FAKHRUDDIN G. EBRAHIM, J.-This petition under Article 201 of the Interim Constitution challenges the detention of one Ishawarlal son of Radhomal, who was arrested on 14th June 1972, by the Larkana Police allegedly without showing any order. On 20th July 1972, the grounds of detention were served upon the detenu, which indicated to him that he was sought to be detained under Rule 32 of the Defence of Pakistan Rules.
2. The grounds of detention served on the detenu read as follows :----- "That you Ishawarlal son of Radbumal resident of near Qaim Shah Bukhari, Larkana are staunch Hindu and possess anti---Pakistan leanings. That you have thick connections with Sobho Gian- Chandani. That you are taking part in agitation and anti-State activities and promoting hatred between Old and New Sindhis, which activities are prejudicial to the security, public safety and maintenance of public order etc."
3. Mr. Azizullah K. Shaikh, the learned counsel for the petitioner has challenged the detention on several grounds. He firstly contended that the powers of detention available. Under the said rule 32 could only be exercised for the purposes of preventing a person from acting in a manner, prejudicial to the Defence of Pakistan or the efficient conduct of military operation or prosecution of war and not otherwise. It was argued that to prevent a person from acting in a manner prejudicial to the security, public safety and maintenance of public order, as In the present case, a person could be detained only under the West Pakistan Maintenance of Public Order Ordinance, 1960. His next contention was that the detention was in violation of Article 9 of the Interim Constitution Inasmuch as the grounds of detentions were not served on the detenu within a week nor was the detenu---s case referred to the Advisory Board on tee expiry of ; one month of his detention. The third and the last contention urged on behalf of the dotenu was that the grounds of detention or at least some of them are not relatable to the purpose of the said Rule 32 and that additionally these grounds are vague and imprecise.
4. Coming to the first contention of the learned counsel, it will suffice to say that I find no warrant for the proposition that detention for the grounds alleged could only have been effected under the West Pakistan Maintenance of Public Order Ordinance: 1960 and not under the said rule 32. Rule 32 in no uncertain terms empowers the Government to order detention of a person among other things, for the purposes of preventing him from acting in a manner prejudicial to the security, public safety or interest or maintenance of peaceful conditions.
5. Mr. Azizullah K. Shaikh, did not press his second contention based on Article 9 of the Interim Constitution and it has, therefore, become unnecessary to examine the same.
6. The last contention of the learned counsel related to two-fold attack on the grounds of detention served on the detenu. It is alleged that these grounds are vague and imprecise. We enquired from the learned counsel the law under which the Government was obliged to furnish the grounds of detention to the detenu. After some hesitation, the learned counsel sought to place reliance on Article 9 of the Interim Constitution but this too was expressly given up. Rule 32 does not make any provision for supply of grounds of detention to the detenu and I am, therefore, unable to see how inadequacy or insufficiency of the grounds can be challenged merely' because the Government has actually supplied the grounds. In my opinion, therefore the argument that the grounds are vague and imprecise is not available to the detenu. This, however, does not mean that we cannot, as contended by the learned Advocate-General, look at the grounds at all for any purpose whatsoever. The grounds furnished do certainly disclose the reasons which led the Government to make the order of detention and it is certainly open to the detenu to show that the reasons disclosed or any of them are alien to the purpose of the statute and, therefore, outside its ambit.
7. It is necessary to analyse the grounds with a view to ascertain, how far all or any of them can be said to be "activities, prejudicial to the security, public safety and maintenance of public order".
8. The grounds alleged that the detenu ;
(a) is a staunch Hindu ;
(b) possesses anti-Pakistan leanings;
(c) has thick connection with Sobho Giancbandani ;
(d) is taking part in agitation and anti-State activities and promoting hatred between Old and New Sindhis.
9. The learned counsel on behalf of the detenu contended that to be a staunch Hindu or possesses anti-Pakistan leanings cannot be said to be "activities" prejudicial to the security, public safety or maintenance of public order. To be a Hindu or for that matter a staunch Hindu, is according to him, a question of fact or a question of belief. To possess anti---Pakistan leanings, is, again the counsel contended, a state of mind. I am not impressed by this reasoning inasmuch a one's belief or condition of mind may well, not without reason, furnish apprehension that he may act in a manner pre-judicial to public order etc. These grounds in my view must be read in the context of the last ground. Namely, taking part in agitation and anti-State activities, and so read, the first two grounds cannot be said to be irrelevant for the purpose of rule 32 under which the detention has been ordered.
