' This judgment will dispose of writ petition Nos.2054/87, 2055/87, 2056/87, 2072/87 and 2974/87, as they are directed against the same order and same question of law is involved in all the cases.
2. Since the learned counsel for the parties have argued the entire matter at length, therefore, I have admitted these petitions and are being decided accordingly.
3. The uncontroverted facts are that respondents No,2 to 11, filed suit for ejectment against petitioner before A .C.I, Kallur Kot District Bhakkar, on 1-6-1986, on account of default in payment of Batai for Kharif 1985 and Rabi 1986. On 2-8-1986 when the case came up for arguments, petitioners moved an application in view of the provisions envisaged in rule 4(4) read with sub-rule (5) of the Punjab Land Reforms (Procedure for Ejectment Suits) Rules, 1977, (hereinafter referred to as the Rules) submitting that Court had no jurisdiction to proceed in the matter beyond 60 days, and requested that the matter be referred to the Assistant Commissioner for adjudication. This application was dismissed on the same day, holding that the suit was instituted on 1-6-1986, and 1- 8-1986 was Friday, therefore, {{PAGE CUTT}} it was within the statutory period. After disposing of the application the suit was decreed on the same day. Petitioners challenged the order before the Assistant Commissioner Kallur Kot which was also dismissed on 22-9-1986, by observing that the lapses committed the proceedings by A.C.I., are not of such a nature as to rende them void. Petitioners preferred revision petitions before the Addition Commissioner (Revenue) Sargodha Division, being Revision Petition Nos.1430/ACR of 1986 to 1435/ACR of 1986; which were accepte vide order dated 8-12-1986; and the cases were remanded to th A.C/Collector Kallur Kot for decision afresh. Respondents 2 to 1 challenged this order before the Board of Revenue, through revisio petition Nos. ROR 230 to 235 of 1986; which were accepted by the learned Member Board of Revenue on 27-4-1987, setting aside the order of the learned Additional Commissioner holding that judgment decree passed by A.C.I./Tehsildar, in ejectment cases even after expiry of 60 days is valid. This order has been impugned in the present petitions.
4. Learned counsel for the petitioners referred to the statutor provisions incorporated in rule 4(4) read with sub-rule (5) of the Rules and vehemently contended that the learned Member Board Revenue has taken an erroneous view of the law in holding the A.C. I/Tehsildar has the jurisdiction to decide ejectment suits eve beyond the statutory period of 60 days. In support of his submission he has placed reliance on the cases of Muhammad Aslam v. The Additional Commissioner (Revenue) Lahore and 4 others (1983 C L 915) and Muhammad Rafi etc. v. Additional Commissioner (RevenuE Sargodha etc. (1981 SCM R 1181).
5. On the contrary, learned counsel for the respondents, inter alia, argued that Rule 4(4) and (5) of the Rules are ultra vires para. 25 of the Land Reforms Regulation, 1972 (MLR 115) (hereinafter referred to as the Regulation) for having prescribed stringent tin schedule; further that writ is a discretionary remedy, therefore, may not be invoked, that there is concurrent finding of facts recorde in this case, and lastly that the petitioners conduct does not mer relief in constitutional jurisdiction.
6. I have heard the arguments. Of the learned counsel for th parties. The crucial question which determines the fate of this cas is rule 4(4) and- (5), text of which is being reproduced hereinunder:- "4. (4) The said Court shall dispose of the plaint within sixt days of its receipt:
(5) If the said Court fails to decide a case within the stipulate period of sixty days the case shall stand transferred to th Court of Collector concerned to be tried in the same manne as in the original Court. The case so transferred shall b disponcl of within thirty days and the order passed by th Collector shall be final."
7. In view of the submission made by the learned counsel for th respondents, before adverting to the efficacy of these Rules, it woul 'IN appropriate to examine vires thereof. The Rules were framed by the Land Commission in exercise a the Rule making power conferred under para. 6 of the Regulation By virtue of para. 25 of the Regulation, special forum has bee created, and the obvious intention of the legislature is that ejectmen )roceedings between landlord and tenant should be decided in the ;peediest possible manner. This intention of the law-giver has been tdvanced by the rules. The rules have not travelled beyond the ;cope of the parent law. Actually it has made the remedy more effective )y directing the trial Court to dispose of the matters within the ;hortest possible time, failing which matter should be transferred to he Assistant Commissioner, who, will adjudicate upon the same with he desired speed so that the momentum of the litigation is not deferred or one reason or the other. The rules are not repugnant or ultra rires or in any manner contrary to the parent law, but, are in fact lesigned to aid, further and advance the objective of the Regulation.
8. Now to appreciate the connotations of the Rules, it may be )bserved that the Rule making body, in furtherance of the objective Lnd with a view to translating the obvious intendment and spirit of he parent statute into letters of the law has framed Rule 4(4) and 5) of the Rules, by prescribing mandatory time frame work, Rule ,(4) lays down a period of 60 days within which suit shall be disposed If whereas rule 4(5) lays down the consequences that would flow out If non-adherence to the schedule. The phraseology deployed therein lemonstrates the intention of the law-giver which is couched in a leeming fashion; in that if the matter is not decided within 60 days, he suit automatically shall stand transferred to the Court of the ollector concerned and the A.C.I/Tehsildar ceased to have any urisdiction whatsoever in the matter. He becomes functus officio. Ny order passed by him would be nullity in the eye of law. It does lot even require any transfer order from the concerned functionary. t is automatic per force. It would be deemed as if no file is pending In the cause list of the A.C.I./Tehsildar consequent upon the expiry If statutory period of 60 days; and if any order is passed thereafter he law looks upon it as if it is being written on a self-erasable iaterial. I am fortified in this view by the opinions expressed in the ases cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner.
9. Adverting to the facts of the present case, the suit was nstituted on 1-6-1986 and in simple mathematical terms, 60 days xpired on 31-7-1986, thus, ,Friday was not relevant for the puposes f the suit. The matter was taken up on 2-8-1986. On that date it muld be deemed as if there was no lis pending on the cause list of he A.C.I/Tehsildar, therefore, he could not have passed any order rhatsoever. The onl lawful course open to the A .C.I./Tehsildar rould have been to refer the case file to the Assistant Commissioner/ ollector concerned. The impugned order is void ab initio, over which o superstructure could have been raised.
10. In the light of the aforementioned view of the law other points aised by the learned counsel for the respondents, such as that writ etition is a discretionary remedy,- etc. Are not relevant for the urposes of resolving the present controversy.
11. The impugned order is accordingly set aside. The matter is eemed to be pending in the Court of Assistant Commissioner/Collector :allur Kot, who shall decide the same in accordance with law.
However, he parties are left to bear their own costs. {{PAGE CUTT}}