1. MUHAMMAD GUL, J.-This petition for special leave is from the judgment of a Division Bench of the Lahore High Court under clause 10 of the Letters Patent setting aside the judgment of a learned Single Judge remanding the case to the Settlement Authori--ties for a fresh decision in the case.
2. The dispute concerns property bearing No. 838/558 Block No. 3, Sillanwali, Districts Sargodha, which on the eve of the settlement operation was occupied by the petitioner, respondent No. 1, Fateh Muhammad and Irshad Ali. Of them only the first three named applied for the transfer of the house under their respective CH Form. The Assistant Settlement Commissioner transferred the house to the petitioner and respondent No. I in accordance with their respective possession but at the same time giving an additional room hitherto in joint occupation of Fateh Muhammad and Irshad Ali, to the petitioner. Fateh Muhammad was excluded from the transfer of any share in the house. Against this order the petitioner and respondent No. 1 filed separate appeals. The petitioner claimed the transfer of the entire house to the exclusion of respondent No. 1 resting his claim to the entire house on his being a prior allottee of a major portion of the house over respondent No. 1 who at one time was his son-in-law but who had since divorced his wife and therefore his relations with the petitioner had thus become strained. The latter only questioned the mode of division. The Deputy Settlement Commissioner accepted both the appeals and remanded the case to the Assistant Settlement Commissioner for a fresh decision. After remand, the Assistant Settlement Commissioner vide order dated 4-4-1960 transferred the room occupied by Fateh Muhammad and Irshad Ali (earlier transferred to the petitioner) to respondent No. 1 in addition to the two rooms already in his occupation and the remaining five rooms to the petitioner leaving the dehliz and courtyard common to both. There were cross-appeals both by the petitioner and respondent No. 1.
3. The Deputy Settle--ment Commissioner vide order dated 26-4-1960 disposed of the two appeals holding the house to be indivisible and the petitioner to be entitled to the whole of it to the exclusion of the respondent No. 1. Respondent No. 1 filed a revision, which was rejected by the Additional Settlement Commissioner. A further revision to the Settlement Commissioner exercising the powers of the Chief Settlement Commissioner however, succeeded vide order dated 31-8-1961.
4. Before the Settlement Commissioner the position taken by the petitioner was that he was an allottee of the entire house but stated that the allotment order had been lost. The Settle--ment Commissioner did not accept that plea and treated both the parties on a par as claimant-non allottees because neither of them was able to produce an allotment order. On the basis of a copy of the site plan on the file, he agreed with the recommendation of the Assistant Settlement Commissioner made after spot inspection that the house was easily divisible. Accordingly, he directed that respondent No. 1 should be transferred two rooms already in his possession and the room in possession of Fateh Muhammad and Irshad Ali and yet another room occupied by the sons of petitioner No. 1. The petitioner was thus allowed to retain four rooms instead of five in his possession. The Settle--ment Commissioner further directed that the dehliz and the court--yard shall remain common.
5. Dissatisfied with the above order of the Settlement Commis--sioner dividing the house equally between the two contestants, the petitioner filed a writ petition. During the course of the hearing of the writ petition, he produced what purported to be an allot--ment order in his favour of the entire house signed by a Naib Tebsildar in his capacity as the Requisition Officer. On the basis of this chit; it was argued on behalf of the petitioner before a learned Single Judge that he was an allottee of the entire house and therefore was entitled to its transfer to the exclusion of respondent No. 1. The learned Single Judge, who was impressed by this argument, accepted the writ petition and remanded the case for fresh decision with the direction that the Deputy Settle--ment Commissioner shall enquire into the genuineness of the allotment order produced by the petitioner which it was his duty to do.
6. In the appeal filed by respondent No. 1 under Clause 10 of Letters Patent the learned Judges of the Division Bench however reversed the remand order in view of the clear case set up by the petitioner before the Settlement Authorities that he was in occup--ation of a portion of the house through his sons who were allottees of that portion which was completely at variance with his earlier stand before the learned Single Judge. The learned Judges of the Division Bench further observed that in view of the material placed before him, the Settlement Commissioner, who was exercising powers of the Chief Settlement Commissioner, gave a clear finding that the house was easily divisible. That finding was not questionable, and therefore the petitioner must rest content with one-half of the house comprising four rooms which under the Settlement Law is a complete residential tenement and cannot have the other half of the house which will be a separate residential unit.
7. This petition seeks leave against the order of the Division Bench.
8. Learned counsel for the petitioner reiterated that be was a regular allottee of the entire house. In support of that contention learned counsel again produced a chit which purported to bear the signature of the Naib Tehsildar. But there were a number of over-writings and interpolations in that chit which on a cursory examination appeared to be a suspicious document. That apart, as observed by the learned Judges of the Division Bench, the plea that the petitioner is the allottee of the entire house is inconsistent with the initial stand before the Settlement Authori--ties. The house having been rightly held as divisible, to transfer' the entire house would amount to transferring two residential units in his favour, which the law does not countenance.
9. There is no force in this petition which is dismissed.