10. Now it is obvious to me that to have connection, how--soever thick, with one Sobho Gianchandani, unrelated to the maintenance of public order etc. Cannot under rule 32 be the reason for making the impugned order of detention. Nothing has been said or alleged against Sobho Gianchandani in the grounds. On behalf of the detenu it was stated at the Bar that Sobho Gianchandani is a free man and is a practising Advocate at Larkana. Be that it may. Mere association with a person howsoever undesirable he may allegedly be from the point of view of maintenance of public order or safety, cannot justify the inference that the detenu was acting in a manner prejudicial to public safety or maintenance of peaceful conditions. This ground, therefore in my view falls outside the ambit and therefore, extraneous to the said Rule 32 of the Defence of Pakistan Rules.
11. In my view, therefore, while the grounds (a). (b) and (d) above fall within the scope and the ambit of rule 32, ground (c) is wholly outside it. The detaining Authority has given us all its reasons or grounds for making the impugned order of detention. 1s it then open to us to sever the bad froth the good grounds and uphold the detention as based on the latter only ? In my opinion, it is not permissible to do so as it is impossible to say whether the relevant or wholly irrelevant considerations gave the requisite satisfaction to the detaining authority.
12. This aspect of the case has come up for consideration in several reported decisions and I may with advantage reproduce the relevant portions.
The Federal Court in the case of Keshav Talpade v. King---Emperor (AIR 1943FC72) observed as follows :----- "If a detaining authority gives four reasons for detaining a man, without distinguishing between them, and any two or three of the reasons are held to be bad, it can never be certain to what extent the bad reasons operated on the mind of the authority or whether the detention order would have been made at all if only one or two good reasons had been before them." --- . . If a reason is given for the detention of a person which is not within the scope and ambit of the Act conferring the power upon the Government to detain, then the whole order is vitiated notwithstanding the fact that the other reasons given are good, because something may have operated upon the mind of the detaining authority which is foreign and extraneous to the purpose of the Act."
The Madras High Court in a case reported in M. R. S. Mani v. District Magistrate and another (AIR 1950 Mad. 162) observed as follows : - "Take a case where the grounds and particulars furnished under section 3(1) are such that some of them are within the scope and ambit of section 2 and some are wholly outside it and the satisfaction of the detaining authority is derived from both of them. It is impossible to say whether relevant and admissible or wholly irrelevant and inadmissible considerations gave the requisite satisfaction to the detaining authority. In such a case, detention would be bad."
PLD 1965 Lah. 112) Mr. Justice Muhammad Yakub A.I observed as follows:- "Similarly, if there is more than one ground on which the order of preventive detention is based then each ground has contributed to the satisfaction of the detaining authority and none could be excluded from consideration. Conversely, if the detaining authority considered any material as insufficient to warrant preventive detention he will not set it out in the grounds of detention served on the person detained to make an effective representation against it."
These observations were again approved by our own Supreme Court of Pakistan in the case of Government of West Pakistan v. Haider Bux Jatoi and another (PLD 1969 SC 210) in the following words; "Reliance was placed on the view expressed by a Full Bench of the High Court in Rehmat Elahi v.
Government of West Pakistan PLD 1965 Lah. 112 that wrongful Inclusion of ground renders orders of arrest and detention under section 3 of the Ordinance illegal. It was said in that case that if there are more than one ground on which the order of detention is based then each ground has contributed to the satisfaction of the detaining authority and no ground can be excluded from consideration in judging the legality of the order of detention."
13. Applying the law as laid down by our Supreme Court which I am even otherwise bound to, I am of the view that the impugned order of detention cannot be sustained, in view P of inclusion of a wholly irrelevant ground No. (c) referred to above, and the detention must, therefore, be declared to be not In accordance with the law.
14. For the foregoing reasons this petition is accepted and it is directed that Ishwarlal son of Radhomal be released from custody forthwith.
TUFAIL ALI A. RAHMAN, C. J.-I have had the advantage of reading the judgment proposed to be delivered by my learned brother and entirely agree that the petition must be allowed.
2. However, in regard to what my learned brother bas described as ground (a) I am unable to agree that this is a ground upon which detention can properly be ordered. The fact that the person is a Hindu or staunch Hindu is a matter of his religious faith. There are many Hindus who are citizens of Pakistan and it would be far too wide and sweeping a generalization to state that on that ground alone they cannot be regarded as loyal citizens of this country. In a given case it may be that the religious faith of a person may be so connected with some activity which can properly be described as anti-State activity as would justify such an inference.
3. I would, therefore, regard not merely ground (c) but ground (a) also as irrelevant.
4. This, however, cannot make any difference to my con--clusions that the petition should be allowed ; on the contrary it makes the case for the detenu stronger. I therefore, agree that this petition be allowed and the detenu directed to be released at once.