1. ' Appellant Muhammad is in occupation of shops No,8, 9 and 10 on plot No,III-D-I, Gole Market, Nazimabad, Karachi, as tenant of the respondent Dilawar Khan Durani. The respondent filed Rent Case No,860 of 1984, under section 14 of the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979 (hereinafter referred to as the Ordinance) on 3-3-1984. He stated that he had retired from service with M/s Mackinnon-Mackenzie & Company. Ltd., in the year 1976 and had also attained the age of 60 years on 16-1-1982. He further stated that he had served on the tenant/appellant requisite notice for vacating the rented premises but there was no response. He also made some other allegations of default in payment of rent and unauthorised alterations/ additions etc. The appellant resisted the Rent Case contending, inter alia, that the grounds for eviction urged in the application placed the case outside the scope of section 14 of the Ordinance. 'He further contended that the respondent/landlord owned the entire building consisting of 13 shops and 18 flats and he was interested in letting them out on charging 'Pugree' and he had, therefore, filed the eviction case against him. He made denial of other allegatins contained in the application. He also advanced the plea that the respondent had agreed to sell the shop to him. The parties filed their own affidavits in evidence. In addition, the respondent's son Muhammad Sarwar Khan also filed Affidavit to support his father, and the appellant filed Affidavits of two persons, by names Riaz Ali Ismail Manchani and Muhammad Ibrahim. The learned Controller held that the respondent/ landlord was entitled to get possession of the rented premises under section 14 of the Ordinance and passed order of eviction on 8-10-1985, directing the appellant to hand over vacant possession of the shops within 60 days.
2. The appellant has preferred this appeal against this order.
3. ' The learned counsel for the appellant has urged that the appellant had retired from service on 16- 1-1977 and had, according to him (the appellant), attained the age of 60 years on 16-1-1982, although not proved, and ejectment application was filed on 3-3-1984 and delay in making the application indicated that the respondent did not need the rented premises for his own use. In this respect, he has also urged that the respondent has sold away 10 other shops in the same complex and he was interested in selling the rented shops. He has relied upon a case reported in 1985 SCMR 291. He has contended that the respondent was already occupying first floor of the building and the ejectment application filed by the respondent is hit by subsection (2) of section 14 of the Ordinance. He has relied upon a case reported in 1984 CLC 2291. He has further contended that the respondent could not seek, under section 14 of the Ordinance, possession of the shops simultaneously. He has made reference to an unreported judgment of this Court in F.R.As. No,620- 625/85. He has also contended that section 14 of the Ordinance is confined only to the need of the landlord and does not envisage need of the spouse of their children. He has cited PLD 1982 Kar.
4. 406 as the supporting authority. According to him, most of the grounds agitated in the eviction application did not fall within the purview of section 14 of the Ordinance. He has lastly urged that defence of the appellant was not considered and the case may be remanded for reconsideration in the light of decision reported in PLD 1984 Kar.
5. 173.
6. ' The learned counsel for the respondent has submitted that the factum of age of the respondent stood proved by the documents placed on the record and his identity card etc. He has next submitted that there is no time limit for making application under section 14 of the Ordinance and he has cited two cases reported in 1982 CLC 175 and PLD 1983 Kar. 445 as supporting authorities.
7. He has also urged that the respondent, having retired from service and also having attained the age of 60 years, is entitled to seek possession of the rented premises which, according to him, constitute one composite unit, and, alternatively, he would be entitled to get possession of at least one of the shops in light of Supreme Court decision reported in 1986 SCMR 1981. He has stated that the respondent landlord would opt for shop No,8 in case he is not found entitled to have possession of all the three shops as one unit. He has argued that the grounds falling outside the sphere of section 14 of the Ordinance, were dropped by the respondent vide statement dated 6-4-1985 and eviction application could be maintained on the left out grounds admissible under section 14 of the Ordinance. He has relied upon a case reported in PLD 1985 Kar.
8. 663.
