ABDUL QADEER CHAUDHRY, ACTG. C.J.--This Judgment would dispose off the appeal filed by the appellant against his conviction recorded under section 302 P.P.C. By the learned Sessions Judge, Quetta, whereby he was sentenced to imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of Rs.5,000 or in default of payment of fine to suffer R.I. For Six months. It was further ordered that the accused should pay Rs.20,000 to the heirs of each of the deceased as compensation. The benefit of section 382-B Cr.P.C. Was also given. The State has also preferred a revision for the enhancement of the sentence through the Advocate General. The complainant Ghulam Abbas has also filed revision for the enhancement of the sentence.
2. The facts in brief are that P.W. Ghulam Abbas brother of deceased Ghulam Ali lodged report of the incident on 17-7-1985, at about 8-10 p.m. Which is alleged to have taken place on the same day at about 6-55 p.m. According to prosecution on the day of incident the accused Muhammad Naseem asked deceased Ghulam Ali, who was standing near his house that there was no electricity in the Mohallah and that he should telephone the WAPDA authorities in the matter. The deceased Ghulam Ali told the accused that he had already telephoned the WAPDA authority. The accused is alleged to have abused the deceased Ghulam Ali. There were exchange of harsh words between the accused and deceased Ghulam Ali and they grappled with each other. P.Ws. Wilayat Hussain and Muhammad Ali and others separated them. The accused was taken to his house. He then took a churry/knife and came out of his house and attacked the deceased Ghulam Ali and Mujawar Hussain, who were standing near their house. The injured were then removed to Hospital.
Deceased Mujawar Hussain expired at 9-45 p.m. While deceased Ghulam Ali succumbed to the injuries on the following morning. The statement of P.W. Ghulam Abbas was recorded by Additional S.H.O. In the Hospital and sent back to Quaidabad Police Station for registration of the case. The Police visited the place of incident. The Investigating Officer secured the blood stained earth from the Vardat. The accused came out of his house with blood stained Churri in his hand. He was arrested and Churri was taken into possession. The site plan was prepared at the pointation of complainant Ghulam Abbas. The post-mortem examination of the dead bodies were performed.
The statements of P.Ws. Were recorded on 20-7-1985 site plan through Patwari was got prepared.
The statement of the accused under section 164 was also recorded by a Magistrate First Class, Quetta.
3. After usual investigation the case was challaned and the accused was sent up to face the trial under section 302 P.P.C. The accused pleaded not guilty to the charge. At the trial prosecution examined 15 witnesses. P.W. I is Dr. M. Gul Khan, Police Surgeon, P.W.2 Willayat Hussain P.W.3 Shahnawaz Patwari P.W.4 Dr. Shabbir Hussain P.W.5 Ghulam Abbas son of Muhammad Ramzan, P.W.6, Mr. Nazir Ahmad Aftab Magistrate First Class, Quetta, P.W.7 Muhammad Ali, P.W.8 Waliur Rehman, P.W.9 Head Constable Rab Nawaz, P.W.10 Muhammad Akbar Bugti, P.W.11 Ali Raza, P.W.12 Ghulam Abbas son of Ahmad Jan, the brother of deceased Ghulam Ali P.W.13 Ali Madad, who was a witness of scene of occurrence but was dropped by the prosecution. P.W.14 is Ali Hassan and P.W.15 is Rafiullah Shah.
4. It is alleged that P.W.2 Wilayat Hussain and Muhammad Ali P.W.7 have witnessed the first part .Of the incident and they have been informed about the incident by the deceased Ghulam Ali P.W.12 is stated to have seen the second part of the incident. Some witnesses are formal in nature and the other are the Police Officers connected with the investigation of the case in one way or the other.
The deaths of the two deceased i.e. Ghulam Ali and Mujawar Hussain have not been disputed. This fact has been established through the evidence of P.W.1 Dr. M. Gul Khan who performed the post- mortem on the dead bodies and found the following injuries on the person of Ghulam Ali.
1. Stitched wound on right side of abdomen 1" in length.
2. Incised wound below left eye 1" x ----- into skin deep.
He produced certificate Ex.P/A. According to Doctor the injuries were sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. He also performed post-mortem examination of the deceased Mujawar Hussain and found the following injury:-
1. Stitched wound about --" in length on the left side of chest 2" below the nipple.
According to the doctor the injury was sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature.
