1. HAMOODUR RAHMAN, C. J.-The dispute in this case relates to a plot of land measuring 4 kanals and 6 marlas comprised in khasra No. 552 of Mauza Bawaka, Tehsil and District Peshawar. The petitioner claimed that he had purchased the same from Sher Zaman Khan by unregistered sale deeds executed on 4-1-63 and had since been in possession thereof. On the 30th of June 1969, however, Abdul Jabbar, the son of Sher Zaman Khan, and four others, instituted a suit for the possession of these lands alleging that the petitioner had taken forcible possession thereof some six months before the institution of the suit.
2. According to the plaintiffs, Sher Zaman Khan had transferred the lands by a registered sale deed executed on 24-3-55 to Mst. Allah Rakhi, the deceased wife of his son Abdul Jabbar Khan, in lieu of her dower fixed at the time of her marriage, and had also delivered possession of the lands to Mst.
3. Allah Rakhi. Mst. Allah Rakhi died issueless leaving the plaintiffs as her heirs.
4. The petitioner further claimed that the suit was barred by time and that his rights were protected by section 41 of the Trans--fer of Property Act as a bona fide purchaser for value without notice of the previous transaction which was not mutated in the revenue records.
5. The trial Court found that the lands had been transferred to Mst. Allah Rakhi earlier and, therefore, the subsequent unregistered sale deeds in favour of the petitioner were of no value and passed no title to the petitioner. He was also held to be no entitled to the protection under section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act as there was no evidence to show that he had searched the Registrar's records. The suit was also held to be within time as it had been filed within 12 years of the rejection of the mutation on 28-8-58. It was, accordingly, decreed. The findings of the trial Court have been upheld in appeal by the Additional District Judge of Peshawar and in second appeal by the Peshawar High Court.
6. The petitioner now seeks special leave to appeal and it is contended on his behalf that the High Court was wrong in taking the view that regardless of the fact whether Article 142 or 144 of the Limitation Act applied the suit was within time, because, after the execution of the deed in favour of Mst. Allah Rakhi and the transfer of possession in her favour Sher Zaman had no further right left to transfer the property to anybody else .
7. Learned counsel appearing in support of the petition contends that since the suit was brought on the allegation of possession and dispossession Article 142 of the Limitation Act applied and the onus was on the plaintiff not only to prove possession within 12 years but also &possession within 2 years before the institu--tion of the suit. In support of this contention reliance is also sought to be placed on a decision of the Federal Court in the case of Karam Ali v. Raja (PLD 1955 FC 35).
8. All the Courts below have held that till 1963 the land was in possession of Mst. Allah Rakhi through her father-in-law and her husband. Hence the suit filed within 12 years of that period in 1969 was within time. On the other hand, the learned counsel contends that the mutation entered in the name of Mst. Allah Rakhi was actually rejected on the 28th of August 1958. Hence there is no evidence to show that there was any delivery of possession to Mst. Allah Rakhi. The rejection of the mutation does not necessarily disprove the possession which has been A concurrently found by alt the Courts to have been with Mst. Allah Rakhi. The mutation after being entered was rejected for non-prosecution after two years as Mst. Allah Rakhi being a pardah nashin lady did not appear before the revenue authorities, This question is thus concluded by the findings of the Courts below.
9. The petitioner himself did not produce any evidence of any mutation in his favour. The alleged transfer in his favour too was hit by the provisions of the Kabul River Project (Control and Prevention of Speculation of Land) Act, 1948. In the circum--stances there was only his word against the word of the plaintiffs as to the date of his possession. The Courts below have accepted the word of the plaintiff. The High Court was, therefore, right in holding that the suit was within time whether Article 142, applied or Article 144, particularly since the petitioner never claimed title by adverse possession, The decision cited has no application in the facts of this case.
10. We see no reason, therefore, to interfere with this concurrent finding of fact of all the Courts below.
11. Since the petitioner had no title to these lands and he had not prescribed title by adverse Possession for more than 12 years, lie could not successfully resist the respondent' suit. ,This petition is, accordingly, dismissed.