MUHAMMAD AKRAM, J.-This is a petition made by Begum Agha Abdul Karim Shorish Kashmiri to this Court under Article 201 (a) (b) of the Interim Constitution of Pakistan, 1972 and section 491 of the Criminal Procedure Code calling in question the validity of a detention order passed by the Government of Pakistan against her husband.
2. The detenu, Agha Abdul Karim Shorish Kashmiri is the Editor of the Weekly Chatan, Lahore. It is alleged in this petition that respondent No. 1, Sardar Abdul Wakeel Khan, Senior Superintendent of Police, Lahore arrested the detenu on the 17th of August 1972 at about 1 p. m. At the Lahore Airport when he was about to board a plane for Multan where he was due to address a public meeting.
Some of the members of the staff of the Weekly Chatan contacted the respondent in order to find out the reasons for his arrest. They were informed that he was wanted in connection with a case registered against him at the Civil Lines, Police Station, Lahore. But on enquiry it transpired that actually no such case was registered against him at the Police Station. However afterwards, from a news-item; published in The Pakistan Times dated August 18, 1972, it transpired that according to a press Note issued by the Ministry of Interior Government of Pakistan the detenu was arrested and detained under the Defence of Pakistan Rules, 1972 for a period of three months in connection with his alleged "statement made in Lahore at a public meeting of August 5, 1972 making insinuations against the Government of Iran". The petitioner has averred in this petition that this reason given out to the Press for the illegal detention of her husband was altogether false and a distortion of the true facts. 'The detenu did not say anything at all against the Government or Shehanshah of Iran as a pact of the public speech in question made outside Mochi Gate, Lahore, on the 5th of August 1972. According to the petitioner what had actually happened was that somebody from among the audience at the public meeting had asked a question from the speaker about the role played by Iran during the recent crises through which Pakistan has passed: But the detenu spontaneously parried the question with a view to divert the attention of the public to another topic. According to the petitioner it was noteworthy that the detenu did not say anything on this subject in his Weekly "Chatan" or at any time during the course of his various speeches delivered before and after the meeting in question held on the 5th of August 1972.
The petitioner vehemently asserted that the impugned order was passed mala fide against her husband by the respondents. Recently a public controversy ensued between the Governor of the Punjab and the detenu over the award of two contracts in respect of the installation of barbed wire on the boundary wall of tine Governor's House and the collection of toll tax at the new Ravi Bridge, Lahore. In that connection on the 28th of July 1972 the Governor at a public meeting held outside Mochi Gate, Lahore threw a challenge to the detenu to substantiate his allegations other--wise he shall order his arrest and prosecution for having made these false and malicious allegations against him. On this the detenu publicly replied to the Governor's challenge stating that he did not attribute these allegations to the Governor and that he bad merely drawn the attention of the public to the two con--tracts in which some of his relatives were reported to tm involved. On this the Central Government by a notification issued on the 9th of August 1972 appointed Mr: Justice Mushtaq Hussain, Judge of the Lahore High Court as a Commission of Enquiry to go into the two allegations forming the subject-matter of the public controversy between them. The detenu appeared before the Commission in Lahore on the 16th of August 1972 and made a statement expressing inter alia his inability to participate in the proceedings until the Governor has resigned.
The proceedings before the Commission were held on the 16th and, 17th of August 1972, and the report of the enquiry was yet to be submitted to the P-resident, when the detenu was arrested at about mid-day on the 17th of August 1972. It is alleged in this petition that in these circumstances the arrest of the detenu was made for collateral purposes with a view to satisfy the ego and personal vendetta of the Governor against him. It is further alleged that the detenu has addressed several mammoth public meetings all over the Province and criticised the policies of the present Government in power. He has also beep writing to the same effect in his Weekly "Chatan". In doing so ac exercised his legitimate right of freedom of speech and expression to inform the public about the true state of affairs in the country. According to the petitioner these public speeches and the writings of the detenu have elicited tremendous response from the public and this has weakened the hold of the party in power in the Province as well as at the Centre. Therefore, in the opinion of the petitioner for these personal as well as party reasons the respon--dents, in gross abuse of their lawful authority, arrested the detenu for male fide and ulterior reasons. The petitioner has averred in her petition that the detenu is a law-abiding citizen, a great patriot and an eminent journalist of very long standing. He has not done anything objectionable to warrant his preventive detention. On these allegations the petitioner filed the above petition in the High Court on the 18th of August 1972 and prayed for the production of the detenu in Court with a view to satisfy itself that he is not being held in custody without lawful authority or in an unlawful manner.
3. This petition is opposed by all the three respondents Nos. 1 to 3, the Senior Superintendent of Police, Lahore ; the Government of Punjab and the Government, of Pakistan respectively.
Respondents Nos. 1 and 2 filed their joint written statement and respondent Nos. 3 has separately filed its written reply. Respondents Nos. 1 and 2 controverted the allegations of the petitioner.
According to them the detenu, Agha Abdul Karim Shorish Kashmiri was wanted by the police in a case F. I. R. No. 553 dated the 16th of August 1972 registered against him at the Police Station, Old Anarkali, Lahore, under section 16 of the West Pakistan Maintenance of Public Order Ordinance, 1960, Rule 49 of the Defence -of Pakistan Rules read with section 500/504 of the Pakistan Penal Code for delivering an objectionable speech on the 6th of August 1972. The case was under investigation with the Police Inspector Sultan Ali, it was in that connection that he arrested the detenu at first on the 17th of August 1972, at the Lahore Airport when he was about to leave for Multan and lodged him in the Police Station, Civil Lines at Lahore. Afterwards the detention order in question passed by the Central Government under Rule 32 of the Defence of Pakistan Rules was received during the night and served on the detenu in the morning of the 18th of August 1972 in the judicial lock-up where he was already lodged. His detention was ordered on account of the objectionable remarks made by him in the course a public speech delivered outside Mochi Gate, Lahore on the 5th of August 1972 against a friendly Muslim country. In this speech he condemned a foreign Muslim country friendly to Pakistan. He cursed her and described her in most denigrated form. He was also disrespectful towards a high dignitary of that country. He was accordingly ordered to be detained with a view to preventing him from acting in a manner prejudicial to Pakistan's relations with foreign power. The respondents asserted that this detention had nothing to do with the alleged controversy between the detenu and the Governor. They denied that the detention of the detenu was male fide or that the impugned order was passed with a view to satisfy the alleged ego of the Governor or any other collateral purposes.