Apart from the statement of the doctor, P.Ws. Wilayat Hussain, Muhammad Ali, Ghulam Abbas son of Ahmad Jan and Ghulam Abbas son of Ramzan have also deposed about the deaths of the deceased. The defence has also not challenged this fact.
5. In order to bring home the charge, the prosecution relied upon the ocular testimony of (i) P.W.2 Wilayat Hussain, P.W.7 Muhammad Ali, P.W.12 Ghulam Abbas son of Ahmad Jan brother of deceased Ghulam Ali and maternal uncle of deceased Mujawar Hussain (ii) Judicial confession of the accused (iii) Dying declaration of the deceased. (iv) Recovery of blood stained Churri.
6. According to the prosecution case the accused asked the deceased, who was standing near his house that there was no electric light in the Mohallah and that he should telephone the WAPDA Authority. Thereupon there was some exchange of harsh words and even they grappled with each other. P.W. Wilayat Hussain and other separated them. P.W.2. Took Ghulam Ali towards his house and the others had taken Muhammad Naseem (the appellant) towards his house P.W.7 Muhammad Ali has corroborated the statement of P.W.2 on all material facts about the first incident. Thereafter the second part of the incident had occurred and this fact has been narrated by P.W.12 Ghulam Abbas son of Ahmad Jan brother of deceased Ghulam Ali. According to this witness he was present in his house, he heard cries from out side. He went out of his house on cries and saw that Muhammad Naseem had a Churri in his hand and he was attacking his sister's son Mujawar Hussain. He gave a Churri blow on the left side of the chest of Mujawar Hussain. The witnesses are the residents of the locality, their presence at the time of the incident cannot be disputed. It is, therefore, clear that about the two parts of the incident the aforesaid witnesses have not only identified the appellant but have also deposed about the conduct and the action of the accused. Thus, P.W.12 had seen the accused causing injury to Mujawar Hussain. He had also seen Ghulam Ali lying injured. The statement of this witness inspires confidence as he has narrated those facts which he had seen. Otherwise he could very well say that he had also seen the accused causing injury to his deceased brother.
7. That statement of P.W.12 is corroborated by P.Ws. 2 and 7 as they attracted to the scene after hearing the commotion. They came-- to Vardat and saw Ghulam Ali and Mujawar Hussain lying injured. The direct evidence of P.W. Ghulam Abbas is corroborated by P.Ws.2 and 7.
8. These P.Ws.2, 7 and 12 have also stated that the deceased Ghulam Ali had told them that the accused has caused him the injuries. The three pieces of evidence are interconnected. Once we accept that the P.Ws. Had come to the Vardat then it is to be accepted that the statement was given by the injured Ghulam Ali to the aforesaid P.Ws. Ghulam Ali had died on the next day of incident. He was not unconscious, therefore, it is natural and probable that on the inquiry of these witnesses the injured had given them the name of his assailant. The accused is also resident of the same Mohalla. He was known to the P.Ws. The question of wrong identification does not arise. The aforesaid facts would clearly show that the appellant had caused injuries to Ghulam Ali and Mujawar Hussain and those persons had died on account of injuries received by them at the hand of the appellant. The evidence of P.Ws.2, 7 and 12 have also been corroborated by P.W.4 and 5 P.W.4 Dr. Shabbir was a family doctor of both Ghulam Ali and Muhammad Naseem. Ghulam Hussain brother of appellant was working as dispenser/compounder with him for the last 10 years.
According to this witness he accompanied Ghulam Hussain brother of the appellant to their house.
The accused was sitting inside his house. The inmates of the house were disturbed. The appellant inquired from him if Ghulam Ali and Mujawar Hussain were not seriously injured and he told the accused that whatever he had to do he had done and Allah will do best. P.W.5 Ghulam Abbas son of Muhammad Ramzan had deposed that Ghulam Ali was standing with the support of the wall and had kept his hand on the stomach. This witness has stated that he took the injured to the Hospital. It is, therefore, proved that the accused had caused injury to Ghulam Ali and Mujawar Hussain.
9. The next piece of evidence against the appellant is recovery of blood-stained Churri, which has been secured by P.W.8 Wali-ur---Rehman S.H.O. According to this witness the accused came out of the house and he had a Churri in his hand. P.W.9 Rab Nawaz and P.W.15 Rafiullah have supported the statement of P.W.8 Wali-ur-Rehman about the recovery. The weapon of offence along with the shirts of the deceased were sent to the Chemical Analyser and his report is in positive. According to his report Ex.P/N these articles and the blood stained earth secured from the place of incident were stained with human blood of Group-A, thus, this is another piece of evidence against the accused.
The next piece of evidence is the confession of the accused which was recorded by P.W.6 Nazir Ahmad Aftab Magistrate First Class after observing all the necessary precautions. The accused has admitted that there was some altercation between him and deceased Ghulam Ali when he had asked him to ring-up to the WAPDA authorities. He has also admitted that the persons present there had separated them and' he was taken to his house. From where he brought the Churri and inflicted Churri blows to Ghulam Ali and Mujawar Hussain. The appellant has also admitted in his 342 Cr.P.C. Statement that he was produced before the P.W.6 for recording his confessional statement but he has not admitted the same voluntarily. The confession has been retracted but this has been used against the appellant by the learned trial Court for sound reasons. The accused also appeared as his own witness and he has admitted the first part of the incident; however, about the second part he stated as under", I, was sitting in my house when after 3/4 minutes deceased Ghulam Ali again came to the door of my house. When I came out of my house, the deceased Ghulam Ali caught hold of me by my collor. He gave a fist blow on my face. We then exchanged fist blows and in this process we reached the house of deceased Ghulam Ali. Mujawar the sister's son of deceased Ghulam Ali was standing in front of his house. Mujawar Hussain had a knife in his hand. He abused me. He came running towards us and attacked me with the knife from behind Ghulam Ali. It struck to Ghulam Ali. Deceased Ghulam Ali got injured. "Even from the above statement it is quite clear that the appellant has admitted his presence on both the occasions. He had also admitted that the deceased Ghulam Ali and Mujawar Hussain had received injuries by means of knife blows. However, he has given a different version of the incident in his statement but the explanation furnished by the accused is not spelt out from the evidence on record and it cannot be accepted.
10. The learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that he does not dispute the incident, he does not dispute the place of incident and he does not dispute the recovery of blood-stained knife.
He also does not dispute that the accused gave injuries to Ghulam Ali and Mujawar Hussain. It is, however, contended that there is not a single witness of the incident because P.Ws. Wilayat Hussain and Muhammad Ali had not seen the accused causing injuries to the deceased. Ghulam Abbas the brother of the deceased is the only witness who stated to have witnessed the injuries caused by appellant to Mujawar Hussain. The learned counsel submitted that Ali Madad P.W.13 was the only witness of the incident but the prosecution had not examined him on the plea that he had been won over by the defence. The defence did not cross-examine P.W.13, though he was tendered for cross-examination, therefore, no adverse inference can be drawn on account of non- examination of P.W.13. Even otherwise it is not necessary for the prosecution to examine all the witnesses on a particular point. The overall conclusion would be drawn from the evidence on record. As stated above the learned counsel has not disputed the incident. He has also not disputed the part ascribed to the appellant. He has also admitted that the confession is true and voluntary and in spite of the fact that the same has been retracted it can be used against the appellant. On the basis of confession the learned counsel stated that the case falls under section 304 P.P.C. Exception 4 to section 300 P.P.C. Would be attracted in the instant case. In order to appreciate the contentions of the learned counsel for the appellant it is relevant to reproduce the confession of the appellant in toto. The statement of the accused under section 164 Cr.P.C. Was recorded in Urdu, the English translation of the same is as under:- "On 17-7-1985 at about 7-30 p.m. I was standing at the corner of my street. Wilayat Hussain and Ali Madad were also standing there. After some time Ghulam Ali also came there. I told Ghulam Ali that there was no electric in Mohalah and that you should telephone WAPDA as there was telephone in your house. Ghulam Ali replied that he had already done so. He also told me that one should not work for the people of that Mohala. Over this there was exchange of harsh words between myself and Ghulam Ali and we both grappled with each other. The people separated us I went to my house. After some time, there was a commotion in the street. I picked up a Churri from my house. My brother's wife prevented me but I came out in heat of passions. Ghulam Ali and Mujawar were at some distance in front of house. I went there and attacked them and gave churri blows on their abdomens. They also hit me with some thing on my head. People separated us. The Police came after an hour and arrested me. I handed over the churri to the Police. This in all is my statement."
