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1987 SCMR 1715

MEHRULLAH KHAN KIBZAI And Others vs GOVERNMENT OF BALUCHISTAN And

Citation1987 SCMR 1715
CourtSupreme Court of Pakistan
Judge(s)Zaffar Hussain Mirza, Abdul Qadir Sheikh, S. A. Nusrat
ResultAppeal dismissed

S.A. NUSRAT, J. --The above two appeals arise out of a common judgment of the Baluchistan Service Tribunal, Quetta dated 14-10-1985 and are being disposed of together as the questions of law raised therein are the same.

2. The appellants were selected as Markaz Managers in Grade-17 on purely temporary and ad hoc basis, "till further orders and subject to selection by the Baluchistan Public Service Commission, whichever was earlier vide order dated 20-7-1974. These posts were under Local Government Rural Development and Agrovilles Department, Government of Baluchistan. The appellants joined the service and continued to serve the Department in various capacities. Later, they were declared surplus and on the recommendation of the Provincial Local Councils Selection Board, were appointed on regular basis in Grade-17 in the Local Councils Service by notification dated 26-9- 1982, which mentioned that the appellants. "surplus Grade-17 ad-hoc officers of the Local Council Department," were appointed on regular basis in Grade-17 in the Local Councils Service with immediate effect. The notification further provided as under: - "On appointment to the Local Councils Service, the above officers will be on probation for a period of two years as provided under the rules."

Later, by two different orders dated 11th December, 1984, the services of the appellants were dispensed with due to unsatisfactory work. The appellants filed review petitions before the Governor, which were rejected on 6-2-1985. The appellants thereupon preferred appeals before the Service Tribunal, which were dismissed as per impugned judgment.

3. In support of the appeals, the contentions raised before the Baluchistan Service Tribunal were as under:-

(i) That the appellants were appointed by transfer and instead of terminating their services, they should have been reverted to their parent department.

(ii) That the action against them was taken on the fact that they had allegedly overdrawn some T.A. And the Secretary, Local Council Department was inimical to them.

As respects the first contention, it was found by the learned Tribunal that the appellants were appointed by direct recruitment on regular basis and not by transfer. Even otherwise they could not claim to be reverted back to their post in the Local Government Department because they were appointed as Markaz Managers on purely temporary and ad-hoc basis and had become surplus and this was the reason why they were appointed in the Local Councils Service. As there was no post left to which they could be reverted, their claim was unfounded.

As regards the second ground, the learned Tribunal found that according to sub-rule (3) of rule 13 of the West Pakistan Local Councils and Municipal Committee Service Rules, 1963 (hereinafter called the Rules), the initial period of probation of two years was extendable by another one year and if no order of confirmation was made after the expiry of the said period of two years, the period of probation was automatically extended by another year. The services of both the appellants were dispensed with on 11-12-1982 well within the extended period of probation.

4. It was contended by the learned counsel for the appellants that as respects Mehrullah Khan Kibzai, appellant in C. A. No.20-Q/1986, the Tribunal had failed to consider that before his appointment in the Local Councils Service, he was already working as Chief Officer, Municipal Committee since 29-12-1980 and there being no interruption or discontinuity in his service as Chief Officer since the said date until his appointment on regular basis in the Local Councils Service, the previous officiating service had to be reckoned as a period spent on probation under Explanation I to rule 13 of the Rules. On going through the impugned judgment of the Tribunal, we find that no such contention was raised before the learned Tribunal and this question is, therefore, not open for consideration as the same is not one of pure law and determinable on proper scrutiny of facts as well.

5. It was next contended that since the orders of dismissal were passed on the ground of unsatisfactory work, such mention in the orders was tantamount to a stigma and hence no action could have been taken without recourse being had to regular departmental proceedings. This contention is without force because in the case of a probationer, rule 13 (3) of the Rules itself provides as under:-

(3) On completion of the period of probation of a member of the Service, the appointing authority may, subject to the provisions of sub-rule (4), either confirm him in his appointment,or if his work or conduct has, in the opinion of the appointing authority, not been satisfactory:

(a) in case he has been appointed by initial recruitment, dispense with his services, or

(b) in case he has been appointed otherwise, revert him to his former post, and if there be no such post dispense with his services; or

(c) extend the period of his probation by a period not exceeding one year in all, and during or on the expiry of such period, pass such orders as it could have passed during or on the expiry of the initial probationary period.

Explanation I. If no orders have been made by the day following the completion of the initial probationary period the probation shall be deemed to have been extended.

Explanation II. If no orders have been made by the day on which the maximum period of probation expires, the probationer shall, subject to the provisions of sub-rule (4) be deemed to have been confirmed in his appointment from the date his probation was last extended or deemed to have so extended."

6. We have also seen the order of dismissal which simply mentions that the appellants were being removed due to unsatisfactory work and such mention was in accord with the above rule.

7. Having heard the learned counsel and examined the impugned judgment of the learned Tribunal, we find that no exception can be taken to the judgment of the learned Tribunal. The appeals are accordingly dismissed.

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