4. Similarly respondent No. 3 the Government of Pakistan, in its written statement contended that the detention of the husband of the petitioner was perfectly legal and not male fide. It had nothing to do with the controversy that was going on between him and the Governor. He was arrested on account of his objectionable speech in question delivered at the public meeting held on the 5th of August 1972 outside Mochi Gate, Lahore with a view to preventing him from acting in a manner prejudicial to Pakistan's relations with a foreign power.
5. At the hearing before us the parties were allowed opportunity to adduce their evidence.
Respondents Nos. 1 and 2 produced six witnesses in support of their case. Respondent No. 3 examined the Deputy Secretary (Political) Interior Division of, Islamabad with a view to satisfy us that the detenu is not being held in custody in an unlawful manner or without lawful authority. The respondents also produced a number of documents in support of their case. In rebuttal the detenu appeared as his own witness and also produced a number of documents.
6. An important witness produced on behalf of respondents Nos. 1 and 2 is R. W. 3, S: I. Muhammad Yamin, Urdu Steno--grapher, Special Branch, Lahore. He was deputed by R. W. 2, Muhammad Bashir D. S. P. 7(S. B.), Lahore to cover the proceed--ings of the public meeting, held outside Mochi Gate, Lahore, on the 5th of August .1972 in the short-hand note books supplied to him for the purpose. He took down in short-hand the speeches of all the speakers who spoke at the meeting. The detenu Agha Abdul Karim Shorish Kashmiri also addressed the gathering. The witness prepared a verbatim record of his speech in short-hand in his short-hand note books produced in Court. After the meeting the Magistrate on duty, Mr. Sajid Hussain Shirazi (R. W. 1) appended his signatures to these short-hand notes taken by the Urdu Stenographer. S I. Muhammad Yamin further deposed that afterwards on the 7th of August 1972 he deposited these note books with R. W. 2, Mr. Muhammad Bashir Haleemi. He transcribed the entire speech delivered by the detenu from his short-hand notes. A copy of the Urdu transcrip--tion prepared by the witness is Exh. R. W. 2/1. In this the objectionable portion of the speech in question is Exh. R. W. 2/ 1-A. The testimony of this witness is substantially corroborated by R. W. 2, Mr. Muhammad Bashir Haleemi and R. W. 1 Mr. Sajid Hussain Shirazi, Magistrate on duty. The other witness of considerable importance is R. W.
4. Ghulam Rasool, Inspector of Police, Special Branch, Lahore. He independently prepared tape---recorder while the detenu was addressing the gathering in front of him within his hearing and in his presence. His speech was played back in Court as desired by the parties. This was also necessary in order to fully understand the background and the context in which the allegedly objectionable portion of speech was delivered by the detenu. Exhibit R. W. 4/1 is a verbatim record of the objectionable portion of the speech in Urdu correctly prepared by him in his grand from the tape-record. The petitioner has failed to establish that tape-recording in question and it: replay back in Court was manipulated by this witness by any artifices adopted by him.
R. W,
6. Muhammad Rafique, S. H. O., Police Station, Old Anarkali, Lahore recorded the F.I.R. No. 553 of 1972 (Exh. R. W. 4/6) on the 16th of August, 1972 against the detenu. The investigation relating to this case against the detenu was made by R. W. 7 Mr. Sultan Ali, City Inspector Police, Lahore. According to this witness he arrested the detenu at 1-45 p. m. On the 17th of August 1972 at the Lahore Airport in this case under section 16 of the Pakistan Maintenance of Public Order Ordinance, 1960. Rule 49 of the Defence of Pakistan Rules, and section 500/504, Pakistan Peal Code for having delivered another objectionable speech to the public in Y. M. C. A. Hall, Lahore on the 6th of August 1972.
7. The detention order in dispute was passed by respondent No. 3, the Government of Pakistan. R. W.
5 Mr. M. Zia Hussain, Deputy Secretary (Political), Interior Division (formerly known as Home Affairs), Islamabad, appeared to support the action taken by the Government against the detenu. He deposed that in this connection the Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, Home Department, Lahore wrote vide letter No. 8/59-H-SPL-II/72, dated the 17th of August 1972 (Exh. R. W. 4/1) to the Secretary to the Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Interior, Islamabad infor--ming him about the objectionable speech in question made by the detenu outside Mochi Gate, Lahore on the 5th of August 1972. A copy of the English translation of this portion of the speech in question was also enclosed with this letter. This letter was sent through a special messenger by the Provincial Government. According to the witness the messenger also made over to him a copy of the entire speech of the detenu in Urdu. He examined the case under the rules and on the basis of the material laid before him he was satisfied that the speech of the detenu contain--ed material which could prejudice Pakistan's relations with an extremely friendly country. At the time the Secretary, Interior Division (Home Affairs), Government of Pakistan was away to Karachi and the witness then took the file to the Minister for Interior, Khan Abdul Qayyum Khan. He too was of the opinion' that the speech was obviously highly objectionable. He, therefore, gave his approval to the preventive detention of the detenu. A true copy of the aforesaid letter received from the Provincial Government is Exh. R. W. 4/l, Copy of the objection--able portion of the speech in question translated into English enclosed with this letter is Exh. R. W. 4/2. The witness deposed that Exh. R. W.
4/3 is true copy of the order of detention passed by Khan Abdul qayyum Khan, Minister of Interior.
Exh. R. W. 4/4 is a copy of the detention order signed by the witness actually served on the detenu on the 18th of August 1972 and Exh. R. W. 4/5 is a copy of the Memorandum of the grounds of detention delivered to him. According to the witness it was necessary to detain Agha Abdul Karim Shorish Kashmiri because he had already delivered the objectionable speech in question which contained material prejudicial to Pakistan's relations with a very friendly foreign country and there was a well-founded apprehension that if allowed to remain at liberty he might make further speeches likely to endanger their good relations. In his cross-examination the witness admitted that no publication was given to the objectionable portion of speech in dispute in this country. Te Press Note (Exh. R. W. 4/6) issued by the Govern--ment was received by the Press Information Department at 22-00 hours and it was released to the public afterwards at 22-40 hours on the 17th of August 1972. The witness admitted that at the time of passing the detention order he was not aware that before it the detenu had already been' arrested by the S. S. P., Lahore. According to him he could have considered this matter about his previous arrest as well if brought to their notice.
The witness was, however, positive that on the papers brought to him this detention was perfectly justified in the circumstances of the case. The witness repelled the suggestion put to him that the Provincial Government procured the detention order in question from the Ministry of Interior by suppression of facts.
8. In rebuttal the petitioner produced the detenu Agha Abdul Karim Shorish Kashmiri as a witness.
He deposed that on the 17th of August 1972, at about 1-32 p. m. When he was about to board a plane for Multan, a Sub-Inspector of Police in plain clothes contacted him in the departure lounge at the Lahore Airport. He told him that the Senior Superintendent of Police, Lahore wanted to speak to him. Soon afterwards he also arrived there and arrested the detenu. After his arrest the Senior Superintendent of Police took him in his car to the Lahore Cantonment North Police Station. The witness has vehemently denied that R. W. 7 Mr. Sultan Ali, City Inspector, Lahore had' arrested him at the Airport or that he took him to the Police Station. The witness admitted to have delivered a public speech outside Mochi. Gate, Lahore on the 5th of August 1972. It was correctly reported in the Weekly Chatan (Exh. A. W. 1/1) for the 14th of September 1972. He denied haying made any objection--able remarks in his speech against Iran. He maintained that in none of his speeches made before or after the 5th of August 1972, he even broached upon the subject of our relations with any foreign country. The witness is the Editor of the Weekly Chatan and according to him he has quite often written in favour of Iran in his paper. He even wrote editorial in praise of Iran.
9. It may be stated here that' during the course of the, hearing before us on the 31st of August 1972, Mr. Saeed Akhtar learned counsel for the petitioner raised an objection against the admissibility of the tape-recorded speech in question produced in' Court by R. W.
4. Ghulam Rasool, Inspector.
Police, Special Branch, Lahore. In this connection he at first largely relied on the observations in Dr. Partap Singh v. The State of Punjab (AIR 1963 Pb. 298) cite before us. Hut afterwards in consultation with the detenu he did not press his objection to the admissibility of the tape-recording in the evidence.
10. Even otherwise we find that this objection bad no force. In this connection no reported case decided by the superior Courts in our country was brought to our notice. However, there are a number of decisions by the American Courts on the admissibility of the evidence furnished by the automatic devices for recording and reproduction of the talks and speeches. In Andrews v. United States (105 A M L R 322) the evidence based on conversation on telephone was held to be admissible provided the identity of the person with whom the witness spoke or the person whom he heard speak is satisfactorily established. Similarly Blair, J. Of the Supreme Court of Michigan in Boyne City, G. & A. R. C. O. v. Anderson (117 A M S R 642) observed :----.
"Communications conducted through the medium of the telephone are held to be admissible, at least in cages where there is testimony that the voice was recognised . . . . . . The ground for receiving the testimony of the phonograph would seem to be stronger, since in its case there is not only proof by the human witness of the making of the sounds to be reproduced, but a reproduction by the mechanical witness of the sounds themselves."
Similarly, in Brindley v. State (193 Ala. 43) testimony as conversation heard by a witness through a `detectophone' was admitted. The evi--dence obtained through the dictograph along with the statement of the operator thereby to explain the working of the instrument and demonstrate the principles on which it operated was held to be admissible.
11. In England in Buxton v. Cumming ((1927) 71 So. Jo. 232) Swift, J. Saw no reason why a dictophone record made by the witness should not be put in evidence. In Hopes v. H. M. Advocate (1960 SC (J)
104) an objection was taken that if this is permitted it would admit evidence which was illegally and irregularly obtained as a. Result of a deliberate trick on the part of the police. But on appeal 'the following observa--tions made by Lord Justice-General (Lord Clyde) on the point are quite instructive:- ' 'The Inspector's evidence of the conversation was as much primary evidence as the evidence from the replaying of tape--recorder. Each received it at the same time, the one recording it in human memory, the other upon a piece; of tape."
In R. v. Mills ((1962) 3 All E R 291). a tape-recording machine was installed at a convenient place and the appellants were cautioned. They shouted incriminating remarks to one another. At the trial, a policeman gave evidence that he himself heard and remembered the various remarks which passed between them and that he could confirm from his human memory the accuracy of record of the conversation which were on the tape and which he had caused the machine to play back to him for the purposes of checking and improving his own note made from memory. In these circumstances the Court held that the evidence of the conversation was admissible because - "the tape-recorder was used by the policeman to perform the function which would otherwise have been performed by a pen or pencil in his own hand, and he used the record produced by that piece of machanism, which he was employing as his tool, to refresh his memory when he was giving evidence ; alternatively, the machine; albeit inanimate, was set by the policeman to perform the function of making a record, and. Very soon after the conversations had taken place, the police--man adopted as accurate the record which that machine had made, and thereupon it became his own record and was in all respects and for all relevant purposes the equivalent of a note made by him in this own note book, sufficiently shortly after the occurrence of the conversation, to which he wits entitled to refer when giving evidence."
In that connection in another case in R. v. Maqsud Ali ((1965) 2 All E R 464) it was laid down that a tape-recording is admissible in evidence provided the accuracy of the recording can be proved and the voices recorded can be properly identified. In the opinion of the Court such evidence should always be regarded with some caution and assessed in the light of all the circumstances of each case. There can be no question of laying down any exhaustive set of rules by which the admissibility of such evidence should be judged.
12. We respectfully agree with the above observations of Lord Clyde in Hope v. H. M. Advocate. On principle there can be no difference of a trustworthy witness when he faithfully reproduces from what is recorded by him in his own memory or replayed from a tape-recording prepared by him with the bell of scientific device or automatic instrument that may completely a ensure its faithful recording and reproduction in Court. In a proper case under suitable circumstances a witness is permitted by law to refresh his memory from what was taken down by hi in pen or ink. There is no reason why he cannot be allowed to refresh his memory by playing back from tape-record prepared by him under identical circumstances.
