' This Civil Revision arises out of a suit filed by the respondent Nayyar Qayyum for possession through partition of certain properties which had been left by one Haji Rehmat Ali upon his death, claiming the share as his son. After contest, the dispute had been set down for recording of his remaining evidence on 17-3-1985 when he filed an application under Article 163 of the Qanun-e- Shahadat, 1984 for the truth cf his claim, to be supported by him on an oath of Holy Quran, being required to be denied upon similar oath by the defendants. Plaintiff took the oath in the Court in support of his claim and so did also the three opponents take oaths individually to deny his claim for inheriting Rehmat Ali as his son, whereupon trial Court came to hold the view that the plaintiff should face the consequences of the risk taken by him in offering the oath to the defendants and dismissed his suit on 3-7-1985.
2. An appeal threagainst filed by the plaintiff came up for hearing before the learned District Judge, Jhang who found that whereas the plaintiff himself had not offered in his application that his suit may be dismissed in the event of the defendants taking the proposed oath on the Holy Quran, such was not the consequence provided even in the Qanun-e-Shahadat. Consequently, he accepted the appeal on 21-4-1987 and after setting aside the judgment and decree of the trial Court, remanded the suit for being proceeded with in accordance with law by giving full opportunity to the parties to produce their evidence. The defendants have now come up to this Court on revision.
3. Learned counsel maintains that the suit had been rightly dismissed by the trial Court inasmuch as the plaintiff had got under the Islamic Law a right to have his case proved either directly on the basis of evidence to be led by him or indirectly in consequence of the refusal of the defendants to take an oath of denial of his claim but since the defendants had taken the desired oath, therefore, he will be deemed to have elected for the mode of indirect proof, upon the frustration whereof in consequence of the oaths taken by the defendants against his hope, he could nct be allowed to have resort to the mode of direct proof. Learned counsel has not supported his contention with any authority and even though the foundation of his contention may not be wrong, yet, the conclusion which he desires to be drawn, appears to be incorrect.
' Article 163 of Qanun-e-Shahadat reads as under:- "163. Acceptance or denial of claim on oath:-
(1) When the plaintiff takes oath in support of his claim, the Court shall, on the application of the plaintiff, call upon the defendant to deny the claim on oath.
(2) The Court may pass such orders as to costs and other matters as it may deem fit.
(3) Nothing in this Article applies to laws relating to the Enforcement of Hudood or other criminal cases."
' There is not mentioned any consequence to follow upon the plaintiff taking the oath and none is provided about either the defendant refusing to take a similar oath or even with regard to his taking the desired oath.
' Actually, a defendant can be called upon to take oath only on the basis of an application for that purpose made by a plaintiff. Suppose, in some hypothetical case, a plaintiff takes an oath in support of the truth of his claim but does not apply for the defendant being called upon to deny the same on oath, then obviously enough, the Court will not have any power to call upon the defendant to take a similar oath and a question will arise as to what may be the effect of such an oath taken by the plaintiff and since the defendant is not enabled in such a situation to take any oath at all, therefore, a further question will arise as to whether his case can become liable to be prejudiced by the plaintiff's oath merely because of the disability created, not by his own act, but, by the act of his adversary, 'the plaintiff? The reply has clearly to be in the negative. The statement so made on oath by the plaintiff would not be anything more than a piece of strong evidence in support of the truth of his case, liable to be dealt with under sub-Article (2) to pass such order as the Court may deem fit but, clearly enough, the defendant will have an undeniable right to disprove the truth of the plaintiff's claim on the basis of evidence in rebuttal to be adduced by him because there will not be any reason, in such a situation, to deny this right to a defendant.
4. In this case, if the defendants would have left the plaintiff's oath uncontested then, obviously, it would have been liable to be considered as strong evidence in support of the truth of his case which the defendants could have disproved in the usual manner by means of evidence and in taking the desired oath they cannot be considered to have placed the matter at any higher footing because therein they had not done anything more than merely destroying the weight which would otherwise have attached to the plaintiff's statement made on oath. This exactly is the view held by the learned District Judge in remitting the suit for being decided on the basis of evidence to be led by the parties.
5. Even the premises whereas the learned counsel has sought to raise his contention rather than supporting it, fortifies the view held by the learned District Judge.
6. In the present case neither had the plaintiff been put to the choice ever of electing one of the two modes of proof nor had he himself done so in his application wherein care was taken not to offer that the suit may be dismissed in the event of the defendants taking the desired oath and since such a consequence is not provided even in the relevant provision, therefore, there is no reason to suppose that the plaintiff may have abandoned his right to prove his case on the basis of evidence.
7. There was no offer made by the plaintiff to have his suit dismissed in consequence of some counter-oath to be taken by the defendants and the relevant provision is silent about the consequences, therefore, in absence of any specific provision laying down the penal consequences, the suit could not be dismissed. The natural result of an oath getting pitched against a similar oath would be to treat the matter left where it was, so that the suit of the plaintiff became liable to be tried uninfluenced by the oaths of the parties. Contention of the learned counsel cannot be sustained and is accordingly repelled.
8. The consequence cf dismissal of the plaintiff's suit in such a situation simply could not follow and learned District Judge has rightly remitted the suit for being decided after providing full opportunity to the parties to produce their evidence because this was their basic right and no reason had been shown for its being denied to either cf them or being otherwise whittled down. Although, the view taken by the learned District Judge is perfectly sound and appears to be the only correct conclusion to follow in the circumstances, yet, even otherwise, no interference would have been possible to be made 'therewith in exercise of revisional jurisdiction which is limited only to the correction of errors of jurisdiction committed by the Courts below and cannot get attracted to cases of mere wrong decisions on questions of fact or even of law. There is no error of jurisdiction pointed out by the learned counsel, therefore, there does not exist any case for exercise of revisional jurisdiction.
9. The Civil Revision is accordingly dismissed in limine.