M.S.H. QURAISHI (CHAIRMAN).--This appeal was heard under sub-section (4) of section 22-B, I.R.O., 1969 in the absence of third learned Member Mr. Ashraf Ali, J.S. Labour Division, who is out of Pakistan.
2. Appellants, Messrs National Cement Industries Ltd. By their order dated 7-3-1985 transferred respondent Muhammad Maroof, an assistant, from their Head Office, Karachi to their Factory at Dandot, he challenged the transfer through a petition under section 22-A (8) (g) read with section 15 (1) (d) of the industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 which was accepted by a Single Bench of this commission by its order dated 13-3-1986 and in consequence the transfer order was set aside.
Aggrieved, the Management has filed this appeal.
3. Muhammad Mauroof had entered service on 16-8-1955 under the concern which was then known as Dalmia Cement Factory. It was renamed in 1965 as Pakistan Progressive Cement Industries and after its take over, it was given the present name of National Cement Industries Limited. Muhammad Maroof had remained throughout at Karachi. He challenged the transfer as being an unfair labour practice and liable to interference, having been motivated by the reason of victimizing him for his trade union activities.
4. For his trade union activities he brought out the fact, that he had been participating in such activities for the last 20 years, that he had been Vice-President of Dalmia Cement Workers Union in 1966, General Secretary of the Pakistan Progressive Workers Union in 1972, General Secretary of the National Cement Industries Mehnatkash Union in 1976, President of National cement Industries Labour Union in 1980, and President of National Cement Industries Mehnatkash Union since March 1985.
5. The main basis of his case of victimization is the affairs of a Housing Society, which was established in 1974 for the benefit of the workers with the co-operation of the Management. He had been one of the promoters of the society. Ghulam Raza, General Secretary of the Labour Union was its Chairman and Habibullah Abbasi, Technical Manager, an officer of the Management, was its Secretary. According to him, Ghulam Raza had joined hands with the Management in regard to the affairs of the Society which forced him to resign in 1980 from the presidentship of the Labour Union of which Ghulam Raza was the General Secretary. In February 1984, he made a complaint with the Anti-Corruption Police about corruption and malpractices prevailing in the Housing Society, in pursuance of which, enquiries were held. He also led evidence to show that in 1980, he had filed a criminal case against Muhammad Akram, Works Manager, which case was pending before the Supreme Court of Pakistan in appeal preferred by the Management. The General Secretary of his Union filed a complaint bearing No. 97/85 against the Management which was pending with the F.I.
A. He himself instituted a complaint with the Ferozeabad Police Station against the said Ghulam Raza which was pending before the Sub---Divisional Magistrate. He filed yet another case in regard to malpractices in the Housing Society which was pending with the SDM Malir. He further brought out that on account of these developments, he resigned from even the ordinary membership of the Labour Union on 11-2-1985 and was on 5-3-1985 co-opted as President of the rival Mehnatkash Union which was approved on 20-3-1985 by the General Body of the said union and also by the Registrar Trade Unions on 29-4-1985 (Exh. A.W.1/5. It was in this backgroung that he challenged his transfer as an act of victimization for his trade union activities.
6. In support of his case he produced oral evidence of himself and of Muhammad Yusuf, another employee of the Management, and documentary evidence. The respondent produced Muhammad Asghar, Manager Administration, according to whom the transfer was ordered on account of requisition dated 3-2-1985 (Exh. R.W.1/1) received from the Works Manager, Dandot, which was followed by a reminder dated 28-2-1985 (Exh. R.W.1/2). Although he stated that " Every letter that is received by post is entered in a register", he admitted that the two letters (Exhs.R.W. 1/1 and 1/2) "have not been entered in any register". He even admitted that originals of these letters do not bear any initials of the receiving official. He further admitted that in the Writ Petition filed by the Management before the Sind High Court against the interim order passed by the Commission, the ground of the transfer being in pursuance of the requisition from Dandot had not been taken.
Another admission made by him which is significant is that Assistants junior to Maroof were working at Karachi.
7. The learned Member, after scrutiny of the case, found that the Management was annoyed by Muhammad Maroof on account of his trade union activities, that the stand taken by the Management in justification of the transfer was self-contradictory inasmuch as they had in the transfer letter given the reason as his having become surplus, but in the parawise comments had attributed the transfer to instructions received from the State Cement Corporation, Lahore, while in the evidence the excuse for the transfer was requisition from the Works Manager, Dandot. He refused to accept that the transfer could be on account of Maroof being surplus, so long as Assistants junior to him were still working at Karachi. He also noted that no evidence had been led to show that the transfer had been on instructions from the Head Office of the State Cement Corporation, Lahore. He rejected their plea based on the requisition received from Dandot, as being "not free from suspicion", in view of the accompanying circumstance firstly that the transfer letter did not show that he was being transferred against a vacancy at Dandot, secondly that such reason had not been given in the parawise comments, thirdly that the two letters containing the requisition had not been satisfactorily shown to have been received and fourthly that such had not been their stand before the High Court in the writ petition. He therefore, accepted Maroof's petition and set aside the transfer order.
8. The respondent did not appear in spite of notice. The appeal was accordingly heard in the presence of the appellant's counsel. His main point was that the respondent's apprehension of victimization emanated from the affairs of the- Housing Society, which could not be connected with his trade union activities and as such he cannot challenge the transfer as being an act of victimization for his trade union activities. The argument proceeds by ignoring the fact brought out by the respondent that in 1974 when the Society had been established, he had been the General Secretary of the Union, that according to him he had been one of the promoters of the Society and that on account of the malpractices in the Society, he had to resign from the presidentship of A the union and later from its very membership and to join another union i.e. Mehnatkash Union. It cannot, therefore, be said that his interest in the Society was detached from his trade union activities. Since the Management was also connected with the affairs of the Society, the conduct of the respondent would inevitably bring him in conflict with the Management. He, therefore, did make out a valid basis for his assertion of victimization.
9. The next point raised by him is that the respondent's petition being of a civil nature, the procedure of section 25-A of I.R.O., 1969 was applicable and that no grievance notice having been given to the appellant by the respondent, the petition was not competent. We notice that no such point had been taken at the proper time before the Single Bench. We are, therefore, not inclined to go into this point which we may advert to in some proper case if occasion arises.
10. Learned counsel also made out a grievance of refusal by the Single Bench to entertain an application made on 10-3-1986 for amendment of the parawise comments. It is to be noted that the evidence of the respondent, and for that matter in the case itself, had been concluded on 13- 10-1985, and the arguments had also been heard on 20-2-1986. There was therefore, little justification for moving the application as late as on 10-3-1986 for amendment of parawise comments after the evidence itself had been concluded.
11. As to facts of the case we have gone through the evidence with the help of learned counsel but we find no way to disagree with the finding reached by the learned Single Bench which is supported by sufficient material and cogent reason.
12. The appeal, therefore, lacks substances and is accordingly dismissed.