SAAD SAOOD JAN, J.--This appeal by special leave arises out of a suit filed by the appellant inter alia for the specific performance of an agreement to sell a half share in a shop including a Tharra located in Block No. 4, Sargodha City, allegedly executed by Muhammad Islam, respondent No. 1, in his favour. The suit was dismissed by the trial Court on the finding that there was no agreement of sale it existence. The appellant went in appeal before the District Judge. The learned Judge affirmed the said finding of the trial Court and dismissed the appeal. The appellant then filed a revision petition in the High Court. It remained unsuccessful as the High Court declined to interfere with the concurrent finding of the lower Courts.
2. The property in dispute belonged to Muhammad Islam, respondent No. 1. The case of the appellant was that on 24-3-1977 Muhammad Islam orally agreed to sell it to him for a sum of Rs.20,000. The entire sale price was to be paid before the Sub-Registrar at the time of registration of the sale-deed. In pursuance of the said agreement Muhammad Islam executed a sale-deed in his favour on 26-3-1977. It was to be registered, on 28-3-1977 but on this date Muhammad Islam did not appear before the Sub-Registrar. On his application, the Sub-Registrar fixed 8-4-1977 as the date for the registration of the sale-deed. On this date Muhammad Islam did appear before the Sub-Registrar but informed him that he had already sold the property through a registered sale- deed to Muhammad Saeed-ul-Hassan, respondent No. 2, on 28-3-1977. In the circumstances the Sub-Registrar declined to register the sale-deed executed in his favour by Muhammad Islam.
3. At the trial Muhammad Islam denied that he had ever offered to sell the property in dispute to the appellant. He alleged that in February, 1977 he had agreed to sell the property to respondent No. 2. Accordingly, a sale-deed was also drafted. At the time of the drafting of the sale-deed the previous owners from whom he was to purchase the property had not executed a sale-deed in his favour. Consequently, some particulars in the sale-deed drafted in favour of respondent No. 2 were left out. These were to be supplied after the previous owners had completed the sale in his favour.
They did so on 24-3-1977. On 26-3-1977 respondent No. 2 gave the draft sale-deed to his son, Tariq Saeed, with the amount of the consideration and asked him to get the particulars filled in by the deed-writer and have it registered. He also gave him another sale-deed relating to another property, which also required registration. Bashir Ahmad, father of the appellant and a cousin of respondent No. 2, offered to accompany Tariq Saeed and took over the two deeds and the money.
When they reached the Court premises, Bashir Ahmad disappeared with the deeds and the money and in collusion with the deed-writer got another sale-deed drafted in favour of the appellant.
Later, he fraudulently made respondent No. 1 to sign the sale-deed drafted in favour of his son, holding out that it was the one drafted in favour of respondent No. 2.
4. On the pleadings of the parties the trial Court framed a number of issues. Of these the following two alone are relevant for the disposal of this appeal. These are:--
(i) Whether defendant No. 1 (now, respondent No. 1) agreed to sell -- share of the shop in dispute to the plaintiff (now the appellant) for a sum of Rs.20,000; and
(ii) On proof of issue No. 1, whether defendant No. 1 executed the unregistered sale-deed, dated 26- 3-1977 in favour of the plaintiff and promised to get it registered.
Both parties led evidence in support of their respective versions. After considering the same the learned trial Court decided both these issues against the appellant, holding that respondent No. 1 had neither agreed to sell the property in dispute to the appellant nor had he executed a sale- deed in his favour. As regard the signatures of respondent No. 1 on the sale-deed it took the view that as at the relevant time he was unaware of its contents the mere appendage of signature thereon could not amount to execution of the deed.
5. From the judgment and decree of the trial Court the appellant preferred an appeal before the District Judge. After re-appraising the evidence the learned District Judge affirmed the findings of the trial Court and dismissed the appeal. The appellant then filed a revision petition in the High Court. As mentioned earlier, the High Court declined to interfere with the concurrent findings of the lower Courts.
6. It will be noticed that both the material issues raise questions of fact. The subordinate Courts have recorded their findings on these issues after considering all the relevant evidence. The learned counsel has not been able to point out any instance of misreading of the evidence nor has been able to show that the conclusions recorded by the Courts are not supportable on the evidence which was before them. The High Court was, therefore, right in declining to interfere with their concurrent findings.
7. We would accordingly dismiss this appeal with costs.