1. ' This appeal arises from the order passed by the Sixth Senior Civil Judge and Rent Controller, Karachi, dated 20-3-1985, ordering ejectment of the appellant from the premises in question within two months from the date of the order.
2. ' The facts of the case are that the appellant was the respondent's tenant in respect of the premises situated on Plot No. C-94, Block 11, Federal 'B' Area, Karachi at the monthly rent of Rs.900.
3. The premises were rented out to the appellant in 1975. In 1982 the respondent filed an application for eviction of the appellant from the premises on the ground of personal bona fide requirement and default in payment of rent in respect of two months, i.e. August and September 1982. As to the default the learned Rent Controller held that no case of default in payment of rent was made out as there was no written rent agreement between the parties, and if grace period of 60 days was allowed to the appellant then the rent for the month of August should have been paid by the appellant before 11-11-1982 and the ejectment application which had been filed on 7-10-1982 was premature. The other ground of personal bona fide requirement raised by the respondent, however, found favour with the learned Controller resulting in passing of the impugned order.
4. ' I have heard Mr. Dewan Bashir Ahmad, learned counsel for the appellant and Mr. M.A. Jan learned counsel for the respondent.
5. ' The basic issue involved in the case is, whether the respondent had succeeded in establishing good faith in respect of his personal requirement. According to the averments made in the eviction application, it was stated by the respondent that circumstances compelled him in 1975 to rent out the premises to the appellant and after doing so the respondent was forced to live with his relatives firstly in Paposhnagar and then in Jahangir Quarters. In 1980 the respondent requested the appellant to vacate the premises but first the appellant promised to vacate the same within one month or so but later he failed to keep his promise with the result that the respondent had to take another house in Nazimabad, Karachi. According to the respondent the appellant had owned three-storeyed building consisting of flats which had been falling vacant from time to time but the appellant still continued to occupy the rented premises. It was further averred that the respondent was also under pressure of his landlord to vacate the premises which he was then occupying.
6. ' As against this plea of the respondent, the appellant in her written statement stated that the respondent had rented out the premises to her voluntarily and of his free will and choice as he himself opted to reside elsewhere. The only object of the respondent, therefore, was to enhance the rent. As such it was not admitted by the appellant that the respondent required the premises for his bona fide personal use or that of his family.
7. ' At the time of evidence also the stand taken by the parties was more or less the same. The respondent stated that he was residing in rented premises which he had originally taken from his landlord at a monthly rent of Rs.800 which had later been enhanced to Rs.1,000. It was also stated by the respondent that he was constantly being pressed by his landlord to vacate the premises and that the premises in his possession were not suitable for his requirement as the same was situated on a plot measuring 216 Sq. Yds. And only half portion of the house was in the respondent's possession. The respondent further stated that his family consisted of two children, his father-in- law and mother-in-law, besides himself and the accommodation which consisted of only three rooms was not sufficient for their requirement. In the cross-examination the respondent stated that the premises in occupation of the appellant consisted of drawing and dining rooms besides three bed-rooms. The appellant in her evidence, on the other hand, stated that the house which the respondent was occupying as a tenant, in fact, was his own house although the same stood in the name of one Mahmooda Begum who was a Benamidar.
8. ' The learned Controller on the basis of this evidence came to the conclusion that the respondent had succeeded in establishing his good faith and consequently he ordered the appellant's ejectment from the premises as indicated above.
9. ' Mr. Dewan Bashir Ahmad learned counsel for the appellant has vehemently argued that the respondent has failed to establish his good faith before the learned Controller. About the claim of the respondent that he is living in rented premises, the contention of Dewan Bashir Ahmad has been that no sufficient evidence had been produced by the respondent to establish the same. On the point of respondent's requirement the contention of the learned counsel is that the same must be sufficiently established and the tenant cannot be ejected on account of mere desire of the landlord to occupy the rented premises. The first contention of Mr. Dewan Bashir Ahmad had not been seriously contested by Mr. Muhammad All Jan but his second contention has been vehemently contested by Mr. Jan as according to the learned counsel if any assertion made by the landlord is not shaken in his cross-examination and no evidence is further produced by the tenant in rebuttal, no further proof would be necessary to establish bona fides or good faith of the landlord's requirement.
10. ' Both the learned counsel have placed reliance on precedents and the first case cited on behalf of the appellant is the case of Sultan Press Ltd. v. Muhammad Hassan PLD 1965 Kar.
624. In that case it was held that the landlord in order to make out case for personal requirement of the premises must clearly establish good faith and mere ipse dixit of the landlord in this respect was not sufficient. The next case cited by Mr. Dewan Bashir Ahmad was that of Mst. Farrukh-Un- Nisa v. Safdar and 6 others PLD 1985 Kar. 639 wherein also similar views have been expressed. The other cases relied upon by Mr. Dewan Bashir Ahmad are Haji Ghulam Muhammad v. Abdul Qadir PLD 1975 Lah. 200, National Bank of Pakistan v. Wadhumal through his legal heirs and 2 others 1985 CLC 1053 and Syed Israr Alam v. G.M. Hussain 1983 CLC 468. In Haji Ghulam Muhammad v. Abdul Qadir it was observed that the ejectment of tenant would not be ordered by a Rent Controller on mere expression of the desire, even in good faith, by the landlord unless the Controller himself was satisfied that the claim of the landlord was bona fide. In National Bank of Pakistan's case, decided by this Court, my learned brother Ibadat Yar Khan, J. Held that "good faith" used in the statute was not a term of art and it must be proved through facts and circumstances to inspire confidence in the mind of the Controller for exercise of power in favour of the landlord to such a degree as to deprive the tenant of his statutory protection under the special law. It was further held that under the rent laws something more persuasive than mere desire to occupy his own property must be pleaded and proved in order to dispossess a tenant in possession. In Syed Israr Alam v. S.M.