It is contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that there was no previous enmity between the accused and the deceased. The incident occurred without premeditation in a sudden fight. There was exchange of ho: words between the deceased Ghulam Ali and the accused. They even grappled with each other and these facts have also been considered by the learned trial Judge in awarding lesser sentence to the accused. In support of this contention he has referred to the cases of Masoom Beg v. Muhammad Munir and another 1971 SCM R 476, Mahiwal v. The State 1975 P Cr. L J 1121, Yousuf v. The State 1984 P Cr. L J 1982, Mir Khan v. The State 1981 PCr.LJ 511, Bashir Ahmad v. The State 1975 P Cr. L J 203 and Burial v. The State PLD 1962 Kar. 152.
11. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the State has controverted the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that the case falls under section 304 P.P.C. He submitted that the facts on record would indicate that the case falls under section 302 P.P.C. And Exception 4 is not attracted. The learned counsel for the State has also distinguished the authorities cited by the learned counsel for the appellant. The contention of Mr. Basharatullah has sufficient force. In order to attract Exception 4 to section 300 P.P.C., there are four essential requirements (i) the fight was sudden (ii) absence of premeditation; (iii) heat of passion and (iv) undue advantage had not taken. If these ingredients are available on record then Exception 4 would apply but in the present case the accused did not strict to his confession. He had given the different version in his statement. When the accused and the deceased Ghulam Ali exchanged harsh words or grappled with each other they were separated by the P.Ws. Wilayat Hussain and Muhammad Ali and other persons present there and the accused was taken to his house. At the time of first incident the accused was un-armed. The accused brought the knife from his house and, thereafter caused blows to the deceased Ghulam Ali and Mujawar Hussain. There was sufficient time elapsed between the two incidents. The incident must not only be sudden but the record must show that the party assaulted must be on equal footings and both have caused blows to his opponent and there must be some sudden provocation, which originated in the dispute. It is also to be seen whether the injury was inflicted with a weapon which was already in his possession.
12. Keeping in view the aforesaid principle it can be said without any contradiction that the accused was taken to his house, therefore, the fight was not sudden because that fight had already ended and the accused had not given any blow to the deceased when there was altercation between him and the deceased Ghulam Ali. The authorities cited by the learned counsel for the appellant are not attracted to the facts of the present case. In 1971 SCM R 476 only a single blow was given during the grappling and the deceased had offered provocation and it was pleaded as defence at the trial. In 1975 PCr.LJ 1121 the fight was sudden and the man was already armed with hatchet and there were altercation of words. In 1984 P Cr. L J 1982 altercation was held by the deceased earlier.
In 1981 P Cr. L J 511 and 1981 P Cr. L J 610 the concession of the State Counsel was also taken into consideration. The facts were also distinguishable. The circumstances of the present case would show that there was no sudden fight. No provocation was offered by the deceased, the weapon of offence was not readily available with the accused and the incident had not happened in the same transaction, therefore, Exception 4 would not attract. The learned counsel for the appellant next contended that the perusal of the confession would show that Exception I to section 300 P.P.C.
