' Respondents No,1 and 2, being the owners of residential plots situated in Model Town Scheme, Bahawalpur and residing there in their respective houses built thereon filed a suit for declaration and permanent injunction to challenge a resolution dated 2.2-2-1986 passed by the Municipal Committee which aimed at the recreation park in the Colony being put to use for residential purposes so as to bring about a radical change in the character of the plan and result in a substantial alteration, of the scheme at the hands of Municipal Committee which, it was asserted, did not have any right to do. Alongwith the suit, an application was also filed for grant of a temporary injunction to restrain the said resolution from being effectuated through a Sub- Committee or otherwise to change the nature and character of the park. The suit appears to still have to go through the trial but by his order dated 15-10-1986 learned Civil Judge declined the temporary injunction for the reason that there did not appear a locus standi in the plaintiffs, for the suit and proceeded on the assumption also that the property in dispute vested in the Municipal Committee who was entitled to put it to public use so that balance of convenience also appeared against the plaintiffs whose interest could not be regarded dearer than that of 112 families who were intended to be benefited by the change in contemplation.
2. An appeal there against, filed by the plaintiffs was heard by a learned Additional District Judge who, concluded on the authority of a Division Bench judgment in a case, Saeen Muhammad and 2 others v. Govt. Of Punjab and 3 others PLD 1979 Lah.67, that the plaintiffs prima fade had the locus standi to file the suit and challenge the proposed action of the Committee. Therein, Mian Fazal Din v. Lahore Improvement Trust, Lahore and another (PLD 1969 SC 223) had been relied upon for a similar conclusion. Learned Additional District Judge thus found that the plaintiffs had a case and the questions of balance of convenience and likehood of suffering irreparable loss also leaned in their favour because with the refusal of the temporary injunction the contemplated change in the nature of the property will stand brought about. Consequently, he set aside the order of the Civil Judge and accepting the appeal by his judgment dated 18-12-1986 granted the temporary injunction restraining the defendants from proceeding with the implementation of the resolution impugned in the suit and making further allotments of the disputed property and proceeding with the constructions over it.
3. Private defendants in the suit have come up to this Court onrevision wherein the two plaintiffs, the Municipal Committee, its Chairman and three Councillors, who appeared to have been assigned the job of allotment of plots by forming a Sub-Committee, were impleaded as respondents.
4. In view of the importance of the dispute I had heard the Chairman of the Municipal Committee on 25-1-1987 to assess the magnitude of the implications of the controversy. He stated before me that all that was being done was to put the existing disorderly habitat of squatterers into proper shape with a view to providing civic amenities at the spot and although there had been made some alterations in the areas under their occupations, yet the location of their Abadi was not under contemplation to be shifted. Consequently, I have today heard the plaintiff-respondents also who have emphatically challenged the said assertion of the Chairman with reference to the impugned resolution which clearly contemplates grant of alternate land to certain occupants of a locality which was intended to be got cleared for some other purpose.
5. Be the above as it may, this is not the stage to enter into a deeper appreciation of the merits and.
Demerits of the controversy, which will come up for consideration in due course in the suit itself. In this proceeding, I am concerned with the mere question whether the learned Additional District Judge has erred in passing the impugned order which pertains to the domain of the discretionary jurisdiction. Manifestly enough, he has regulated his discretion upon due consideration of the settled rules fore the purpose and his order cannot be termed as being either arbitrary or fanciful within the scope of the rule of law laid down in Shahzada Muhammad Umar Beg v. Sultan Mahmood Khan and another (PLD 1970 SC 139), as reaffirmed in Kanwal Nain and 3 others v. Fateh Khan and others (PLD 1983 SC 53), and, hence, it does not become amenable to the exercise of revisional jurisdiction.
6. This Civil Revision does not have merit and is accordingly dismissed in limine.