1. ' M.A. RASHID, J.--Petitioner Malik Muhammad Hassan challenges the orders of respondents Nos. 1 to 3 whereby he has been stopped from excavating a well in Mauza Sinjdi of Quetta Tehsil.
2. ' The petitioner started excavating a well in his Mauza. Due to rocky surface the same could not be successful. Consequently he moved 100 feet aside and started excavation of a new well.
3. Respondent No.4 Habibullah objected to it and filed a civil suit under the Civil Procedure (Special Provisions) Ordinance, 1968, hereinafter called the Ordinance before Assistant Commissioner, Quetta, exercising powers of Deputy Commissioner under the Ordinance. At the same time he requested the Assistant Commissioner for directing stoppage of the excavation, pending the suit.
4. The Assistant Commissioner not only directed the stoppage of the well but also directed that the petitioner as well as the contractor, one Faiz Muhammad, should he arrested. An appeal was filed before the Commissioner Quetta Division against such orders of the Assistant Commissioner. This appeal was dismissed by the learned Commissioner by his brief order of 28th January, 1978. A revision was filed before the learned Member Board of Revenue in which the contention raised was that the orders of staying the excavation of the well pending the suit, was without lawful authority and of no legal effect, in as much as no such power vested in the Deputy Commissioner. The learned Member Board of Revenue by his order dated 11th February, 1978 held that the order of Assistant Commissioner dated 9th January, 1978, as well as the orders of Commissioner dated 28th January, 1978 were void as they run counter to the provisions of law. Such orders were. Therefore, set aside. It was directed that the case may be referred to a properly constituted tribunal. In the meantime, however, it was ordered that the work on the well should be stopped.
5. ' In his counter-affidavit respondent No. 4 contends that since the filing of the petition a new development has taken place inasmuch as the learned Assistant Commissioner had constituted a tribunal to examine the question of grant of temporary injunction. According to the findings arrived at by such tribunal, a fresh order was passed by the Assistant Commissioner on 26th of March, 1978, restraining the petitioner from carrying out the excavation of the said well pending the decision of the suit.
6. ' Another allegation is that the well being excavated by the petitioner is situated on State land and that such State land is in the SARANA or MAHAZ of the land belonging to respondent No.4 and not to that of the petitioner. The contention of the petitioner is to the contrary. The respondent has filed such documents which relate to the finding of the Revenue Authorities with respect to the MAHAZ of the two contesting parties. As this is purely a question of fact, beyond writ jurisdiction of this Court, therefore, we would not like to express any opinion about it. This is also because the matter is in dispute between the parties in the suit pending before the Assistant Commissioner.
7. ' However the contention raised by Mr. I.H.B. Hanafi, the learned counsel for the petitioner, is that the Ordinance does not envisage grant of a temporary injunction. The first contention raised in this behalf by the learned counsel is that the Deputy Commissioner, and the tribunal constituted under the Ordinance, are in the nature of Special tribunals, therefore, their jurisdiction is to be construed strictly in accordance with statutes conferring it. This Tribunal as well as the Deputy Commissioner have not been conferred any powers of grant of interim injunction, therefore, they should be deemed to be completely divested of any such powers. In this connection the learned counsel relies upon Karamat Ali v. Muhammad Younus Haji PLD 1963 SC 191 and Nasim Silk Industries v.
8. Sind Labour Court 1977 PLC 489. The first of the authority is not relevant to the facts of the present case because it lays down the rule that if a tribunal of special jurisdiction can exercise jurisdiction, if a certain states of facts exists, then it also has the jurisdiction to determine that such state of facts actually exists or not. However, the second judgment relied upon by Mr. Hanafi is more to the point. In this case a learned single Judge of the then Sind and Baluchistan High Court has held that the jurisdiction of a tribunal is fettered by the statute under which it is created, and if it exceeds the conditions for the exercise of its jurisdiction, its orders, will be void. There is no cavil with this proposition of law. A tribunal has to act within the four corners of the statutes which creates it. It does not have any inherent jurisdiction, unlike the ordinary civil courts, nor can it travel beyond the specific limits placed on its jurisdiction by the statute. If, therefore, a jurisdiction is not specifically conferred on a tribunal it cannot exercise it, and if it does so the orders passed beyond such jurisdiction are a nullity in the eyes of law. But the question would be if the tribunal under the Ordinance has or does not have any jurisdiction to grant an interim injunction or a temporary relief.
9. ' So far as the Deputy Commissioner under the Ordinance is concerned there is no doubt that he does not have any such jurisdiction. In this connection we may refer to an unreported judgment in C.P. No.10 of 1972 Haji Sultan Muhammad v. Haji Syed Taj Muhammad, where a Division Bench of the then Sind and Baluchistan High Court held that a Deputy Commissioner under the Ordinance, being a mere referring authority, has no powers to issue an injunction or take any other steps.
