1. SHAFIUR RAHMAN, J.--Leave to appeal was granted under Article 212(3) of the Constitution in two separate matters disposed of by a common judgment by the Federal Service Tribunal on 10th of November, 1985, to examine whether a grievance notice given to the employer under section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, amounted to substantial compliance with the requirement of Rule 11 of the Water and Power Development Authority (Efficiency & Discipline, Rules, 1978 (hereinafter referred to as the Rules) so as to satisfy the requirement of first proviso to section 4(1) of the Federal Service Tribunal Act, 1973.
2. The two appellants were Line Superintendent in WAPDA posted in Gujranwala District. They were charge-sheeted and after obtaining their replies and affording personal hearing to one and a factual inquiry into the case of another, they were both removed from service, Mr. Muhammad Latif Bhatti by an order dated the 2nd of December, 1981 and Mr. Muhammad Siddique by an order dated the 13th of February, 1982. Both of them served on the employer a grievance notice under section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance and thereafter approached the Labour Court and succeeded in getting their removal orders set aside. On constitutional petitions filed by the WAPDA, the orders of their removal from service, were restored as the interference of Labour Court was found to be without jurisdiction, the appellants having been declared to be Civil servants for the purposes of seeking relief under the Service Tribunals Act vide section 17(113) by an Ordinance 84 of 1975. After such a decision by the High Court in the year 1984 the two appellants filed an appeal under section 4 of the Federal Service Tribunal Act. A preliminary objection was taken by the WAPDA to the competence of such appeals on the ground that the requirement of first proviso to section 4(1) of the Federal Service Tribunal Act remained unsatisfied as the appellants had not exhausted the departmental remedies provided by Rule 11 of the WAPDA (Efficiency and Discipline)
3. Rules, 1978.
4. The Service Tribunal in its impugned judgment not only reproduced verbatim the provisions of the two laws under examination but summarised distinguishing features of each in the following words:- "There are some material difference in the provisions of Rule 11 of the said Rules and section 25-A of the said Ordinance. Grievance can be brought under section 25-A of the Ordinance to the employer. Appeal under rule 11 of the Rules lies to the departmental authority. Time limit for grievance notice is three months, where for appeal it is two months. The appeal is to be submitted through proper channel by the aggrieved employee. Grievance can be brought to the notice of the employer either by himself or through his Shop Steward or' Collective Bargaining Agent. In the case of a grievance notice, the employer is required to communicate his decision within 7 days. In the case of appeal, no such period is provided for. However, under section 4(1)(a) of the Service Tribunals Act (LXX of 1973), the aggrieved civil servant in the absence of reply to the departmental appeal, can come to the Tribunal only after exhausting the waiting period of ninety days. In the scheme of the Efficiency and Discipline Rules, everything is to be done by the aggrieved civil servant himself. Section 25-A of the said Ordinance, on the other hand, gives vast power to the Shop Steward and Collective Bargaining Agent to bring the grievance. Again in the case of employer rejecting the claim, the employee or the Bargaining Agent is given two months to approach the Labour Court. A civil servant, however, affected by the Efficiency and Discipline Rules is bound to come to the Tribunal within 30 days of the communication of the decision to him.
5. All the above differences go to the very root of the two proceedings which are basically different.
6. We are now, therefore, firmly of the view that grievance notice under section 25-A of the said Ordinance does not serve the purpose of appeal under rule 11 of the said Rules."
7. The Tribunal ultimately non-suited the appellants on the ground that there has been a non- compliance with the jurisdictional requirements of first proviso to section 4(1) of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973.
8. Mr. Muhammad Zaman Qureshi, Advocate, the learned counsel for the appellants, does not dispute the specific requirement of the law, namely, the availability of a right of appeal under rule 11 of WAPDA (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules or the satisfaction of the requirement of first proviso to section 4(1) of the Service Tribunals Act 1973 for investing jurisdiction to the Service Tribunal. What the learned counsel seriously contends is that the notice of grievance issued by the two appellants under a misconceived law, that is, section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance satisfied substantially the requirements of these provisions of the law and having substantially and materially satisfied such requirements the jurisdiction of the Service Tribunal was clearly attracted.
9. In this connection, the learned counsel has referred to certain decisions of the Service Tribunal itself where a representation required to be filed under the law was addressed to a wrong departmental authority, (1983 PLC (CS) 709) or where the appeal was not routed through the proper channel (1985 PLC (CS) 188). The Tribunal took a more liberal view holding that the requirement of law with regard to exhausting departmental remedies had been substantially resorted to. According to the learned counsel for the appellants, in this case too, the higher departmental authorities had been addressed by the grievance notice, the objection to the impugned order of the departmental authorities had been listed and relief against them had been sought., What ultimately objected to was that there was a wrong reference to the law. In all other respects, the grievance notice satisfied what was expected of a departmental appeal under rule 11 of the WAPDA (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules.
10. It is clear to us that it was not a case of mistake of fact, that is quoting a wrong law, addressing an incompetent officer or mentioning an incorrect fact but that a mistaken view of the law was at the back of it all. The appellants considered themselves to be governed by Labour Laws in the matter of their employment and removal from service. This accounted for the grievance notice under section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance and their point of view prevailed before the Labour Court as well. Finally, they were told by the High Court that law was inapplicable and their remedy lay before the Service Tribunal. It was then an occasion for them to have referred to the law applicable and to have satisfied its, jurisdictional requirements for approaching the Service Tribunal. Having failed to do that they cannot as a matter of legal right claim that the Service Tribunal was bound in law to treat their grievance notice as substantial compliance with the law, requiring a departmental appeal before approaching the Service Tribunal. If in individual cases, the Service Tribunal has been, after examining the facts, condoning such or similar lapses, condonation cannot be claimed as a general rule in all cases where the requirement of first proviso of section 4(1) Service Tribunal Act is not satisfied. It was within the discretion of the Service Tribunal and we find that the Tribunal has in fact attended to all aspects of the case involving facts as well as the law before exercising the discretion against the appellants. We too find no reason why the appellants failed to file a departmental appeal as was required under the law.
11. The appeals raise no question of law of public importance as to require our adjudication under Article 212(3) of the Constitution. The appeals are, therefore, dismissed with no order as to costs.