' Record has been received and perused.
2. Nazir Hussain, a son and general .Attorney of Muhammad Hussain, instituted a pre-emption suit in his (principal's) name on 31-7-1977 with regard to a sale of 48 K&nals of agricultural land situated in village Moran, Tehsil Sadiqab;id, District Rahim Yar Khan, secured by respondent 140.1. He contested the suit and one of the objections raised was that Nazir Hussain had not been conferred the authority, by the deed constituting him general attorney, to institute this suit on behalf of Muhammad Hussain. The question whether the suit was instituted by a duly authorised agent was set down in issue No,1 which was treated as preliminary by the trial Court and evidence for and against it was led. Therein, apart from producing the registered power of general attorney, dated 2-3-1977 as Exh.P.9, the principal Muhammad Hussain himself also appeared as P.W.1 to ratify the institution of the suit by stating with reference to the registered power-of-attorney that he had constituted his son Nazir Hussain to be his general attorney for the purposes of the suits instituted against him and also for the suits to be instituted on his 'behalf and claimed that thereunder four suits have been instituted by Nazir Hussain against Bashir Ahmad etc.' whereof the present suit is one, brought under his instructions. He also reaffirmed this by refuting the suggestion put to him in his cross-examination to the effect that the authority to institute the present suit had not been conferred and denying also that the authority was restricted to only two suits titled, 'Muhammad Hussain v. Muhammad Anwar etc., and 'Muhammad Hussain v. Abdul Rashid etc.'. Apart from this statement made on 11-6-1985, Muhammad Hussain had himself signed the amended plaint, dated 26-7-1983.
3. After considering the above evidence and perusing the contents of the deed of power-of- attorney learned trial Judge held that the statement of Muhammad Hussain was contradicted by the contents of the deed wherein power was restricted to pursuing only two described suits pending in the Court of the Senior Civil Judge, Rahim Yar Khan and no authority has been conferred therein for even instituting a pre-emption suit as the present one. In consequence, the suit was dismissed on 9-7-1985.
4. An appeal there against filed by Muhammad Hussain himself was heard by .a learned Additional District Judge who upheld the findings of the trial Court and affirmed its decree by dismissing the appeal on 12-1-1986. Muhammad Hussain has now come up to this Court in this Second Appeal.
5. Learned counsel has attempted to support the institution of the suit on the basis of section 196 of the Contract Act by contending that due ratification of the act of the general attorney had been made by the appellant himself in personally signing the amended plaint, dated 26-7-1983. Section f96 of the Contract Act is as under:- "Where acts are done by one person on behalf of another, but, without his knowledge or authority, he may elect to ratify or to disown such acts. If he ratify them, the same effects will follow as if they had been performed by his authority."
' In raising this contention, learned counsel seems to be oblivious of the provision made in section 200 thereof which reads:- "An act done by one person on behalf of another, without such other person's authority, which, if done with authority, would have the effect of subjecting a third person to damages, or of terminating any right or interest of a third person, cannot, by ratification, be made to have such effect."
Thereunder, a ratification is incapable of terminating the right or interest of a third person and if the institution of this preemption suit is taken to have been validated by the ratification made by Muhammad Hussain then, in the event of its ultimate success, the right and interest of the vendee-defendant will come to be terminated on account only of this ratification.
' Hence, the act of signing the amended plaint by Muhammad Hussain may, if at all, operate as his own act, not referable to the attorney, from that date onwards but since the limitation for filing the suit had long since expired, therefore, this act is only unavailing to the appellant.
6. Rule 2 of Order III of the C.P.C. Permits the performance of acts on behalf of the parties by their recognised agents and they are specified to be, among others, "the persons holding powers-of attorney, authorising them to do such acts on behalf of such parties". Therefore, to sustain an act done by one person on behalf of the other, a specific power 'to do such an act' on his behalf has to be established. Sections 226 and 227 of the Contract Act are also in point. They provide as under:- "226. Contracts entered into through an agent, and obligations arising from acts done by an agent, may be enforced in the same manner and will have the same legal consequences, as if the contracts had been entered into and the acts done by the principal in person.