13. In Dr. Partab Singh v. The State of Punjab cited before us on behalf of the petitioner, in this connection it was observed :--- "Mechanical' process of obtaining statements recorded on tape-recorder is fraught with possibilities of such tampering as to render a statement or conversation something quite contrary to what might have been stated by the speaker originally or in the first instance. After a statement or a conversation has been recorded, the tape can be replayed and, in most tape-recorders by reverse playing the recording cleared or wiped off. This means that words or sentences can be tampered with After tampering the tampered tape can be replayed on another tape---recorder and the second tape will produce recorded statement or conversation which will appear to be natural in continuity but which has in fact been so tampered with that it has lost its value as a correct representation of statement or conversation. If reliance is placed upon no more than record of a statement or conversation on the tape, it cannot be said to be basically reliable evidence. The only way to ensure the veracity of such statement or conversation, is to examine the person whose statement or conversation has been tape-recorded, to put the recording to him, and then to let him say what he has to say about the same. Without this to proceed to rely upon such piece of evidence is to tread on extremely unreliable grounds. The recordings, without examination of the persons whose statements or conversations have been recorded, cannot be taken as reliable piece of evidence which can be depended upon."
On appeal in that case the Supreme Court of India in S. Partap Singh v. The State of Punjab (A I R1964SC72) remarked that :---- "There are few documents and possibly no piece of evidence which could not be tampered 'with, but that would certainly not be a ground on which Courts reject evidence 'as inadmissible or refuse to consider it. In the ultimate analysis the factor mentioned would have a bearing only on the weight to be attached to the evidence and not on its admissibility. Doubt--less, if in any particular case there is a well-grounded suspicion, not even say proof, that a tape-recording has been tempered with that would be a good ground for the Court to discount wholly its evidentiary value."
In, our opinion there can be no cavil to this statement of the law on the point.
14. At the hearing before us Mr. Saeed Akhtar, the learned counsel for the petitioner, contended that according to the respon--dents the detenu was already under arrest made at the Lahore Airport at 1-45 p. m. On the 17th of August 1972, in connection with F. I. R. No. 553 registered against him at the Police Station, Old Anarkali, Lahore under section 16 of the West Pakistan Maintenance of Public Order Ordinance, 1960, Rule 49 of the Defence of Pakistan Rules and section 50)/504, P. P. C. In these circumstances so it was argued that in the presence of his punitive detention under the ordinary law the order subsequently passed by the authority for the preventive detention of the detenu was.
Wholly illegal and could not be sustained. On the merits the learned counsel for the petitioner denied that the objectionable portion of the speech in question attributable to the detenu was delivered by him. He also asserted that, at any rate, the disputed portion of his speech is not at all actionable. Moreover accord--ing to the learned counsel the impugned detention order was not competently passed by any authority lawfully vested with the powers of the Central Government in this behalf. The detention of the detenu for a period of three months was not warranted. Last but not the least the learned counselvehemently questioned the bona fides of the impugned order which was allegedly passed for collateral purposes and ulterior reasons. But on behalf of the respondents their learned counsel have repelled all these contentions.
15. We shall now proceed to dispose of these contentions one by one. The respondents and their witnesses have admitted that at first Agha Abdul Karim Shorish Kashmiri was arrested at 1-45 p.m.
On the 17th of August 1972 at Lahore Airport when he was about to leave for Multan. He was wanted in connection with the F. I. R. No. 553 dated the 16th of 'August 1972 registered against him at the Police Station, Old Anarkali, Lahore under sec--tion 16 of the West Pakistan Maintenance of Public Order Ordi--nance, 1960, Rule 49 of the Defence of Pakistan Rules read with section 500/504, P. P. C.
On the basis of another allegedly objec--tionable speech delivered by him in the Y. M. C. A. Hall, the Mall, Lahore on the 6th of August 1972. But the impugned-- order of detention was passed against him sometimes afterwards in the evening on the 17th of August 1972. It was actually served on him in the morning of the 18th of August 1972, while he was already under arrest at Civil Lines Police Station in connection with the aforesaid case registered against him. The learned counsel for the petitioner contended that in these circumstances the order of preventive detention of the petitioner passed while be was already under punitive detention was absolutely illegal. He maintained that on principle the preventive detention of an accused cannot be ordered at all as long as he was kept under arrest for any offence allegedly committed- by him under the ordinary penal laws in force.
16. This contention advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner is based on some of the observations made by our learned brother K. E. Chauhan, J. In Muhammad Mayas Khan of Tamman v. Government of West Pakistan and another (PLD 1969 Lah. 985). In that case the main judgment was written, by one of us (Muhammad Akram, J.) with which K. E. Chauhan, J. Fully agreed in his separate judgment. He also advanced an additional reason in support of the judgment. In this connection he relied on some of the reported cases from the Indian jurisdiction and in conclu--sion he observed that :----- "The case-law quoted above leads to the conclusion that if a person is already under punitive detention his detention cannot be converted into a preventive detention."
These observations in the facts of that case can be justified but with utmost respect and in all humility eve regret that we do not interpret these observations to lay down any absolute and inflexible rule of law. In this connection we find that our learned brother in his judgment quoted with approval and has relied on Kamala Kant Azad v. Emperor (AIR 1944 Pat. 354But that case was overruled on this precise point by the Federal Court in Basant Chandra v. Emperor (AIR 1945FC18).
The Court observed that :---- "There is equally no force in the contention that no order of detention can be passed against the person who is already under detention. The decision of the Patna High Court in 23 Pat. (equivalent to AIR 1945 Pat. 354) cannot be understood as laying down any such proposition as a general proposition of law. The learned Judges seem to have drawn the inference from the facts and circumstances of the case that the order of detention was not made in the Bona fide exercise of Governor's powers."
Another cast on which our learned brother relied was Labaram Deka Barua and another v. The State (AIR 1951 Assam 43) which in turn was based on Kamla Kant Azad v. Emperor and hence cannot be accepted as laying down good law. We find that the Patna High Court has itself departed from this view in a number of other reported cases: In Dayanand Modi v. The State of Bihar and others (AIR 1951 Pat. 47) the Court observed that the answer to the question "whether detention of a person and prosecution started against him can be simultaneously made does not depend ors any rule of law, the question has to be approached and answered in each case, on the footing whether the order of detention, in view of the pending prosecution, is bona fide or not".
Similarly in Subodh Kumar Singh and another v. The State and others (AIR 1951 Pat. 68) the Court held that it could not be stated that as a rule of law that when a person is accused of an offence the only alternative is to prosecute him and there is no legal authority to detain him. The Court further observed that it is a fallacy to say that the right to prosecute a person under the ordinary criminal law and the right to detain him are mutually exclusive. This view was followed by a Full Bench of the Patna High Court in Gharar Nath Parshad and another v. The State of Bihar and others (AIR 1952 Pat. 185). We also find that the preponderance of the cases reported from the different High Courts under the Indian jurisdiction is against this contention advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner before us. But we do not consider ii necessary to burden this record with a detailed discussion of all that case-law on the subject. We may add here that even the Supreme Court of India in Thakar Parshad v. The State of Bihar (AIR 1955 SC 631) does not seem to favour this contention advanced by the petitioner.
17. In this connection in our country in Mairaj Muhammad Khan v. Government of West Pakistan and another (PLD 1966 Kar. 282) Sajjad Ahmad Jan, J. (as he then was) observed that:--- "It may be that the detention order was made to deprive the detenu of his liberty earned by him in view of the bail order made by the High Court, but it may equally be for the reason of an honest conviction on the part of the detaining authority that the petitioner was not a person to be allowed free movements and action in the context of the situation then prevailing without detriment to themaintenance of law and order. In the absence of any proof that the action of the detaining authority is motivated by malicious intent and purpose, which the petitioner mast prove as a fact, we are unable to attribute any malice to the detaining authority. The prosecution has in the first instance resorted to the ordinary law, making a full effort to keep the petitioner in custody, to thwart that they considered to be his prejudicial activities and having failed, there, and after the petitioner, earnest his bail from the High Court they have taken a recourse to the law of preventive detention, but this only shows the serious apprehensions in their mind of the prejudicial or the suspected.
Prejudicial activities of the petitioner."
In this connection a Full Bench of the East Pakistan High Court in the matter of Mahbub Anam v. The Government of East Pakistan (PLD 1959 Dacca 774). Has held that when the police arrests a persons under ordinary law and the authorities order his detention under the Public Safety Ordinance they act in different sphere guided by different objectives and their fields of activities are not concurrent they are largely exclusive 'of each other. The order of detention might result m some prejudice to the person detained but there was nothing illegal about it.
18. In our considered opinion every case must depend on its own facts. There is no rule of law which lays down that no order of preventive detention can be passed against a person who is already under arrest under the ordinary law of the land. Indeed the fact that the person was already under arrest might give, rise to an inference in a suitable case that the detention order subsequently passed against him was non bona-fide and was made for ulterior reasons and collateral purposes.
But independently of this question of the malafides, there is no bar to the passing of a detention order against a person who is already under arrest under the ordinary law. Indeed the scope, of the two orders for preventive detention and the punitive arrest; are altogether different. The Courts in granting bails under the ordinary law and the executive authorities in ordering preventive detention, act in different spheres guided by different considerations and actuated by different objectives in view. The Courts are charged with the judicial determination of an offence already committed under the law in considering whether or not the accused about be enlarged on bail. But before the detaining authority the object is to adopt preventive action against the detenu in the interest of the maintenance of public order, our relations wit foreign powers and the security of the State. The preventive detention is meant as a check against the detenu to prevent him from acting in future in a prejudicial manner. For all these reasons we find no force in this contention of the petitioner advanced before us, which is repelled. Brit the questions relating to the bona fides of the impugned order will be separately examined hereinafter in this judgment.
19. As a result of the above discussion in the preceding paragraphs we find that the respondents have succeeded in establishing that the detenu had in fact made the objectionable remarks attributed to him in his speech in question. On a plain reading this portion of his speech was derogatory towards Iran and contained disparaging remarks about a high dignitary of that country. He described them in a most denigrated form. Unfortunately in his reference to Iran and her dignitary in his speech he dad not exercise the necessary restraint required of him and he had no scruples about it. Even afterwards he did not show any regrets for what he said and made no amends in this connection. However, before us in denying the allegations made against him, the deteau stated that in none of his various speeches made before and after this solitary occasion he had even broached upon the subject of our foreign relations with Muslim countries and said anything against them. He also deposed that he has quite often been writing in favour of Iran in his weekly "Chatan" and he even wrote editorials in Persian in her favour. Mr. Saeed Akhtar, the learned counsel for the petitioner, who was all along instructed by the detenu in Court, was apologetic and candidly regretted these remarks, if any. He stressed that the theme of the entire speech in question did not even relate to our relations with foreign powers. The detenu did not launch any frontal and deliberate attack in his speech against any foreign country. He had no intention to ridicule or expose any of them to the public. The learned counsel, therefore, argued that in these circumstances no importance could be attached to those indiscret and inappropriate utterances and unintentional stray remarks, if any, made by the detenu. He maintained that properly speaking they did not form part of the speech delivered by him.
20. Foreign affairs is indeed a delicate subject to discuss in public. We are already passing through difficult times and in this hour of need we cannot live without friends. In this state of affairs, we can ill afford is offend any of our friendly countries by ridiculing- their dignitaries. In these circumstances the objectionable portion of the speech in question made by the detenu was certainly prejudicial to Pakistan's relations with the other friendly Muslim country.
In the Central Secretariat this case was dealt by R. W. 5 Mr. M. Zia Hussain, Deputy Secretary (Political), Interior Division (formerly known as Home Affairs Division), Islamabad. He deposed that on receipt of the relevant papers from Lahore through a special messenger, he examined them under the rules. On the basis of the material laid before him he was satisfied that the speech of the detenu contained material which could prejudice Pakistan's relations with an extremely friendly country. He further deposed that on the basis of this speech there was a well-founded apprehension that if allowed to remain at liberty, tile detenu might matte future speeches which were likely to prejudice and endanger their foreign relations between the two countries. He then took the papers to the Minister of Interior, who after having gone through the speech in question was also of the same opinion that the speech was obviously highly objectionable, and he, therefore, approved of the detention of the detenu in this case.
21. In an half-hearted attempt before us the learned counsel for the petitioner ventured to contend that the mere use of strong words or language and even abuses, howsoever deplorable, was not sufficient and is not necessarily actionable. In support of his contention in this connection he cited before us Nihasendu Dutt Majumdar v. Emperor, (AIR 1942 P C 22) and Naba Krishna Chaudhry v.
Emperor (AIR 1943 Pat. 418). But both these cases are distinguishable. There it was held that the use of abusive language in speeches did not necessarily amount to "sedition" under the then Defence of India Rules. In the case of Niharunda Dutt Majumdar the learned counsel in particular referred us to the observations of Gwyer, C. J. He remarks: "There is an English saying that hard words break no bones; and the wisdom of Common Law has long refused to regard as actionable any words which though strictly and bitterly defamatory, would be regarded by all reasonable men as no more than mere vulgar abuse. Abusive language even when used about a Government, is not necessarily seditions". Similarly in the otherwise of Naba Krishna Chowdhury from Patna the accused criticised the British and said that; "They are wicked people, unscrupulous and foolish too'.
