DECISION These two appeals are directed against the orders passed under Standing Order 18 to the Schedule of the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968 (hereinafter called the Standing Orders Ordinance). A preliminary objection has been taken by the learned Representatives for the respondents that the appeals are not maintainable as the orders passed under Standing Order 18 of the Standing Orders Ordinance are final.
2. In order to appreciate the contentions of the learned Representatives of the parties, it would be useful to trace the history of Standing, Order 18 of the Standing Orders Ordinance. In the Industrial Disputes Legislations of 1947. 1959 and 1969, an individual workman had no redress even if the employer committed any breach of the provisions of the Standing Orders Ordinance. . Under the Legislations of 1947, 1959 and 1969, the only cower that the Legislature conferred on an individual workman was against violation of the terms or conditions of his service. A decision against it was also appeal able. There was agitation by the labour for more power to individual workman. The individual workman, it was urged, should not' be left in all matters at the mercy of the Union.
Moreover, dispute raised by the Union was to be disposed of as an industrial dispute and took very long time for its decision. Even if the Union was successful the labour could not get the benefit of the decision because of the provision of appeal. The Legislature in order to meet the long standing grievance of the labour enacted Standing Order 18 of the Standing Orders Ordinance.
2. Standing Order 18 of the Standing Orders Ordinance lays down the grievance procedure for the workmen. Under the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Ordinance an industrial dispute can only be raised by the workmen collectively or by a Trade Union on their behalf and this forms the very essence of the law of industrial disputes. Standing Order 18 of the Standing Orders Ordinance strikes at the root of collective bargaining and gives an individual workman who has a grievance in respect of any matter under the Standing Orders Ordinance, to seek redress 1n the manner specified therein and ultimately A move the Industrial Court for redress. The Legislature prescribed a procedure to expeditiously dispose of the application. Under Standing Order 18(d), the decision of the Court on an appli--cation under Standing Order 18 of the Standing Orders Ordinance was to be final.
3. It would appear from a perusal of Standing Order 18 that it not only confers a quick remedy on the workman, but also prescribes the procedure, which is a summary one. The intention behind Standing Order 18 of the Legislature was to redress the grievances of the workmen as quickly as possible. It also confers finality oh the order passed under Standing Order 1,8 of the Standing Orders Ordinance. It contemplates that the workmen or the employer should not be harassed twice by litigation.
4. Messrs A. R. Kazi and M. A. Ghani, for the appellants, raised the following points in support of their, contention that the appeal was maintainable:-
(1) That the impugned orders were passed after the repeal of Standing Order 18 of the Standing Orders Ordinance, and after the promulgation of section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 (hereinafter called the Ordinance). The contention being that Standing Order, having been repealed should be taken to have been substitued by section 25-A of the Ordinance. An order under section 25-A of the Ordinance is appealable.
(2) That there being no saving clause while repealing Standing Order 18, the proceedings under Standing Order 18 should be deemed to have abated.
(3) That under section 8 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, any reference to the repealed enactment be construed as references to the provisions so re-enacted. .
(4) That provisions governing appeal should be given liberal construction in favour of the right.
(5) Lastly, it was contended that there will be anomaly,, those making an application under Standing Order 18, would be debarred from challenging the decision against themselves, while those making an application under section 25-A of the Ordinance could appeal against the decision.
5. In order to appreciate the contentions of the learned Representatives for the parties, it would be useful to reproduce a passage from a well-known case of the Privy Council. The Colonial Sugar Refining Company Limited v. Irving (1905 A C 369): "On the other hand, if it be more than a matter of procedure, if it touches a right in existence at the passing of the Act, it was conceded that, in accordance with a long line of authorities extending from the time ' of Lord Coke to the present day, the appellants would be entitled to succeed. The Judiciary Act is not retrospective by express enactment or by necessary intendment. And therefore the only question is, was the appeal to His Majesty in Council a right vested In the appellants at the date of the passing of the Act, or was it a mere matter of procedure? It seems to their Lordships that the question does not admit of doubt. To deprive a suitor in a pending action of an appeal to a superior tribunal which belonged to him as of right is a very different thing from regulating procedure. In principle, their Lordships see no difference between abolishing an appeal altogether and transferring the appeal to a now tribunal. In either case there is an interference with existing rights contrary to the well-known general principle that statutes are not to be held to act retrospectively unless a clear intention to that effect is manifested."
6. The first question is as to whether Standing Order 18 of the standing Orders Ordinance confers any vested right on a workman. It confers a valuable right on the workman to ventilate his grievance in case of violation of any provision of the Standing Orders Ordinance. This to my mind is a vested right of the workman. It cannot be taken away unless there be something express or implied whereby the vested right was taken away by the repealing enactment. No such provision has been pointed out by the learned Representatives for the respondents.
7. It is true that the impugned order was passed after Standing Order 18 was repealed, but in the absence of anything specific a vested right cannot be taken away by another piece of Legislation.
In this connection, it may be mentioned that the right of the workman under Standing Order 18 of they Standing Orders Ordinance was confined to the violation of the; provisions of the Standing Orders Ordinance along while under section 25-A of the Ordinance a workman had much wider, power to ventilate his grievances in respect of any right guaranteed or secured to him by or under any law, award or settlement there is nothing under section 25-A of the ordinance to treat the application under Standing Order 18 of the Standing Orders' Ordinance to be one under section 25- A of the ordinance.
8. There is no force in the contention that the application under Standing Order 18 should be construed under section 25-AI of the Ordinance. Section 8 of the General Clauses Act contemp-- lates repeal of certain provision of an enactment and re-- enactment of the same with or without modification. If that takes place then any reference to the repealed enactment can be construed as reference to the provision so re-enacted. This is not the case here. Standing Order 18 of the Standing Orders Ordinance has altogether been repealed and no similar pro--vision in the Standing Orders Ordinance with or without modification has been introduced. Section 25-A of the Ordinance is a new provision in the Industrial Relations Ordinance, much wider in scope than Standing Order 18. Moreover, there is no provision in the Ordinance in which reference has been made to Standing Order 18, so that it may be construed to refer to section 25-A of the Ordinance.
9. It is true statutes pertaining to the right of appeal should be given a liberal construction in favour of the right. Toe answer to this question would depend upon the construction of Standing Order 18 of the Standing Orders Ordinance. If the answer be that Standing Order 18 confers a vested right in the finality of the order passed under the said provision of law, the question of-appeal would not arise. I am of the view, consi--dering the nature of the provision of Standing Order 18, that the right as to the finality of the order passed under the said $ provision of law is a vested right. The intention of the Legislature being to expeditiously redress the grievance of the workman and to confer finality on the order passed to avoid delay and harassment.
10. There is not much force in the contention that there is anomaly, inasmuch as the appeal would lie against orders passed under section 25-A of the Ordinance, while appeal would not lie against orders passed on an application under Standing Order 18 of the Standing Orders Ordinance. There is no anomaly. Application under Standing Order 18 was limited to violation of any of the provisions of the Standing Orders Ordinance. While the application under section 25-A of the P Ordinance is of much wider scope, a workman may make an application in respect of any right guaranteed or secured to him by or under any law or any award or settlement. The Legislature considering the wide scope of section 25-A of the Ordinance made the order passed therein appealable. The question of anomaly would now hardly arise as Standing Order 18, having been repealed, applications would now be only under section 25-A of4he Ordinance. I would, for the reasons given above, hold that the orders passed under Standing Order 18 are not appealable. Appeals are accordingly dismissed.