227. When an agent does more than he is authorised to do, and when the part of what he does, which is within his authority, can be separated from the part which is beyond his authority, so much only of what he does as is within his authority, is binding as between him and his principal."
' Again, in section 2 of the Power of Attorney Act, VII of 1892, it is provided as under:- "The donee of a power-of-attorney may, if he thinks fit, execute or do any assurance, instrument or thing in and with his own name and signature, and his own seal, where sealing is required, by the authority of the donor of the power; and every assurance, instrument and thing so executed and done, shall be as effectual in law as if it had been executed or done by the donee of the power in the name, and with the signature and seal, of the donor thereof."
The expression 'thing so executed and done', used in this section also signifies the importance of the conferment of a specific power on the donee of a power-of-attorney to, become as effectual as done by the donor himself. Law treats the agent (the donee of power-of attorney) as the alter- ego of the principal and the primary purpose of such an instrument is to evidence the authority of the agent to the third parties with whom the agent deals. A power-of-attorney is held to confer only those powers as are specified therein so that the agent can neither go beyond the terms of the power-of-attorney nor deviate therefrom. In Fida Muhammad v. Pir Muhammad Khan (deceased) through legal heirs and others PLD 1985 SC 341, it is held:- "It is wrong to assume that every "general" Power-of-Attorney on account of the said description means and includes the power to alienate/dispose of property of the principal. In order to achieve that object it must contain a clear separate clause devoted to the said object."
The rule is firmly settled that the deed of power-of-attorney has to be strictly construed and a power which is not specifically given therein, except to the extent of doing lawful things incidental E to the exercise of such specified power (vide section 188 of the Contract Act), cannot be regarded to have been impliedly conferred. See, for instance, Messrs Eagal Star Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Messrs Usman Sons Ltd. And others PLD 1969 Kar. 123; Munir Hussain v. Mst. Mehrun Nisa (through her legal heirs) PLD 1982 Kar. 71; Pakistan Radio House Ltd. And 12 others v. Cassim Suleman and 7 others 1983 CLC 1656 and Muhammad Afsar Khan and another v. Khadim Hussain and 3 others PLD 1978 SC (A J & K) 143.
7. A power-of-attorney is not an instrument, of title and construction of such documents does not involve any issue of law, as is laid down in The Midnapur Zemindari Company Limited v. Uma Charan Mandal and others AIR 1923 P C 187. The meanings conveyed by the words used in such documents remain questions of fact so that the interpretation placed thereon in the first appeal is G final and cannot be departed from, as has been held in Mahmud All v. Mt. Ghulam Fatima AIR 1935 Lah. 902 on the basis of two earlier judgments of this Court reported as Dal Singh V. Pluiman AIR 1923 Lah. 626 and Devi Chand v. Jai Chand AIR 1926 Lah.
21.' The conclusion reached concurrently by the two Courts below, on the terminology of the deed of general power-of-attorney, that the authority to institute the present suit had not been conferred on Nazir Hussain, is the one of pure fact which has not been shown to have resulted from any misreading or non-reading and is also eminently justified. It has been laid down by the Privy Council in the above-cited case of 1923 as under:- "Unless it can be shown that the First Appellate Court has misdirected itself in point of law in dealing with the question of fact upon the evidence, there would be no ground for second appeal from its decision on the question of fact."
' The question about the conferment or otherwise of authority on Nazir Hussain to institute this suit on behalf of Muhammad Hussain really gets concluded with the finding of fact duly recorded in the appeal below against the existence of such a power and is not capable of being re-opened in this Second Appeal.
Moreover, since it is a pre-supposition in section 196 of the Contract Act that the act intended to be ratified may have been done by the agent without the knowledge or authority of the principal, therefore, in relying upon the rule of ratification, the appellant is deemed to have admitted that the institution of the suit by the agent was without the requisite authority vesting in him at the relevant time. To this effect is also the case Muhammad Saghir Ahmad v. Qurban Ali and others 1983 CLC 2127.
8. For the foregoing reasons, this Second Appeal is incompetent under section 101 of the C.P.C. And is accordingly dismissed in limine.