10. However, their Lordships did not express any opinion as to such powers being available to the Tribunal. They declared that such jurisdiction "may be available to the Tribunal but at this stage we are not going to decide that question as neither it arises nor it has been argued before us". In view of this state of law there is no doubt that the Deputy Commissioner, does not have any jurisdiction to grant any interim stay.
11. ' But the question is if the Tribunal is also divested of such powers. According to section 4 of the Ordinance 1 of 1968 the Deputy Commissioner is bound to refer, by an order in writing, the dispute between the parties, to the Tribunal constituted under the said section. This section refers to a 'dispute'. But as against that, sections 6, 8 and 10 of the Ordinance do not refer to a 'dispute', but to 'a matter or issue'. Section 6 deals with a situation where a Tribunal declines, or fails to give a finding on any matter or issue. It does not speak of the dispute referred to it. Similarly section 8 lays down the procedure to be followed by the Tribunal. It also declares that for the purpose of coming to a finding on a matter or issue referred to it the Tribunal has to give opportunity to the parties to appear before it and to be heard. Similarly when the finding of the Tribunal is submitted under section 10 such findings are referred to as 'findings on a matter or issue' referred to the Tribunal.
12. Thus, it is clear that the legislature has used the word 'dispute' and 'matter or issue' interchangeably. If we refer to the meaning of the term we find that according to Blacks' Law Dictionary. A dispute means a conflict or a controversy, a conflict of claim, and right; an assertion of a right, claim or demand, made by one side, and met by contrary claim or allegations on the other. On the other hand the word 'matter' is held to include every proceeding in Court. In words and Phrases legally Defined p. 225 Vol. 3 Lord Hanworth in quoted to have dealt with the word 'matter' and held that what is referred to is not merely a dispute or the dispute which may have arisen, but it is the matter in dispute; the word 'matter' to my mind connoting a rather wider term than a 'dispute', or 'the dispute' and being equivalent to matters 'in difference', which is always been held in arbitration to be the widest words". Thus, it is seen that, the word 'matter' has a much wider meanings than the word dispute.
13. ' The word "issue", as it is used in legal terminology, means the point in question, arising out of pleadings in an action, when one side affirms and the other denies. According to Shorter Oxford Dictionary it means a point on the decision of which something depends or is made to rest; a point or matter in contention, or which remains to be decided.
14. ' The words 'dispute', 'matter' and 'issue', as used by the legislature in the above referred to provision of the Ordinance, are interchangeable, and have been used as such. Basically they convey the same thing, but the difference lies in the degree and the extent of their scope. The word dispute might refer to the principal point of difference between the contending parties, but use of the word "matter" enlarges the scope of the dispute, so as to embrace even things ancillary and incidental to the dispute. The question of grant of a stay may not fall under the term "dispute", if we give restrictive meanings to the term, but surely it would fall within the term "matter". In this view of the matter, there is always jurisdiction with the Deputy Commissioner to refer, to the Tribunal, a question regarding grant of an interim injunction; and so also with the Tribunal to consider such question and give its findings on it. Upon receipt of such findings the Deputy Commissioner has again the jurisdiction to pass appropriate orders in exercise of powers conferred upon him by section 10 of the Ordinance. Such orders, like any other orders passed under the Ordinance, would be appealable, and subject to revision, as the case may be.
15. ' There is another aspect of the matter, grant of an Inteirm relief or the making of an interim order is part of the working of the judicial system and no separate specific provision is necessary to empower a Court or a Tribunal to issue such interim orders. This is the view taken by a Division Bench of the Lahore High Court in Choudhry Textile Mill Ltd. v. Central Board of Revenue PLD 1976 Lah.
16. 1392.
17. ' In Commissioner Khairpur Division v. Ali Sher PLD 1971 SC 242, their Lordships of the Supreme Court, while examining the provisions of West Pakistan Control of Goondas Ordinance, 1959, held that the power to suspend the operation of an order passed by the Tribunal under section 13, 14 or 18 of that Ordinance is ancillary to the power conferred upon the Commissioner to discharge the person complained against, till final adjudication, no matter if such power is not conferred specifically on the appellate authority. In another case of Sind Employer Social Security v. Adamjee Cotton Mills PLD 1975 SC 32, the scope of section 59 of the West Pakistan Employees' Social Security Ordinance, 1965 was examined. This section confers simple powers of appeal upon an appropriate social security Court. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed that the power to grant interim relief is ancillary and incidental to the main appellate jurisdiction, expressly conferred by the statute and is, therefore, available to the appellate authority. Same view was expressed earlier by the Supreme Court in Sardar Shah Bukhari v. Chief Justice and Judges of the High Court of West Pakistan PLD 1965 SC 479.
18. ' In view of this state of the law I have no hesitation in holding that the Tribunal under the Ordinance has always the power to give its finding on a question or issue referred to it with respect of the grant of an ad interim relief. Therefore, I find no force in this petition, which is dismissed accordingly. Parties are however, left to bear their respective costs.