9. ' The respondent's case is that he had retired from service on 16-1-1977 and had attained the age of 60 years on 10-1-1982. In this respect, he has placed on record the letter dated 14-12-1976 from his employers M/s Mackinnon-Mackenzie and Co. Ltd. Pakistan, addressed to him that he was to retire on 16-1-1977, after attaining the age of 55 years. Authenticity of this letter has not been called in question. It confirms both the events of the respondents retirement on 16-1-1977 and his attaining the age of 60 years on 16-1-1982. He therefore comes in the category of the landlords who can invoke the provisions of section 14 of the Ordinance for seeking possession of the rented premises, subject to fulfilment of other requirements. He had served requisite notice under section 14 of the Ordinance on the appellant for vacating the premises. The relief for eviction of the tenant under the provisions of section 14 of the Ordinance was provided first time under the Ordinance which was promulgated on 14-11-1979. The respondent could not avail of such relief earlier as there was time limit of six months for filing the application under section 14 of the Ordinance. The time limit was removed under the Sind Rented Premises (amendment) Ordinance, 1980 promulgated on 1-9-1980.
10. The respondent attained the age of 60 years on 16-1-1982. Filing of the application on 3-3--1984 was not belated one. Moreover, there is no time limit now on the filing of the application under section 14 of the {{PAGE CUT}} Ordinance. Such view was adopted also by a learned Judge of thi Court in the case Muzaffar Ali v.
11. Tauqeer Alam Ashahar PLD 198 Karachi 445. Selling of other shops in the same complex by the respondent did, not stand in his way in seeking possession of the Rented Premises under section 14 of the Ordinance. Proviso t subsection (1) of section 14 of the Ordinance disentitles the specifie class of landlords from availing of reief under section 14 of th Ordinance in case the landlord has rented out the building after h had become entitled to invoke section 14 of the Ordinance. In the instant case, there are no such allegations and mere selling of othe shops did not extinguish the right of the landlord to seek possessio of rented premises under section 14 of the Ordinance. No such questio was under consideration in the case Bux Illahi v. Kazi Ghaxib A 1985 SCMR 291 relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant In that case, subsection (2) of section 14 of the Ordinance layin down that landlord shall not be entitled to avail of benefit of subsectio (1) of section 14 of the Ordinance if he is in occupation of an building in the same locality was considered.
12. ' The objection to the maintainability of the eviction applicatio on the ground that it was hit by subsection (2) of section 14 of th Ordinance as the respondent was in occupation of the first floor < the building also does not seem tenable as the shops sought to h vacated constitute commercial premises whereas the first floor I occupation of respondent is residential premises. Of course, there I no express distinction in section 14 of the Ordinance in respect < commercial building and a residential building but it appears fro the text,of subsection (1), subsection (2) of section 14 of the Ordinan( that reference to the word "building" employed in both the subsectior has reference to the building of like nature. Had the intention of th legislature been otherwise, the scope of section 14 of the Ordinan( which provides special and speedy relief to the landlords, who a] placed under special circumstances would be restricted to almo: negation of any relief as the landlord living in his own house wou' not get relief of possession of his commercial building for earning h livelihood; and, conversely, the landlord occupying the commerci building would not be entitled to get possession of his residenti building to live in and leave sigh of satisfaction. The case relic: upon by the learned counsel viz. Mst.Shamsa Khatoon v. Syed`Anwl Ali 1984 CLC 2291 had distinguishing features as the landlady IAN already occupying ground floor of the premises and was seekir possession of the first floor which had been let out and both we the residential premises. The other ground agitated by the learned counsel for tl appellant is that the eviction could not be sought under section 14 the Ordinance as some of the grounds stated in the application d not come within the purview of section 14 of the Ordinance. TI other grounds advanced in the eviction application were abandons during the pendency of the application and such statement data 6-4-1985 was filed before the Controller. Such ground was consider by a learned Judge of this Court in a case Syed Mujtabe Hass Abidi v. Ferozuddin Zaki PLD 1985 Kar. 663 and it was held th after dropping out inadmissible grounds from the eviction case and section, 14 of the Ordinance, the application was maintainable. I / in respectful agreement with the view adopted in that case. The objection to the Maintainability of the application on {{PAGE CUT}} round that section 14 of the Ordinance does not envisage need of Le children of the landlord to seek eviction of the appellant also is )t tenable. No doubt such objection was upheld in a case A .S.Mughal Mst.Khurshid Asmat All PLD 1982 Kar.
