section 100 C.P.C. In the instant case both the learned Courts below had erred in discarding the documents relied upon by the appellant in utter disregard of the provisions of the Evidence Act and, as such, this appeal cannot be said to be incompetent.
9. It may be pointed out that the appellant for the reasons best known to it did not implead Sher Daraz Khan, the guarantor, as a party to the suit though he had stood surety for the respondent and had incurred personal liabilityby executing Exh. P.W.1/2 and 3. Be that as it may, this omission would in no way cast a cloud of doubt on the claim of the appellant against the respondent, the principal debtor.
' In the result, I would accept the appeal, set aside the judgments and decrees of both the Courts below and pass a decree for the suit amount only against the respondent. The parties are, however, left to bear their own costs throughout.