SAAD SAOOD JAN, J.--This is a petition for special leave to appeal from the order, dated 26-1-1987 made in a Letters Patent Appeal.
2. The dispute in this petition relates to a composite property consisting of two shops on the ground floor and four small rooms on the first floor. When the settlement operations started, the property was occupied by two persons, namely, Muhammad Ismail and Kalu Khan, who are now dead and are represented in this petition by their legal representatives. Both Muhammad Ismail and Kalu Khan applied for transfer of the property. Muhammad Ismail was a claimant whereas Kalu Khan was a non-claimant. The Assistant Settlement Commissioner who also exercised the powers of the Deputy Settlement Commissioner treated the property as indivisible and transferred it to Muhammad Ismail. Subsequently, Muhammad Ismail entered into an association agreement with Rao muzaffar A.I Khan, respondent No. 4. As a result of this agreement, the portion which was in the occupation of Kalu Khan was transferred to respondent No. 4.
3. Being dissatisfied with the order of the Assistant Settlement Commissioner, Kalu Khan preferred an appeal before the Additional Settlement Commissioner. It was dismissed. He filed a revision petition before the Settlement Commissioner. This, too, met the same fate. He then invoked the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court. It was dismissed on 11-1-1972 by a learned Single Judge.
From the decision of the learned Single Judge he filed a Letters Patent Appeal.
4. The Letters Patent Appeal was heard by a Division Bench. After examining the record the Division Bench found that the decision of the settlement authorities with regard to the indivisibility of the property was unsustainable. In this regard it noticed that the property had not only accommodated two families for a long time but that the portions in possession of the two families had a wall between them. It declined to remand the case to the appropriate authority for a fresh decision for the reason that it had already remained pending for about 28 years. It then directed that the portion which was in the occupation of Kalu Khan should be transferred to him and the portion which was in the possession of Muhammad Ismail be given to respondent No. 4.
5. While the L.P.A. Was pending, respondent No. 4 transferred the portion that was with him to one Sh. Manzoor Ahmad by a registered sale-deed, dated 11-2-1977. In his turn, Sh. Manzoor Ahmad sold the said portion to the petitioner. Neither Sh. Manzoor Ahmad nor the petitioner cared to apply for permission to join as party in the appeal.
6. In this petition the main grievance of the petitioner is that the Division Bench in the High Court has made an order adverse to her without giving her an opportunity of being heard. We do not think that we can accept this contention. The petitioner chose to purchase the property while it was the subject-matter of litigation in the High Court. She did not care to get herself impleaded. She cannot, therefore, complain that she has been condemned unheard. It may be mentioned that during the hearing of the appeal, her predecessor-in-interest, namely, respondent No. 4 was duly heard through his counsel Mr. Dilawar Mehmood and Ch. Muhammad Hassan. It is then contended that the property which has been taken away from the petitioner was not the subject-matter of the dispute before the High Court. This is also incorrect. Kalu Khan was laying claim to that portion of the house which was in his possession. As the order of the Settlement Commissioner would show, it is precisely this portion which was transferred to respondent No. 4 under the association agreement. The Division Bench has given this very portion to Kalu Khan. Therefore, the contention of the petitioner that the portion purchased by her was not the subject--matter of dispute in the appeal cannot be accepted.
7 . This petition is without any merit and is hereby dismissed