1. ' I propose to decide Civil Revision No,306/D of 1987 and Civil Revision No,307/D of 1987 by one judgment as common questions of law and facts are involved.
2. Civil Revision No, 306-D of 1987.
3. ' Habib Ullah was owner of property in India. He died before Independence. His two widows Mst. Jan and Mst. Jafaran migrated to Pakistan. Mst. Salma Bibi plaintiff-petitioner was daughter of Habib Ullah from Mst. Jafaran.
4. ' A claim was filed by Mst. Jan regarding the property of her husband Habib Ullah. She was allotted 18 Kanals 8 Marlas of land in Chak No,359/G.B. And 61 Kanals 2 Marlas of land in Chak No,351/G.B., Tehsil and District Toba Tek Singh. Mst. Jan vide registered sale-deed dated 17-7-1980, sold 18 Kanals 8 Marlas of land to Shah Muhammad and Bashir Ahmad. Mst. Salma Bibi plaintiff-petitioner on 3-9-1980, filed a suit to challenge the said sale. This suit was dismissed by learned Civil Judge vide judgment and decree dated 11-3-1986. Her appeal was dismissed vide impugned judgment and decree dated 29-9-1986 by learned District Judge, Toba Tek Singh.
5. Civil Revision No,307-D of 1987.
6. ' Mst. Jan on 14-2-1980, gifted 61 kani I 2 marlas of land in Chak No,351/G.B., Tehsil and District Toba Tek Singh to Abdul Wadood. Mst. Selma Bibi on 3-9-1980, filed a suit to challenge the said gift. This suit was dismissed by learned Civil Judge vide judgment and decree dated 11-3-1986. Her appeal against the said judgment and decree was dismissed on 29-9-1986 by learned District Judge, Toba Tek Singh.
7. ' Hence the two revisions.
2. In support of these revisions, it is contended that the provisions of Punjab Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application (Removal of Difficulties) Act No, XXV of 1975 were not applicable to facts of the present case and as such, the two suits could not be considered as barred by limitation. No other point was urged on behalf of the petitioner.
8. ' I have considered the above contention and have also examined the rele'vant provisions of Act No,XXV of 1975. Only issues 5, 6 and 7 were disputed before me. The remaining issues had been decided in favour of the plaintiff-petitioner by the learned Civil Judge. It is an admitted position that after the Supreme Court judgment in Muhammad Yaqoob v. Member Board of Revenue and others PLD 1973 SC 304 and enforcement of Act No, XXV of 1975, .Mst. Salma Bibi plaintiff did not make any application as contemplated by sections 2 and 3 of the said Act. The present suits were, for the first time, filed on. 3-9-1980 after alienation of land by Mst. Jan. Act No,XXV of 1975 was published in the Gazette of Punjab Extraordinary dated 31st March, 1975. Subsection (2) of section 1 of this Act required that "it shall come into force at once but shall be deemed to have taken effect on and from the 15th day of March, 1948." Prior to that, Mst. Jan was all the time treated as full owner of the property allotted to her in lieu of the property abandoned by her in India or to which she was otherwise entitled. This title of Mst. Jan could have been challenged under section 2 of Act XXV of 1975. It is conceded at the Bar that no application was made by Mst. Selma Bibi under this section.
9. The learned counsel tried to argue that after enforcement of this Act, the Revenue/Settlement Authorities should have taken suo motu action to declare Mst. Jan as limited owner of the property allotted to her. I am not inclined to agree with this contention on behalf of the petitioner. Section 2 of this Act contemplates an application by an affected person within one year of the commencement of this Act to seek declaration that the interest of the allottee was limited. No such application was filed by Mst. Salma Bibi. The provisions of section 3 of this Act were not applicable to the facts of the instant case. The remedy under section 3 could be availed to challenge an alienation by a widow before promulgation of Act No, XXV of 1975. The allotment to Mst. Jan and the extent of her interest in the said allotment was never challenged within one year of the enforcement of the said Act. She, therefore, became full owner of the property allotted to her and as such, was entitled to alienate the same. The learned counsel did not point out any material irregularity in the impugned judgments. I, therefore, find no merits in these two revisions which are accordingly dismissed in limine.