The Court held that there was plenty of vulgar and ill-informed abuses of British Imperialism not amounting to sedition. They were not intended or likely to excite disaffection or' promote disorder.
As already mentioned, above both these cases are irrelevant. Before us the detenu is not accused of any charge of sedition: He is being detained allegedly by the Central Government under rule 32(1) (b) of the Defence of Pakistan Rules, 1971 with a view to prevent him from acting in a manner prejudicial to Pakistan's relations with a foreign power.
22. This rule lays down that where with respect to any person the Central Government is of the opinion that, for the purpose of preventing him from acting in a manner prejudicial to Pakistan's relations with foreign powers, it is necessary so to do, it may make a direction that he be detained.
It is the opinion and the satisfaction of the Central Government that counts in such a matter. It must act in good faith and should be satisfied that in the circumstances the detention of the, detenu was necessary with a view to preventing him from acting in a manner prejudicial to Pakistan's relations with a foreign power.
23. In this connection the Supreme Court of Pakistan in the case of Malik Ghulam Jilani v The Government of Pakistan (PLD 1967 SC 373under almost similar provisions of the rules held that the satisfaction of the detaining authority acting under rule 32 must be a state of mind, which has been induced by the existence of reasonable grounds for such satisfaction and this power in the authority was not, immune from judicial review. 'The Court further observed that once the authorities have placed before the Court oral evidence and other material, whose purpose it to, justify an action of arrest and detention, judicial review by the Court has already been attracted and the Court cannot, but be influenced in its decision by the evidence. In another case in Mir Abdul Baqi Baloch v. The Government of Pakistan (PLD 1968 SC 313OP) the Supreme Court further examined the power of judicial review vested in it under Article 98(2) (b) (1) of the late Constitution Of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1962 in such matters. In that connection the Court observed that it is not the purpose of a judicial authority reviewing executive actions to sit on appeal over the executive or to substitute the discretion of the Court for that of, the administrative agency. What the Court I concerned with is to see that the executive or administrative authority had before it sufficient material upon which a reasonable person could have come to the conclusion that the requirements of law were satisfied. In these circumstances it cannot be said that it would be unreasonable for the Court in the proper exercise of its constitutional duty, to insist upon the material upon which the authority had so acted so that it should satisfy itself that it had not acted in an unlawful manner.
24. In this view of the matter and on going through the evidence and the material placed before us (as already discussed, above), we find that there was sufficient material before the detaining authority, like a reasonable person, to believe and be satisfied that it was necessary to detain the detenu with a view to preventing him from acting in a manner prejudicial to Pakistan's relations with a friendly power. It could not be said that this belief in the Central Government was colourable and not well---founded or that no reasonable person, could have acted upon it. But the learned counsel for the petitioner stressed before us c that this action taken against the detenu was harsh and; oppressive, He maintains that it was unreasonable for the authorities to have resorted to this extreme step against him and seriously interfered with his liberty for a few hard words anti stray, remarks unintentionally uttered by him, on the spur of the moment on a solitary occasion. In his opinion there was no sufficient material before the authorities to come to the conclusion that the detenu was likely to repeat and act in future in a manner prejudicial to Pakistan's relation with the foreign country. But in this behalf in the exercise of the powers vested in use under Article 201 of the Constitution we cannot sit in appeal on the conclusions arrived at by the authorities and inferences drawn by them from the past conduct of the detenu. In Maulvi Farid Ahmad v. Government of West Pakistan (PLD 1965 Lah. 135) at page 146 a Full Bench of the High Court held that the past acts of the detenu are relevant and can furnish safe criteria of his likely activities in future in such cases.
We, therefore, see no force in this contention of the petitioner advanced before us.
25. The learned counsel for the petitioner has next ques--tioned the bona fides of the detention order in dispute. He maintains that the impugned order was malicious and was passed at the behest of the Governor of the Punjab to satisfy his vendetta for collateral purposes only. In this connection the learned counsel has narrated to us the recent unfortunate controversy that arose between the detenu and the Governor.
The detenu in a public speech delivered on the 22nd of July 1972, is said to have alleged (i) that the contract for the-collection of the toll tax at the new Ravi Bridge at Lahore was awarded by the Government to a concern of which a brother of the Governor was a shareholder and (ii) that another contract for the installa--tion of the barbed wire round the Governor House at Lahore was taken by one of his relatives. In reply the Governor in his public speech made outside Mochi Gate, Lahore on: the 29th of July 1972, repelled both the charges and challenged the detenu to nominate any Judge of the superior Court of his own choice within 24 hours to hold an inquiry to substantiate his allegations and otherwise he shall be arrested forthwith. In response to this the detenu on the 2nd of August 1972, gave a panel of three names of the Judges including the name of Mr. Justice Mushtaq Hussain of the High Court of Lahore, acceptable to him to hold the enquiry on certain conditions. In the meantime the Govern--ment of Pakistan appointed Mr. Justice Mushtaq Hussain, as the Commission of Enquiry to hold the enquiry into the above two allegations. Accordingly the detenu appeared before the Commis--sion of Enquiry on the 16th of August 19'2. He filed his written statement and then- absented from the proceedings. The Com--mission concluded the proceedings before it on the 17th of August 1972. Immediately afterwards at 1-45 p.m. On the 17th of August 1972, the detenu was arrested at the Lahore Airport in connection with the F. I. R. No. 553 of 1972 registered against him on' the 16th of August 1972, at the Old Anarkali, Police Station under section 16 of the West Pakistan Maintenance of Public Order. Ordinance, 1960, rule 49 of the Defence of Pakistan Rules and section 500/504, P. P. C. In connection with another speech made by him in the Y. M. C. A. Hall, the Mall, Lahore on the 6 of August 1972. It may be mentioned here that eventual While Commission of Enquiry submitted his report to the President and in this the detenu failed to establish his two allegations against the Governor.