Would be attracted. In order to attract exception No.1 it must be shown that (i) it is grave and sudden (ii) must have by its gravity and suddeness deprived the accused of power of self-control and he had no control over his action due to some feeling and provocation as such a normal and a reasonable man in such circumstances would loose his balance and control over his action. In the light of the above test it is to be examined whether the case of the appellant is covered by Exception No.1. The learned counsel has made emphasis on the point that when the accused was brought back to his house, he heard some commotion at his door and he came out of his house duly armed with a knife. It is stated that he had not gone to his house to arm himself with knife. It is, therefore, possible that the deceased had come to the house of the accused and abused him and the deceased might have said something which enraged the appellant, otherwise there was no occasion for the accused to come out of the house and cause stabs to the deceased persons. In support of his contention he has relied upon Mir Afzal v. The State 1972 PCr.LJ 1025 Muhammad Hussain v. The State 1975 P Cr. L J 422 and Sikandar v. The State PLD 1966 SC 555. In the first mentioned case it has been observed as under:- "With regard to application of Exception No.1 i.e. Grave and sudden provocation no doubt there are some decided cases where in the circumstances thereof, it was held that mere abuse or taunt by itself is no ground for giving rise to grave provocation. It has not been laid down as a law that in all circumstances, including an abuse, if it is of the filthiest kind and is given to a person who would normally not tolerate such abuse the Courts should never treat it as capable of giving rise to grave provocation. Such questions cannot be resolved by any technical view of the matter. It all depends upon the circumstances of each case and a finding has to be given on this fact as in respect of any other fact. This supposition is supported by the explanation to Exception I, which provides; "whether the provocation was grave and sudden enough to prevent the offence from amounting to murder is a question of fact." Therefore, while deciding this question of fact the normal practice of appreciation of evidence will have to be kept in view. The social and cultural background of the culprit; his family traditions; his education; his environments; his age; his own way of life and his relationship with the adversary among other circumstances may have to be considered. Similarly the attending circumstances before the abuse and after the abuse will have to be taken note of. "In the second case it has beer observed that it is quite evident that this was on account of grave and sudden provocation that the appellant caused injuries to the deceased. The deceased had used abusive language against the Bradheri of the accused. In Sikandar's case it has been observed as under:- "When the quarrel is followed by a direct clash the Courts cannot fail to take note of the fact that thereby a great heat is imported into the affair. A crime committed in hot blood, for the raising of which the victim is equally responsible with the offender, is not to be visited with the same punishment that the law reserves for deliberate offenders of the same kind, committed in cold blood, that is with malice aforethought."
These authorities are inapt. Facts of these cases are distinguishable and not attracted to the facts of the present case. The confession does not show that any abusive words were hurled at the accused. In the confessional statement it is stated that Ghulam All and Mujawar Hussain were standing away from the house of the accused, it cannot, therefore, be said that the deceased had come at the door of the accused and provoked him. There is no basis for such plea. The case set out in evidence clearly establishes a case under section 302, P.P.C. There was neither any grave nor sudden provocation. The first part of the incident is trivial in nature. As regards the second part, the accused only heard the noise, there was no occasion to arm himself with Churri unless it was premediated with determination to come out and inflict injuries to the deceased persons. In Holmes v. Director of Public Prosecutions 1945 All England Reports 124. It has been observed, the whole doctrine relating to provocation depends on the fact that it causes or may cause, a sudden and temporary loss of self-control whereby malice, which is the formation of an intention to kill or to inflict grievous bodily harm is negatived." The circumstances explained above would bring to irresistable conclusion that neither Exception I nor Exception 4 to section 300 P.P.C. Would be attracted and the case falls under section 302, P.P.C. Here we may also refer to Muhammad Nawaz v. Abdul Hayee and another 1974 SCMR 36. The learned counsel for the appellant has referred to Shamshad v. The State PLD 1963 SC 740 and Rahim Bakhsh v. Crown PLD 1952 F.C.
1. But the facts of the aforesaid two authorities are quite distinguishable and do not support the case of the appellant.
There is another aspect of the case; even assuming for the sake of arguments that any provocation was offered by the deceased Ghulam Ali. There was no reason to cause knife blow to deceased Mujawar Hussain. He had not given any provocation. He did not fight with the accused on either of the two occasions. He even did not give any cause to the accused to inflict blow when the accused came out of his house. No explanation has been given by the accused in the confession as to why he gave knife blow to the deceased Mujawar Hussain. The defence has not been able to bring on record any material to show that Mujawar Hussain had caused any provocation to the accused. There was no justification to give injury to Mujawar Hussain.
13. It was pointed out that though the accused was charged for, double murder but the learned Sessions Judge while convicting the accused has not said anything about two murders in his judgment.
14. The learned counsel for the State has vehemently argued that the facts of the case would bring home the charge of two murders against the accused beyond all reasonable doubt, therefore, the normal penalty should have been imposed on the accused. The reasons which prevailed with the learned Sessions Judge in imposing lesser penalty is as under:- "In the present case, it is admitted that there was no previous enmity between the accused and the deceased. The trouble started over the electricity. There was exchange of harsh words between the deceased Ghulam Ali and the accused. Even they grappled with each other. They were separated.
The accused went in his house. His confessional statement does not show that the accused went to his house to bring the weapon of offence. What has been stated by the accused is that after some time, he heard a commotion from outside and that in the heat of passions, he came out of the house with a churri and attacked both the deceased who were standing at some distance.