406. With utmost respect, do not subscribe to that view and I subscribe to the view of the [me learned Judge to the contrary adopted earlier in an unreported Ise of M/s Tangra v. Pak. Fipk Corporation F.R.A. No,443/81 decided 23-9-1981 and referred to in the aforesaid reported case.
13. There marked distinction between the provisions of sections 14 and 15 of Ordinance for seeking eviction of the tenant. Section 14 of the rdinance provides that the class of landlords specified therein can ek eviction of tenant from the building for personal use. "Personal >e", is defined in clause (g) of section 2 of the Ordinance as the Ise of the premises by the owner thereof or his wife (or husband), n or daughter". Obviously the expression "personal use" employed . Section 14 of the Ordinance includes the need of the children of owner-landlord. Identical provisions contained in clause (vii) of ibseetion (2) of section 15 of the Ordinance provide for seeking / iction of the tenant on the ground of a landlord requiring the .Emises in good faith for his own occupation or use or for the cupation or use of his spouse or any of the children. I am therefore the view that section 14 of the Ordinance does envisage eviction a tenant on the ground of the building needed for the use of the riser or the spouse or a son or daughter of the owner. In the stant case, the respondent's case has been that he needs the rented iilding for his own use.
14. ' The last but one ground put forth by the learned counsel is at the respondent can not seek possession of all the three shops in e light of the decision in F.R.A. No,520-625/85 decided on 6-5- 1986. Has been contended that it has been brought in evidence that all three shops constitute one composite unit. The learned counsel the respondent has urged that even if the three shops are nsidered to be separate units, the respondent/landlord can seek ssession of all the three shops in the light of the Supreme Court cision in a case Dilawar Hussain Nayyar v. Niaz Muhammad Dar 35 SCMR 1969 whereby the Supreme Court upheld decision of a High Court remanding the case to the Controller for considering requirement of the landlord in pragmatic manner. But in a bsequent decision in Civil Petition No,400-K and 401-K/1985 decided 22-1-1986, the Supreme Court held that the landlord was not titled to more than one shop premises under provisions of section of the Ordinance. In view of this decision, the learned counsel the respondent relying on the decision of the Supreme court in case Sardar Khan v. Riyaz Ahmed and others 1986 SC MR 31, wherein it was held that matter of choice in selecting premises getting possession lay with the landlord, made statement that the Tondent would prefer to have shop No,8 in case he is not entitled get all the three shops. This statement of the learned counsel 'trays equitable approach to the situation.
15. ' Lastly, the learned counsel for the appellant has contended t the Controller has not considered the defence put forth by the )ellant and that case may be remanded for re-consideration in the it of the case Shaboo v. Muhammad Ismail and seven others P L 1984 Kar.
173. The case relied upon is not at all, relevant to the a advanced by the learned counsel. The learned Controller seems to have considered the case put forth by the appellant. Of course, he did not dwel upon the plea of alleged sale of the shops, rightly so, as it was beyond the field he was required to examine under the Ordinance. This ground also is not sustainable.
16. The impugned order of eviction has been passed in respect of 3 shops No,8,9 and 10. As. Discussed above, the respondent could seek eviction in respect of only one of the shops. His Advocate has made statement that he would choose to have shop No,8. The impugned order of eviction is maintained in respect of only shop No,8 and it is set aside as regard other two shops No,9 and 10.
17. The appeal stands partly dismissed and partly allowed as above. The parties are left to bear their own costs.
18. ' Judgment was pronounced in presence of the Advocates for the parties, namely Mr.M.A.Kazi and Mr.Ahmed Yousuf Ali Rizvi. They have filed a joint statement that two months time may be allowed for vacating the shop No,8. The statement is placed on record. The appellant is allowed two months time for vacating the shop No,8. revisions by the competent authorities. Therefore, it is advisable to consult the official sources or legal professionals for the most up-to-date and accurate information.