26. Almost simultaneously the Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, Home Department, Lahore wrote to the Secretary to the Government of Pakistan Ministry of Interior, Islamabad in his letter No. 8/59-H-SpI-II/72, dated the 17th of August 1972, (Exh. R. W. 4/1) complaining about the objectionable speech in question delievered by the detenu outside Mochi Gate, Lahore on the 5th of August 1972. He suggested that the disputed portion of the speech in question was lushly objectionable and recommended to the Central Government that in order to prevent the detenu from acting in a manner prejudicial to Pakistan's relations with the foreign power, action may be taken against him under rule 32 of the Defence of Pakistan Rules. This letter was despatched through a special .Messenger from Lahore. On receipt of this letter R. W. 5 Deputy Secretary (Political), Interior Division, Islamabad was satisfied with the material brought to him. He took the papers to the Minister for Interior who was also satisfied and gave his approval to the detention of the Arka detenu. The Deputy Secretary has affirmed that this order was Karim passed against the detenu, on the merits and not at the behest of the Governor. There is nothing to establish that R. W.
5, Mr. M. Zia Hussain or the Minister for Interior were at all influenced by the aforesaid controversy that had raged between the Governor and the detenu. It appears to us that the Provincial Government did not advisedly, bring this matter to the notice of the Central Government at once while this controversy was still going on between them, We have already held that on the merits the detention of the Menu was not altogether unwarranted in these circumstances we find that the petitioner has failed to discharge the heavy onus that lay on him and conclusively establish beyond all reasonable doubts that the impugned order-- was passed maliciously against the detenu for any collateral or ulterior reasons.
27. But all the above discussion does not finally conclude the fate of this case. We are still left to deal with a most for-- midable objection raised on behalf of the petitioner to the effect that the order of detention in question was not passed by a competent authority empowered under the law. In this connec--tion respondent No. 3 produced in evidence R. W. 5 Mr. M. Zia Hussgin, Deputy Secretary (Political), Interior Division (formerly known as Home Affairs Division), Islamabad. He examined this case under the rules and on the basis of the material laid before him he was satisfied that the speech of the detenu contained material which could prejudice Pakistan's relations With an extremely friendly country. At the time his Secretary was away to Karachi and in his absence he took the record to the Minister for Interior, Khan Abdul Qayyum Khan who on himself going through the speech passed the following order (Exh. R. W. 4/ 3).
"The speech is obviously highly objectionable. His detention is approved."
A copy of the detention order No. 10/28/72-Poll (I) dated the 17th of August 1972, signed by M. Zia Hussain Deputy Secretary (Political), Interior Division, Ministry of Interior, Islamabad is Exh. R. W. 4/4.
The witness stated that he did not record his "own note in the case before he took it to the Minister of Interior by hand who then passed his order in the matter.
28. On these facts the stand taken by the respondents is that the detention order (Exh. R. W. 4/4) was competently passed by Mr. Zia Hussain, Deputy Secretary (Political), Interior Division on behalf of Central Government. Since this was an important case decided by him lie also informed the Minister for Interior about it, who gave his approval to the action taken by him But the learned counsel for the petitioner has argued that neither the Deputy Secretary nor even the Minister forth Interior had any lawful authority to pass the detention order in question on behalf of the Central Government in the circumstances of this case.
29. We have carefully considered this aspect of the c. Argued before us. The detention order (Exh. R.
W. 4/4) was sign6d by Mr. M. Zia Hussain Deputy Secretary (Political), Interior Division (formerly Home Affairs Division). Ministry of Interior, Islamabad. It was passed in the purported exercise of the powers conferred on him by clause (b) of sub-rule (1) of the rule 32 of the Defence of Pakistan Rules, 1971 This lays down that where with respect to any person the "Central Government" is of opinion that, for the purpose of Preventing hire, front acting in a magnet prejudicial to "Pakistan's relations with foreign powers", or to the security, the public safety or interest, the defence of Pakistan or of any part thereof, the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the life of the community, the maintenance of peaceful conditions in any part of Pakistan, or the efficient conduct of military operations or prosecution o war, it is necessary so to do, it may make an order directing that he be detained. . Therefore, it is the Central Government which is vested with the powers to order the detention of a person under this sub-rule. The term Central Government has not been defined either in the Defence of Pakistan Ordinance XXX of 1971 or in the Defence of Pakistan Rules, 1971 made thereunder. But rule 3 of these Rules lays down that the General Clauses Act X of 1187 shall apply to the interpretation of these rules as it applies to the interpretation of a Central Act. Now according to section 8 (a)(b) of the General Clauses Act the term "Central Government" shall in relation to anything done or to be done, after the twenty-third day of March 1956 mean the "President", and shall include in relation to functions entrusted to the Govern--ment of a Province, the Provincial Government acting within the scope of authority given to it by the President.
30. The President is the executive head of the Federation of Pakistan. Article 54(1) of the Interim Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan lays down that the executive authority: o the Federation shall be exercised by the President either directly or through officers subordinate to him.
Council of Ministers constituted merely "to aid and advise" the President in the exercise of his functions. Clause (1) of Article 66 lays down that all executives actions of the, Federal Government shall be expressed to be taken in the name President. Clause (2) provide that the orders and other instruments made and executed in the name of the President shall be authenticated in such manner as may be specified in rules to be mode by the President and the validity of an order or instrument which is so authenticated shall not be called in question on the ground that it is not an order oil instrument made or executed by the President. Clause (3) of this Article is relevant. It lays down that the President shall make rules for the more convenient transaction of the business of the Federal Government and for the allocation among Ministers and Ministers of State of the said business. So far the President does not seem to have framed any Rules of Business under this clause. Hut the old Rules of Business, 1962 framed under a similar provision in Article 32 of the abrogated Constitution o the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1962 are there. These rut have continued in force as an existing law under Article 280(1) 0 too Interim Cons
31. For the more convenient transaction tat the business o the Federal Government under rule 3(1) of the Rules of Business the Central Secretariat is divided into. Divisions shown Schedule I. Rule 3(3) deals with the allocation of the business among the various Divisions in the Central Secretariat. It lays down that the business of Government shall be distributed among the Divisions in the manner indicated in Schedule II. One of the Divisions thus Constituted in the Central Secretariat is the "Home Affairs Division" now known as the "Interior Division". According to the aforesaid Schedule the business allocated to this division inter alia includes at item No. 2 "Preventive Detention for reasons connected with the security of Pakistan, and persons subject to such detention". It is, therefore evident that the business allocated to this Division is restricted to case where the detention is for reasons connected with the security of Pakistan. Within this limited scope the powers vested in this Division do not extend to all kinds of detention, much less to the detention of a person made in connection with Pakistan' relations with foreign powers. This is an altogether separate class, and specie of detention. Article 9(4) of the interim Constitution shows that the preventive detention can be ordered to deal with persona acting in a manner prejudicial to the integrity, security and defence of Pakistan or the external affairs of Pakistan. Similarly under rule 32(1) of the Defence of Pakistan Rules, 1971 a person may be detained for the purpose of prevent--ing him from acting in a< manner prejudicial to Pakistan relations with foreign powers or to the security, public safety- o interest, the defence of Pakistan etc. Etc., In Hussain Ali Chagla v. District Magistrate, Lahore (PLD 1966 Lah. 309) a Division Bench of the We Pakistan has observed that "there is hardly any nexus" between Pakistan's relation with a foreign power and maintenance of peaceful conditions in any part of Pakistan". For these reason we find that in this matter concerning the detenu before us for his detention with a view to preventing him from acting in a manner pre-judical to Pakistan's relations with a foreign power, the necessary power was vested with the President alone to order his detention. There was no proper allocation of business sand delegation of powers in this behalf to any of the Divisions in the Central Secretariat under him. On this few of the matter we have no alternative but to hold that the impugned order was passed without his lawful authority.