11. Hussain, Abdul Hayee Kureshi, CJ. (as he then was) held that use of the word "need" would involve the concept of bona fides and mere word of the landlord that the premises were required by him in good faith were not sufficient unless good faith was clearly established by him.
12. ' Mr. Muhammad Ali Jan, on the other hand, has relied upon Hasan Khan v. Mrs. Munawar Begum PLD 1976 Kar. 832, Afaqur Rehman v. Mrs. Rehana Sami 1983 CLC 1105 and Ghulam Ali and 4 others v Muhammad Shafi and 2 others 1983 CLC 1418. In the first case reported in PLD 1976 Kar. 832, it was held that the assertion or claim on oath by landlord that he required the premises for his personal use if found to be consistent with his averments in his application and not shaken in cross- examination or disproved in rebuttal must be accepted by the Controller as bona fide. In Afaq-ur- Rehman v. Mrs. Rehana Sami, it was held that the owner of the property in dispute who is residing in a rented house was fully justified to claim the relief seeking ejectment of the tenant. In Ghulam All and 4 others v. Muhammad Shafi and 2 others it was observed that if assertion of landlord was quite consistent with the claim in question and/or not shaken in cross-examination and evidence produced by the tenant was not sufficient to rebut his claim, the bona fide of the landlord would stand sufficiently proved.
13. ' Turning to the facts of the instant case first of all, the respondent had failed to establish that he was living in rented premises at the time of filing of the ejectment application or that he was paying rent at the rate of Rs.1,000 to the landlord of such premises. Although the respondent has produced photo copies of rent receipts but this evidence by itself is not sufficient to support the assertion as the landlord of the building alleged to be in occupation of the respondent then was not produced either to prove the tenancy agreement or the rent receipts allegedly issued by him.
14. The only evidence on this point, therefore, is that of the respondent himself. However, such evidence is not sufficient to establish that the respondent was occupying the premises on rent as it can hardly be safe to rely upon the solitary statement of the respondent in this regard. Mr. Muhammad Ali Jan however, argued that even if respondent had failed to establish such claim, nevertheless it was not disputed that the respondent was living in another house and his need to occupy his own house still could not be questioned. Although there can be no cavil against this argument as in order to establish good faith, it was not incumbent on the respondent to establish that he was living in a rented house, but nevertheless a duty is case upon the landlord to establish that his claim is bona fide. The facts indicate that in 1975 the respondent himself opted to utilise the premises for commercial exploitation and shifted to another house. Thereafter he was living in a rented house. The reason for that, according to the respondent, was that he was facing a financial crises at that time. The basic question is, whether the mere reason that the tenancy agreement between the landlord and the tenant has expired and the landlord is living in rented premises, entitles the latter to eject his tenant on such ground alone? The desire of the landlord to occupy his own house may be bona fide, but would the same be sufficient to meet the requirements of the law for the purpose? One cannot be oblivious of the fact that originally, according to clause(i) of subsection (2) of section 15 of the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979 the Controller could put the landlord in possession of the premises on the ground that the period for which the tenancy agreement was agreed by the parties to be valid, had expired, but this provision was deleted alongwith section 6 of the Ordinance by the Sind Rented Premises (Amendment) Ordinance, 1984.
15. The legislative intent was clearly manifested by this amendment as the intention was to afford protection to such tenancies where the period for which the tenancy agreement had been agreed to remain valid, had expired. If the object behind clause (vii) of subsection (2) of section 15 of the Ordinance of 1979 was to entitle the landlord to eject the tenant merely on the ground that the former was living in rented premises, then there is no doubt in my mind that such amendment in section 15, as referred to above, would not have been necessary. To allow the landlord to eject tha tenant on such ground is bound to leave the tenant without any safeguard and the latter can be constantly subjected to harassm ent by the landlord Therefore, the respondent's contention now that he is living in a rented house, even if believed, would not be sufficient as to entitle him to eject his tenant. No such change in his circumstances has been pleaded by the respondent which can entitle him to an order in his favour. The plea in regard to insufficiency of existing accommodation for the respondent and his family has neither been sufficiently established nor the same is tenable in view of the circumstances of the case. The cases cited by Mr. Jan are distinguishable as in all those cases bona fide need of the landlord to occupy his own building had been sufficiently established. The findings of the learned Controller on the point are, therefore, reversed.
16. ' For the aforesaid reasons this appeal is allowed and the impugned order passed by the learned Controller is set aside. In view of the questions raised in this appeal the parties are left to bear their own costs.