There was thus, no premeditation. The accused attacked the deceased in the heat of passions. The accused gave one blow to each of the deceased though he was in a position to inflict more injuries. The extenuating circumstances mitigate the enormity of the crime and justifies the imposing of the lesser of the two sentences provided by law."
15. To our mind the reasons advanced by the learned Sessions Judge in awarding lesser penalty are not sound. The learned trial Court has lost sight of the facts that two incidents are separable and there was not any remotest reason for causing injury to Mujawar Hussain. It is also immaterial in the circumstances of the case that only one blow was given to each of the deceased persons.
The injuries were caused on the vital parts of the bodies. The accused came out from his house duly armed with weapon. He covered a distance of about 60 to 80 feet to cause injuries to the deceased. The first incident came to end when they were separated and the accused was brought to the house. The only point that is to be considered is that on account of the judgment of the trial Court the accused has the expectation of life. But this sole ground is not sufficient to award the lesser penalty. The normal penalty is death. The mitigated sentence is the exception. Discretion must be exercised according to principle and not according to the whims of a judge. A sentence must be passed which is the usual sentence, which could have been passed in view of the facts of the case. In Nisar Ahmad v. The State 1981 P Cr. L J 476 the Additional Sessions Judge sentenced the accused to imprisonment for life but the sentence was enhanced by the High Court.
In Talib and 2 others v. The Crown PLD 1955 Federal Court 42 the High Court enhanced the sentence of the accused to death on an application preferred by a private person. It was held that the action of the High Court in enhancing the sentence in the circumstances of the case was justified. We may also refer to the case of Riaz Hussain v. The State 1986 SCMR 1934. It is useful to note the following observation of the Hon'ble Supreme Court made in Asadullah v. Muhammad Ali and 5 others PLD 1971 SC 541. The facts are as under:- "The Supreme Court in appeal against acquittal found that the High Court had passed a patently erroneous order of acquittal and thereby caused a grave miscarriage of justice. The Supreme Court, therefore, set aside the order of acquittal and restored that of the trial Court convicting accused on charge of murder, Question whether the sentence of death imposed on the accused by the trial Judge under S. 302/149 P.P.C. Should also be restored. It was urged on behalf of the convicts that since they had after their acquittal acquired an expectation of life it was not a fit case to exact the extreme penalty of death from/them. It was held the doctrine of expectation of life held out to an accused person by a subordinate Court is primarily applicable to cases involving question of limitation. If the period prescribed for filing an appeal or petition for special leave to appeal against an order of acquittal has expired the accused person acquires a right which cannot be taken away. A case in which the Court below has passed a patently erroneous order causing grave miscarriage of Justice would not fall ipso facto within this doctrine but if inordinate delay occurs in the disposal of an appeal against order of acquittal the appellate Court may refrain from exacting the extreme penalty of death. In some reported cases this Court has refrained from inflicting death sentence on ground of delay yet there is no universal rule that if the subordinate Court has on an erroneous or perverse view acquitted an accused persons resulting in grave miscarriage of justice the appellate Court cannot impose the sentence of death because of the very order of acquittal. Indeed sentence of death is the ordinary penalty for the offence of murder and the lesser penalty is awarded only if there be mitigating circumstances in which the offence was committed. If the doctrine of expectation of life was a rule of universal application, High Courts would in no case be competent to enhance the sentence awarded by the lower Court yet in a number of cases various High Courts of the subcontinent have in the past enhanced sentences of transportation to death if the ends of justice so required. The sentence to be awarded in an appeal against on order of acquittal will, therefore, depend on, the facts of each case."
16. We have come to the conclusion that there is no mitigating circumstances in the case in hand, therefore, the appeal filed by the appellant is dismissed and the revision for the enhancement of the sentence is accepted. The appellant is found guilty under section 302, P.P.C. For the murders of Ghulam Ali and Mujawar Hussain. Consequently he is convicted and sentenced to death on two counts. He should also pay a fine of Rs.5,000 in default of payment of fine to suffer R.I. For six months (in case the sentence of death is not executed). He is further directed to pay compensation of Rs.20,000 ten thousand each to the heirs of each deceased, in default of payment of compensation to suffer R.I. For six months (in case sentence of death is not executed).
The appellant shall be hanged by neck till he is dead. The reference and the appeal stand disposed off by the above judgment.