32. In this connection the learned counsel for the petitioner has gone a step further. He still adheres to his objection that even assuming for the sake of argument but not conceding that the Ministry of Interior in the Central Secretariat was duly seized of this case, neither the Minister for Interior nor R.
W. 5 Mr. M. Zia Hussain, Deputy Secretary (Political), Interior Division, Islamabad had any lawful authority to pass the impugned order on behalf of the Central Government. This takes us to the working in each Division of the Central Secretariat. In this connection clause 4(a) of rule 3 of the Rules of Business lays down that each Division shall consist of a Secretary to Government and of such other officials subordinate to him as the president may determine. Under clause (b) the Secretary shall organize the Division into a number of working units to be known as sections and clause (c) provides that the Secretary shall, by means of standing order, distribute the work of the Division among, the various sections or other units in that Divisions Sub-rule (1) of Rule 4 lays down that no Important policy decision shall be taken except with the approval of the President. Similarly sub-rule (2) provides that it shall be the duty of a Minister to assist the President in the formulation of the policy. In this connection sub-rule (3) lays down that subject to sub---rule (1), the Minister shall be responsible for policy matters concerning his Division. The Minister is also responsible for conducting the business of the Division in the National Assembly-- Rule 4(6) lays down that the Secretary shall he the official head of the Division and responsible for its administration and dis-- cipline and for the proper conduct of the business assigned to it under rule 3, sub-rule (7) (d) and
(e) provider that the Secretary shall keep the Minister and the President informed of any important case disposed of without reference to them. Rule 4(7) (g) is important and it lays down that the Secretary shall issue standing orders specifying the cases or class of cases which may be disposed of by an officer subordinate to him. In this connection R. W. 5 Mr. Zia Hussain, Deputy Secretary (Political), Interior Division, produced before us a copy of the Standing Order No. 1/1/72- Admn. 1 dated the 25th of January 1972 (Exh: R. W. 5/6) issued by the Secretary of the Division about the distribution of work in the Sections under him. According to this Standing Order under item No. 22 the Deputy Secretary (Political), Mr. Zia Hussain, was authorized to dispose of cases relating to the preventive detention.
39. In connection with the above we have already adverted to Article 54(1) of the Interim Constitution. It lays down that the executive authority of the Federation shall be exercised by the President either directly or through officers subordinate to him. In this connection the officers subordinate to the President must exercise their authority only in accordance with the Rules of business applicable to them. Under Article 62 of the Constitution the Minister is appointed to aid and advise the President in the exercise of his function and he could not himself pass the impugned order.
He is mostly responsible for policy matters concerning his Division and for conducting the business of his Division in the National Assembly. In fact it was conceded before us by the learned counsel for the respondents that the Minister for Interior had no lawful authority in the matter.
40. But according to them the impugned order was competently passed by the Deputy Secretary (Interior) in the circumstances of this case. In this connection the learned Advocate-General has relied on Emperor v. Shibnath Banerji and others (AIR 1945 PC 156). In that case nine persons were detained in pursuance to separate orders made under rule 26 of the Defence of India Rules. Some of the orders were passed by the Additional Secretary to the Government of Bengal and the others by the Additional Deputy Secretary to the Government of Bengal in the name of the Governor of the province. Their Lordships of the Privy Council were of the opinion that the Governor need not be personally satisfied as to the matters set out in rule 26 of the Defence of India Rules for the detention of the detenu. There was no good ground for excluding the ordinary methods by which the Provincial Government's executive business is authorised to be carried on. Matters as those which fell to be dealt with by the Governor under rule 26 could be dealt with by him in the formal manner in which the executive business of the Provincial Government was carried on inter alia under the Rules of Business made under the law.
41. On a party of this reasoning it can be safely held that there could be no objection to the President making the rules for the more convenient transaction of business of the Central Government in this behalf as well. Under the Rules of Business already in force the Secretary, Interior Division could act on behalf of the Central Government to the extent of the allocation of business distributed to that Division in accordance with Schedule II of the Rules of Business. Neither the Secretary nor the Deputy Secretary under the standing orders issued by him could-act beyond the limited scope of the business actually allocated to the Interior Division. In this view of the matter, as already discussed above, there is no alternative but to hold that the impugned order was passed without any lawful authority vested in the Deputy Secretary (Political), Interior Division, Ministry of Interior, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad, and ,must be quashed for this reason only.
42. In the result we accept this petition and declare that the impugned order of detention of Agha Abdul. Karim Shorish Kashmiri is without lawful authority. He is accordingly set at liberty if not required in any other case.
The petitioner (has succeeded?) not on the merits but for a technical reason only and, therefore, we have made no order as to Costs.
Important.
1. The following are not approved for release to the press;
(i) Pares. 19 to 24 (both Inclusive) of this judgment directly eating with objectionable portion of the speech in question.
(ii) All portions of the oral and documentary evidence and proceedings directly dealing with the objectionable portion of the speech in question.
2. There is no objection tote supply of copies of the entire judgment to the parties only for use in Court. This order may be brought to the notice of the Registrar for compliance.