I propose to dispose of these .two appeals by common order as the points involved in both the appeals are common.
2. The appeal is directed against the orders passed by the learned Chairman of the Second Sind Labour Court on the 20th of August 1972. The learned Court came to the conclusion that applications under section34 of the Industrial. Relation` Ordinance, 1969 (hereinafter called the 'Ordinance), were not maintainable. The learned Chairman of the Court came to the conclusion that if the applications were treated under Stand--ing Order 18, the appellants have not compiled with the procedureprescribed therein. The application, could not be allowed.
3. The facts giving rise to these appeals" briefly pmt are these.
4. Both the appellants pleaded that their services were terminated only because of their activities in the affairs of the Union. Services of both the appellants were terminated round-- about 26th June 1970. The appellants made separate applications under section 34 of the Ordinance.
5. The appellant, Maqbool Hussain specifically stated in pare. 4 of his application under section 34 of the Ordinance that he was dismissed from service without any Enquiry. The relevant paragraph runs as under:- "That on 25-6-1970, the Shift Incharge withhold the Atten--dance Card of the applicant and on 26- 6-1970 when he reported for duty he was not allowed to enter the Factory.
Neither any Enquiry was held nor anything was given to him in writing."
On these grounds Maqbool Hu3seii prayed for his re-instatement. Ashiq Hussain stated in para. 4 of his application under section 34 of the Ordinance that: "The applicant was turned out of the Factory on 29-6-1970 without giving him anything in writing and threatened him of the Police. "-- Para. 7 of his application runs as under: "That it is a right guaranteed and secured to the appli--cant that his services be governed and dealt with accord--ing to law and, therefore, he is entitled to re-instatement in service."
6. It may be noted at the very outset that the appellants have not said anything in their application as to why they waived for about eight months when the law as it stood on the date of their dismissal from service gave them immediate remedy on the grounds that they have mentioned in their applications. A perusal of the two applications would disclose that their main grievance is that their services have been dispensed with because of their Union activities without holding any inquiry against them. This ground is specifically covered by Standing Order 15 of the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employ--ment (Standing Orders) ordinance, 1968.
7. Mr. Lodhi, the learned Representative for the 'appellant contended in the first place that section 34.of the Ordinance watt amended on the 17th of October 1970, whereby an individual workman was given right for the first time for the enforcement of any right guaranteed or secured to him by or under any 'law or an; award or settlement. As there was R violation of Standing Order 15 inasmuch the appellants, were dismissed without any inquiry the applications under section 34 were main--tainable. On the other hand, it was contended by Mr. M. A.Khan, for the respondent, that Standing Order 18 is a special provision of law providing remedy as well as procedure to obtain immediate relief. Mr. Lodhi, on the other band contended that section 34 is also a special provision of law.I do not think that there is much force in the contention of Mr. Lodhi. A proper analysis of the ground disclosed in the applica--tions under section 34 of the Ordinance come to this that the appellants were dismissed from service without any inquiry. This is ' a provision of law which is provided under Standing Order 15. So tar as Standing Order 18 is concerned it will be attracted only where there is any violation of the provision of Standing Order anti not of any other law. In that view of the mater Standing Order is a special provision of law providing quick remedy to the workers f their services are dispense, with in violation of any provision of Standing order. Standing Order would not be attracted if there was violation of any other law and not any of the provision of the Standing Order.
8. Mr. Lodhi, the learned Representative for the appellant contended in the second place that in the present case it would appear from the perusal of the applications of the appellants that they were dismissed from service because of their Union activities. In other words, Mr. Lodhi submitted that dismissal for Union activities is not a ground which is covered by Standing Order 18 and therefore his applications under section 34 of the Ordinance were maintainable. In this connection Mr. Lodhi relied on section 15 of the Ordinance as it stood in February 1970, when the applications were made by the appellants. Section 15 forbida unfair labour practice on the part of the emp--loyers. The employers are forbidden to refuse to employ a person because he is a member of a Trade Union.
Mr. Lodhi contended that as the appellant's services have been terminated because of their Trade Union activities their case is covered by section 15 of the Ordinance. Even if it is conceded for the sake of argu--ment, that the services, of the appellants bad been terminated be--cause they took active part in the affairs of the Union, Section 15 of the Ordinance does not provide to the workmen any remedy. The remedy; however, is provided under section 53 of the Ordi--nance. It runs as under:- "'Whoever contravenes the provisions of section 15 shall be punishable with imprisonment which may extend to one year, or with fine which may extend to five thousand rupees or with both.'
The proper remedy of the appellants was to have made and application under section 53 of the Ordinance as it stood then and not under section 34. There being a specific remedy for the violation of section 15 of the Ordinance the provisions of section 34 were not attracted.
9. The appellants who have slept over the specific remedy provided under Standing Order 18 connot be now allowed to invoke section 34 of the Ordinance. At the time when the cause of action arose, admittedly, the appellants were not entitled to make an application under section 34 of the Ordinance. Moreover, section 34 of the Ordinance provides for enforcement of any right guaranteed or accrued to the workman. Technically speaking section 15 of the Ordinance as it stood in February 1971, does not guarantee any specific right to the workman. It only forbids the employer to do certain things. In case the employer was to violate the provisions of section 15, he would be punishable to imprisonment or fine or with both.
I have come to the conclusion that the order of the learned Chairman of the Labour Court is proper and based on good reasons: The Appeals are dismissed: